arbitrarily in this inftance, as well as in any other cafe, for any thing we know, or can fhew to the contrary. That is, notwithstanding those fupernatural operations were wrought to prove what Mofes declared to be true; yet, Mofes might be but an impoftor; because God might, in this cafe, as an inftance of his arbitrary pleasure, either ufe his own power, or permit fome other invifible agent to exert fuch power, for the confirmation of this impofition. I fay, this may be the cafe, for any thing we know. For, as God is here fuppofed fometimes to act arbitrarily; fo this may be juch an inftance of his arbitrary pleasure, feeing we have no rule by which we can judge when he acts thus, and when he acts otherwise.

If it fhould be urged, that fuch a conduct, viz. the ufing of his power, or the fuffering other invifible agents to use theirs, for the confirmation of a lie, in a matter of fuch importance, is inconfiftent with God's moral perfections. I anfwer, fo is every other inftance of arbitrary pleasure. And therefore, if an argument drawn from God's moral perfections is conclufive in one cafe, it must be fo in every cafe; and, if fuch an argument is inconclufive in one inftance, it will be fo in every inftance. And from hence I think it plainly appears, what a precarious foot the divinity of every religion ftands upon, which is built upon revela tion, fuppofing God acts arbitrarily, as aforefaid; becaufe from hence it evidently appears impoffible, in the nature of things, to prove any revelation to be divine, upon this principle. Befides, fuppofing we could be able to prove a revelation to be divine, upon the prefent fuppofition, yet still we should be in a very evil cafe; because God might, as an inftance of his arbitrary pleasure, actually deceive us himself, as well as leave us in the hands of other deceivers. And this leads me

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to ask of those men (who maintain that God fometimes acts arbitrarily) how they can certainly know, what will please God, and what are the fure grounds upon which they build their trust and confidence in him? If they fay, that divine revelation is the rule of their actions, and the ground of their confidence, alas! this, in confequence of their own principles, is like that broken reed Egypt (if I may be allow'd to use the Prophet's expreffion) upon which, if a man lean, it may difappoint his truft. For, if God fometimes acts arbitrarily, as in this cafe he is under no restraint; fo he must be perfectly at liberty to deceive his creatures, whenfoever he pleafes; and confequently, the foundation of certainty, with regard to revelation-evidence, is taken away upon this principle. And this leads me to put to those men their own question, which I will leave them to answer: What, has not God a right to do what he will with his own? which is the fame as to fay, may he not deceive his own creatures, if he pleafes? But I perfuade myself, that the greatest advocates for arbitrarinefs in God will not allow that he is equally difpofed to reveal the truth or a lie; and that he does either of these at pleasure; but, on the contrary, they will be ready to affirm, that the fupreme Being is a God of truth, whe cannot lie; and therefore is the proper object of their trust. Which, if there be any meaning or confiftency in their words, is the fame as to fay, that truth, in the present cafe, is fo preferable to deceit and falfhood, that God cannot but be difpofed, from the reafon of the thing, to prefer the former before the latter, and to govern his actions accordingly. But then, I must take the freedom to turn their argument upon them; by obferving, that, if God is always difpofed to reveal the truth from the moral fitness of fuch a con

duct,

dud, and therefore is the proper object of our confidence; then, I fay, with equal reason, that he act agreeably to the moral fitnefs of things in every other cafe; because the reason holds as strong, and therefore will have as great an influence upon him to direct his practice in one cafe as in another. And confequently, he will be as much difpofed, from the reafon of the thing, to do what is right and fit in every cafe; as he is to reveal the truth in any declaration or promife he makes to his crea

tures.

If it fhould be urged, allowing that God does make the moral fitnefs of things the measure of of his actions in all those cafes in which that fitnefs can be a rule to him; yet feeing men are liable to make a wrong judgment, therefore it must be right to fubmit to every divine command, because the command would not be given, if there were not an antecedent fitness in the thing commanded; and that this was the cafe of Abraham when he was required to offer his fon in facrifice, in which cafe Abraham could not fee the fitnefs of fuch an action, because it had the appearance of the contrary. I anfwer, as God fees thro' and to the end of things, and thereby has a perfect view of all the circumftances and confequences which attend our actions; fo he must fee wherein the fitness or unfitness of every action lies; and confequently must be a much better judge, in many cafes, than man can poffibly be whofe views are vaftly contracted. And, therefore, I fay, that in all those cafes in which there is no apparent unfitness, and where we are fatisfied of the di vinity of the command, there this will be a reafon for our compliance; and if we should be under a delufion in judging the command to be divine, when in reality it is not, yet the delufion would not be hurtful. But, if the thing commanded appears

appears to us morally unfit, then there is not any thing which can give us a reasonable fatisfaction that the commandment is divine, because here is the highest presumption to the contrary. It is not enough to fay, in this cafe, that our judgment ought to fubmit to the infallible judgment of God, with regard to the fitnefs of the thing commanded, because that would be to take the thing for granted which is in difpute; the prefent question not being, whether our judgment ought to come in competition with the judgment of our Maker, but only, whether the command in question is of a divine original, or not. Befides, if our judg ment, of the fitnefs of things, is to be left out of the cafe, then we are laid open to the most burtful and ridiculous impofitions. For if we should urge the cruelty, and barbarity, and the like, of any inftitution, as an argument against its divinity, the fame answer may be as juftly returned in every cafe, namely, that tho' thefe may appear morally unfit to us, yet it may be otherwife with regard to God, and that therefore we ought to fubmit our judgment to the judgment of our Maker, To this I may add, that if fuch a cafe should happen, as that the thing commanded has the appearance of unfitnefs, when in reality it is otherwife, every wife and good governour will do all that is neceffary to fecure obedience, and confequently will give the reafon of the command as well as the command itself, and thereby cut off that exception against obedience, which otherwise the command would be liable to. And, as God can have no end to answer in giving fuch commands, but purely the good and benefit of his creatures; fo he will, moft certainly, not only give the command, but also reveal the reason, and thew the fitnefs of it; feeing this is abfolutely neceffary to cut off all disputes, which other

wife may justly arife, whether the command is divine, or not.

As to the cafe of Abraham, I think, with fubmiffion, that the thing commanded was in itself morally unfit, and that God gave the command, not with an intent that it fhould be obeyed, but that he might take an occasion from it, to fhew to Abraham, and to all his pofterity, the unfitness of all human facrifices. And that this was the cafe is, I think, evident from the event. For as the command was given to Abraham to be a tryal of his integrity, fo when that end was anfwer'd, and Abraham had fhewn a fteady resolution that he would deny himfelf in fo fignal an inftance, rather than neglect to do what he judged to be his duty, then God recalled the command, and thereby teftified his dislike, and fhewed the unfitness of all fuch practices.

But that I may go to the bottom of all, and thereby remove what may be a foundation for objection in the present cafe, I beg leave to observe, that government, properly fo called, or government, whofe fitnefs is founded in the nature of things, is no other than the exercise of power, for the benefit of thofe that are governed; and governours are no other than guardians of the happiness of those whofe governours they are. So that if thofe, who have the reins of government in their hands, imploy their power otherwife than for the good of thofe they have under their care, this is the abuse of power; this is tyranny, and not go vernment, ftrictly speaking; and all inftances of mere fovereignty, that is, of power fhewn for the fake of fhewing it, and not for the good of those who are fubjected to it; I fay, all fuch inftances are manifeftations not, of the wisdom and goodness, but of the weakness and vanity of the legiflator. The cafe is the fame, whether we confider go