in his principal. If what St. Paul faith fhould be urged in this cafe, viz. that all things were made by him, and for him (to rule over.) I anfwer, they were made for him (to rule over) when God fhould give the right of dominion into his hand, as he hath done under the gofpel difpenfation. Suppose a man fhould build an houfe by his agent for himself to live in for a year, and for his agent to live in when that year fhould be expired, I think it might be truly faid of this agent, that the house was built by him, and for him (to live in) tho' he did not live in it fo foon as it was built, and tho' his right of habitation was not founded upon his being the builder, but wholly upon the grace and bounty of his principal. So in like manner, if God created this world by Jefus Chrift, and for Jefus Chrift to rule over, when he should give the right of dominion into his hand, as in this cafe all things would be made by him, and for him, fo his right of dominion would not be founded in the act of creation, but wholly and folely upon the grace and bounty of his principal. Again I obferve, if the world was created by the effential power of the Father only, as Mr. Claggett fuppofes, and if the effential power of the Father is the very Father, as I have fhewed it is, and if the Son was not an agent in that work; then it will follow, that he was not a co-efficient in either; for as there must be two working together to conftitute a co-efficient, and as the effential power of the Father, which is the very Father, and which is but one, and is not a fecond, is the fole efficient cause of the creation; fo from hence it will follow, by an unavoidable confequence, that there can be no fuch thing as a co-efficient in the cafe. There is an efficient in the effential power of the Father, which is the very Father; but there is not a co-efficient, ber

caufe

cause the effential power of the Father, which is the very Father, is but one, and is not a fecond. Upon the whole, I obferve, that if creating power is incommunicable, as Mr. Claggett fuppofes, from hence it will follow, that the real Son of the Father never had fuch a power; for if the Father could not give it, the Son could not receive it. And if he never had fuch a power, then he never exercised it, because he could not exercise a power which he had not. And from hence will arife two confequences, first, that I was under a mistake when I afcribed creation power, and creation work, to the Son of God: which error I am ready to retract whenfoever it can be proved to me that he could not, or that he did not exercise it. The fecond confequence is this, that thofe places of scripture, wherein creation work is afcribed to the Son, are to be understood, not in a proper, but in a figurative fenfe: not of the natural creation, which Mofes hath given the hiftory of, but of that fpiritual creation, which Ifaiah prophefied fhould be effected under the gofpel. And if my afcribing creation work to Chrift, in a proper sense, is an error, it was my mifapplying those texts which speak about it that led me into that error. I applied them to the natural creation, when, upon this foot of argument, I ought to have applied them to the moral or fpiritual creation. I was, in this cafe, like Nicodemus, who, when our Lord told him, that a man must be born again, or elfe he could not fee the kingdom of God, prefently applied this to the natural birth, when he ought to have applied it to the fpiritual birth. So in like manner, when I read, that God created all things by Ffus Chrift; that all things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made; that all things in heaven and in earth were made by him, and

for

for him, I haftily applied this to the natural creation; whereas if creating power is incommunica ble, as Mr. Claggett fuppofes, then I ought to have applied it to the moral or spiritual creation.

fort

I now proceed to enquire, whether the perfon of Chrift could be a man, upon my principles. I need not follow Mr. Claggett through that long discourse, nor enter into all thofe questions which * Mr. Towgood's manufçript hath furnished him with; and which I have already anfwer'd, in my obfervations on the manufcript referr'd to, and on Mr. Towgood's letter. For the full stating of this queftion, I obferve, that as God hath produced a multitude of things, and as mankind have for ufe or vanity encreased their number, fo these things are ranged or diftinguifh'd into forts, and every fort comes under a particular denomination or name, by which denomination or name every (in our speaking about them) is diftinguish'd or known from all other forts of things. And as they are thus diftinguifh'd into forts, fo there is fomething peculiar to each fort, which is the foundation of that diftinction, and that is made the ftandard of that fort of thing, because it is that, and that only, which makes an effential difference between it and all other forts of things. And as there is fomething peculiar to each fort of thing, which is made the standard of that fpecies, fo that peculiarity is always known, with refpect to all thofe fpecies of things which come within our cognifance, and of which we are capable of judging whether things belong to their fpecies or not; for otherways we fhould never be able to diftinguifh one thing from another, nor know what fpecies things belong to. Thus for example, if the ftandard of the fpecies of gold was fome

*The manufcript, referred to, contained animadverfions on the fupremacy of the Father, by Mr. Towgood, a diffent. ing teacher at Wilton."

I

unknown quality in that metal, then it would follow, that we could not know whether any piece of metal was gold, or not; because we could not discover whether that quality was in it, or not, which is made the standard of that fpecies. To apply this to the cafe in hand. I think, with fubmiffion, that the true and only standard of the fpecies of mankind, is this, viz. only one individual intelligent rational fpirit, fo united to only one individual human body, as that thefe two in their united state do conftitute one individual perfon; I fay, one, and only one of each of thefe, in their united state, does conftitute a man, properly fo called; because Adam, the firft man, and all the men that ever fprang out of his loins, as far as we ever had any knowledge of them, were conftituted of only one of each of thefe, united as aforefaid. Now as this ftandard confifts in fomething khown, as the ftandard of all fuch fpecies muft do which comes within our cognifance, fo I can eafily judge who is a man, and who is not; and therefore, when I find a perfon, conftituted as a forefaid, I pronounce him a man; because I find that in him which is made the ftandard of that fpecies and thus I prove Adam to be a man, and David to be a man, and Chrift to be a man, and Mr. Claggett to be a man; because I find, in each of thefe, that which is made the ftandard of the fpecies of mankind. But if I put by this standard, and fet up fomething which is unknown in its ftead, then I am utterly at a lofs to know who is a man, and who is not; and confequently, for ought I know, Adam might not be a man, nor David, nor Chrift might be men; because I cannot tell whether they had that in them which is made the standard of that fpecies. And I think it will be a difficult thing for Mr. Claggett to prove, that either, or all of these before mention'd were men,

upon

upon any other grounds than those I have laid down. If the fhould reply, that the fcriptures declare Adam to be a man, and David, and Chrift to be men; let him remember, that in his opinion, this is no proof of the cafe, by his own declaration in the cafe of the angels that appear'd to Lot, with refpect to which he tells me, as from Mr. Whiston, that the fcriptures fometimes fpeak of things, not according to what they really are, but according to what they appear to be; and confequently, all that the fcriptures prove in the cafe is, that Adam, David, and Chrift, appear'd to be men, but they by no means prove them to be really fo.

If the fhould farther urge, that each of thefe had an human foul, and fo they were men; becaufe an human foul and an human body, proper ly united, do conftitute a man, properly fo called; and the perfons before mention'd partaking of each of thefe, in their united ftate, were men in the proper fenfe of that term. I anfwer, this brings me to confider the standard of the fpecies of human fouls, which, as it must be fomething known, or elfe it is impoffible that we can ever know who has an human foul, and who has not, fo the ftandard of this fpecies I take to be only this, viz. the union of an intelligent rational fpirit -to an human body, as aforefaid. Here I make the ftandard of the fpecies of human fouls, to confift only in the relation, which an intelligent rational fpirit ftands in to an human body, which relation, is founded in its union, as aforefaid. And according to this ftandard I can prove, that Adam had an human foul, and that David and Christ had each of them an human foul, because, upon examination, I find that each of these had intelligent rational spirits, united to human bodies, as afore-faid: and fo they had that in them which is made -the standard of the fpecies of human fouls. But