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„6y the will and pleasure Of another. Thus gaarl etians and masters have authority over those chil j dren who are committed to their care; but thett "this authority is not natural but derived, it is lodged in them as a trust, by those who are naturally invested with authority, as aforefaid. And, . As authority is thus distinguished into natural and derived j ib the agents or governours who evercise it, are distinguished by difserent characters npon that account,. viz. supreme and subordinate. Supreme governours are such as are naturally invested with authority, and who have constituted others to exercise that authority, either in whole or in part under them, and in their place and stead: and these are called supreme in distinction from, and in opposition to all those who. ex* ercise a delegated authority, under them. Subordi^ nate governours are all such as exercise a delegated authority, as aforefaid; and they are called sub* ordinate in distinction from, and in opposition to those who are the fountains of authority to them. So that when I fay, the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, is a Being inseriour, and [subordinate.] I intend to express, that the authority which hfe .is invested with, is not natural but derived. That is, he is not invested with it from any natural relation he stands in to us; but it is commited to him as a trust, by him, who is the common parent of us all: and therefore he, viz. the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, is, in point of authority, subordinate to that fountain of authority. viz. his God and Father from whom he derived in .Again*
By the [Father] I intend to express that moral agent, or that necessarily existing Being, whom in common language we characterize by the term God; the fame with him who derived his being from none, and who gave being to all things.
And he is called the Father, in contradistinction to our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom he has declared that he is his beloved Son. Again
When I fay that the Father is the supreme God, by the term God, I intend to express both existence, agency, and authority; which is the fame as if I should fay, that the Father is the first and chief Being, and agent; and that he is the first and chief governour, he is the fountain both of being, agency, and authority. Lastly,
By the term [alone] I intend to exclude the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, and every other moral agent, out of the idea of the supreme God, as explained above; excepting only, that necessarily existing Being, who is the Father of God's Son. To him, and to him alone, I do apply the character of supreme God.
So that the whole proposition may be delineated thus the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, is not a mode, property, or the manner of existing of a being, neither a coilition or society of agents, but a Being, that is, one individual moral agent. And this .agent is in point of existence, agency, and all natural persections below or inserior; and in point of authority subordinate to that necesiari* ly existing Being who is his Father. And that the Father alone, exclusive of the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, and of every other moral agent, is the first and chief Being and agent, and the first and chief governour; he alone is the fountain both of being, agency, and authority.
That the Son is a Being inseriour and subordinate to the Father, and that the Father alone' is the supreme God.
First, The Son received his being and existence froik the Father, as the first supreme free cause of that being and existence: consequently, he is inferiour and subordinate to the Father, as every effect is inferiour t o its frst supreme free cause.
T 1 AT the Father is the cause of the Son's
H being, see John iii. 16. For Gcdso loved I he fm World, that he gave his only begotten Son, JL. &c.If the relation of a father to a son, doth not imply the son's receiving his being from that father ; yet certainly the father's begetting of the son, can imply no less. For whatever difserence there may be betwixt begetting, creating, and making of a thing; yet they are all the fame in this, viz. that the thing which is begotten, «reatod, or made, is by that operation really produo u: and if so, then it follows, that the Son received his being and existence from the Father. That the Father is the first supreme cause of the Son's being, is here taken for granted; for if there be a first supreme cause, antecedent to the
Father, then that first cause would justly claim, thecharacter of supreme God. ' And,
As the Father is the first supreme cause of the Son's being, so he is likewise the free cause of thathii being and existence. That is, the Father did not be* get the Son by a necessity of nature, but from the freedom of his will. And this is evident from the nature of the thing. For every thing that acts from a necessityof nature, mustsurely always act the fame* because always under the fame necessity; or rather it would be one continued act through all eternity, * when the being that acts is an eternal being, as the being here reserred to is supposed to be. But it is manisest, that this is not the present case. Because when the scriptures make mention of the begetting or generation of the Son, it is an action > which is past; consequently, it was an act of the Father's will. For if the father begets the Son by-a necessity of nature, then the Son is always begetting, but never is nor will be begotten» The word beget implies the act or operation of. of the Father : the word begotten, implies the per* fecting and finifliing of that act, or of the thing which that act or operation produced, and cons<_« quently the ceasing or discontinuance of that act« Seeing then the scripture speaks of the Son, as a Being, which is already begotten, it will follow, that the Father's act in generating the Son, is past, and that the Son was begotten, not by nc* cessity of nature, but from the freedom of th.z Father's will. So that, if there was such a thing as time, either before or aster the generation of the Son, then his existence sprang not from a ne cessity of nature, but from a freedom of will, But time has taken place since the Son's generation, he having had a real personal existence long since, aad consequently, he owes his being to ths Father's will and pleasure. Again,
John v. 26, As the Father hath life in himself, so hafb he given to the Son, to have life in himself. In this text there are three things asserted, viz. first, ,that the Father hath lise in himself secondly, that the lise of the Son is from the Father ; thirdly, that the lise of the Son is the Father's gift. Now every gift is free and voluntary, and procedes not from a necessity of nature, but from the will of the donor. And, whether we consider the term life, as expressive of that intelligence and effivity which constitutes life in, and to every moral agent, or as a power to convey that lise to others, it alters not the case, because either of them excludes necessary existence from the Son; it being equally absurd, and an impossibility in nature, for the necessarily existing Being, either to receive life and being from another, or a .power to give lise and being to others; such lise and such power being necessarily inherent in the necessarily existing Being. Again,
Col. i. 19, It pleased the Father, that in him (viz. the Son) should all fulness dwell. By all fulness I think the Apostle must be understood to mean, a fulness of natural persections, such as power, know ledge, fefo and a fulness of authority or dominion to be exercised in, and for the good of the Church. This I think, is evident irom the Apostle's discourse, and this fulness in the Son, he declares to arise from the good pleasure of the Father. So that tho the Son is possessed of a fulness of natural persections, and in him are lodged all the treasures of power, wisdom, and knowledge, yet it is manisest from the Scriptures, that these are not in the Son, independent of the Father, but are owing to his good pleasure. And,
Tho there is a fulness of authority in the Son; yet it is manisest, that it is not natural, but derived. For as the God and Father of our Lord Jesus