A. Clearly; it would be prudence in me to get another person bound with a debtor whom I distrusted; but it would be thought loose and unusual language, to say it was prudent to restore a box of jewels intrusted to my care.

Q. In what does the difference consist?

A. In the one case we consider what we shall gain or lose in this world; in the other case, we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come.

Q. Leaving those who would establish a system of morality, independent of a future state, to look out for some different idea of moral obligation, what great questions remain to us?

A. Two; 1. Will there be after this life any rewards and punishments at all? 2. If there be, what actions will be rewarded, and what punished.

Q. What do these questions comprise?

nature.

A. The first comprises, the credibility of Christianity, with the proofs of future retribution from The second, the province of morality. As both questions are too much for one work, the affirmative of the first, though upon it the whole fabric rests, must be taken for granted.

CHAPTER IV.

Q. WHY is an inquiry into the will of God, in any instance, the whole business of morality?

A. Because the will of God is our rule, and there

are two methods of coming at the will of God on any point; 1st, By his express declarations when they are to be had; 2ndly, By what we can discover from his works, or, as we usually call it, the light of

nature.

Q Exemplify the absurdity of separating natural and revealed religion, since both have one objectthe discovery of the will of God.

A. An ambassador, judging by what he knows of his sovereign's disposition and designs, may take his measures in many cases with safety; but if he have his instructions in his pocket, it would be strange not to look into them.

Q. Hume complains of the scheme of uniting Ethics with Christian Theology-do you consider that he succeeds without the latter in his principles of morals?

A. I think a perusal of the ninth section of the essay which contains the practical application of the whole treatise, will show the necessity of additional sanctions. Such as reject Christianity are to make the best shift for a foundation of morality without it; but it appears a great inconsistency in those who receive Christianity, to endeavour to keep out of sight all expectations from it, in their reasonings concerning human duty.

Q. What is the method of coming at the will of God concerning any action by the light of nature?

A. To inquire into the tendency of the action," to promote or diminish the general happiness.

Q. Upon what presumption does this rule pro

ceed?

A. That God wills the happiness of his creatures, consequently that actions promoting that will must be agreeable to him, and the contrary.

Q. As this presumption is the basis of our system, proceed to explain the reasons upon which it rests.

CHAPTER V.

A. I ANSWER this by referring to the Divine benevolence; and say, when God created mankind, he either willed their happiness or misery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about both.

Q. If he had wished our misery, how might he have made sure of his purpose?

A. By forming our senses to be so many pains to us, as they are now instruments of enjoyment, or by placing us amidst objects continually offending, instead of ministering to our refreshment and delight.

Q. What if he had been indifferent about our happiness or misery ?

A. Then we must impute to our good fortune both the capacity of our senses to receive pleasure, and the supply of objects fitted to produce it.

Q. But are not either of these too much to be attributed to accident?

A. Yes; and nothing but the first supposition remains, that God willed the happiness of mankind

at the creation, and provided for them as he has, with that view.

Q. Propose the same argument in different terms.

A. Contrivance proves design, and the predominant tendency of the contrivance indicates the disposition of the Designer. The world abounds with contrivance; and all the contrivances that we know, are directed to beneficial purposes. Evil exists; but is never, that we can perceive, the object of contrivance. Q. Illustrate this line of argument.

A. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache; aching may be incidental to the contrivance, but is not its object. The sickle is not said to be made to cut the fingers, though the mischief sometimes happens. But in instruments of torture, pain is the very object of the contrivance. Nothing of this sort is to be found in the works of nature. No anatomist ever discovered a system of organization calculated to produce pain and disease.

Q. Why must we in reason suppose God's original design for man's happiness to continue?

A. Since he has called forth his consummate wisdom to provide for our happiness, so long as this constitution continues, we must suppose the same design to continue.

Q. Does not the benevolence of the Deity appear from different examples to different persons?

A. Yes; there always appears to be a single example more convincing to each man than all others. I see it most clearly illustrated in the pleasures of a

healthy infant, which are so manifestly provided by another. But the example which strikes each most strongly is the true example for him, and hardly two minds hit upon the same.

Q. We conclude, therefore, that God wills the happiness of his creatures-what liberty does the establishment of this conclusion give?

viz.

A. That of going on with the rule built upon it,

that the method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into its tendency to promote or diminish general happiness."

CHAPTER VI.

Q. So, then, actions are to be estimated by their tendency?

A. Then, whatever is expedient is right; it is the utility alone of any moral rule that constitutes the obligation of it. But to all this there seems a plain objection, viz. that many actions are useful which no man in his senses will allow to be right.

Q. Illustrate this.

A. It may be useful to rob a miser, that his useless wealth may be distributed to the poor-to assassinate a powerful and wealthy oppressor, that his estate may devolve to a benevolent heir to get possession of a seat in parliament by paying or bribery, in order to serve the public more effectually.