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or leaving it to be determined what injustice, extortion, &c. are.

Q. What are these considerations to prove?

A. That the Scriptures do not supersede the use of the science treated of, and at the same time to acquit them of imperfection on that account.

CHAPTER V.

Q. STATE the example given as a test of the moral sense?

A. It is the case of Caius Toranius, who betrayed his father to the officers of the triumvirate. The last moments of the parent were employed in anxious inquiries concerning the health and welfare of his son; and when the executioner informed him that this beloved son was his betrayer, he felt not so much affected by his fate as by the means to which he owed it. Q. What question arises from this?

A. Whether a savage cut off from his infancy from all intercourse with his species, would feel upon the relation any degree of that disapprobation of Toranius conduct which we feel, or not?

Q. Upon what is issue joined in this case?

A. They who maintain the existence of a moral sense, that the perceptions of right and wrong are intuitive, affirm that he would; they who deny the existence of a moral sense, affirm that he would not.

Q. As the experiment has never been made, and

from its difficulty, &c. never is likely to be made, how can the controversy be decided?

A. By judging of the event from probable reasons. Q. How do those on the affirmative side support their position?

A. They say that we approve generosity, gratitude, fidelity, &c, and condemn the contrary without deliberation, without any interest in them, and without being able to give any reason for our approbation, which is uniform and universal-the same conduct being approved or disapproved in all ages and countries in the world.

Q. Mention the arguments opposed to these

A. First, the alleged uniformity is controverted from authentic accounts of historians and travellers, by which we know, that what is held to be vicious or disgraceful in one country or age, is sanctioned and applauded in another; that even amongst ourselves we are far from a perfect consent in our opinions and feelings; that in most instances moral approbation follows the institutions of the country we live in, which arise from the local circumstances of the country, the will of an arbitrary chief, or the caprice of the multitude, all which looks very little like the steady hand of nature.

Q. After these abatements, as it cannot be denied but that some actions are more esteemed than others, how do they account for this approbation of virtue without a moral sense?

A. Thus

Having experienced in some instance

the benefit of a particular conduct to ourselves, a sentiment of approbation ensues, which accompanies the idea of the same conduct, when the private advantage which first excited it no longer exists.

Q. Produce an instance of this continuanee after the reason of it has ceased.

A. That of a rich old miser, without family to provide for, or friend to oblige; yet he is as much overjoyed with gain, or mortified by losses, as when his very subsistence depended upon his success.

Q. The custom of approving certain actions having commenced, is it a difficult thing to explain how it is transmitted and continued?

A. No; for then the greatest part of the approvers of virtue approve it from authority, by imitation, by education, and from the various other causes by which it universally comes to pass, that a society of men touched with the same passion soon communicate to one another a great degree of it: this is the case with most of us, and the cause why the process of association, already described, is little either perceived or wanted.

Q. You have mentioned imitation among the causes of the diffusion of the same moral sentiments, in what class is its efficacy most observable?

A. In children; indeed, if there be any thing in them which deserves the name of an instinct, it is their propensity to imitation. They imitate and apply expressions of affection, aversion, &c.; and when these passions and expressions are connected, the

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passion will follow the expression, and attach to the object to which the child uses to apply the epithet. We do not wonder, then, to find imitation concerned in the generation of our moral sentiments.

Q. Produce instances to show that there are no maxims in the science which can well be deemed innate.

A. I will; since this is another great objection, as no maxims can be assigned which are absolutely true; in other words, which do not bend to circumstances. Veracity, which seems, if any be, a natural duty, is excused in many cases towards an enemy, a thief, or a madman.

Q. State another argument on the same side.

A. Together with this instinct there must have been implanted a precise idea of the object, upon which it was to attach; i. e. if nature prompts the approbation of particular actions, she must also have given a distinct conception of such actions, which we certainly have not received.

Q. But as this argument bears alike against all instincts, and against their existence in brutes as well as in men, and therefore may not be convincing, what do you infer upon the whole ?

A. It seems to me, either that there exist no such instincts as compose what is called the moral sense, or that they are not now to be distinguished from prejudices and habits; on which account they cannot be depended upon in moral reasoning.

Q. Show the facility of making a maxim from the example of Aristotle.

A. He lays down as a self-evident and fundamental maxim, that nature intended barbarians to be slaves. I QUESTION WHETHER THE SAME MAXIM BE NOT STILL SELF-EVIDENT TO THE AFRICAN SLAVE

MERCHANTS. Thus it appears that the laws of custom are very apt to be mistaken for the laws of nature; for which reason I suspect that morality built upon instincts will only find out reasons and excuses for established opinions and practices.

Q. But suppose we admit the existence of these instincts, what, it may be asked, is their authority?

A. It is said, no man can act against them without remorse; but if he chooses to bear with the remorse, or finds the pleasure of sin to exceed the remorse of conscience, of which he alone is the judge, the moral-instinct man has nothing more to offer.

Q. But he may allege, that these instincts are indications of the divine will, and therefore presages of futurity.

A. This, I answer, is to resort to a rule and motive ulterior to the instincts themselves, at which we shall by-and-by arrive by a surer road.

Q. Does not this celebrated question become, in our system, one of curiosity?

A. Purely so; and as such we dismiss it to those who are more inquisitive than we are concerned to be about the natural history and constitution of the human species.

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