ceases with the use and want; so that at his death, the estate reverts to the community. As natural rights cannot expire after the end of a certain number of years, if by the law of nature, a testator has a right to will his property one moment after death, he has the same right for a million of ages, which is absurd.

Q. What were the ancient apprehensions of mankind upon this subject?

A. Conformable to this account of it; for wills have been introduced into most countries by an act of the state; as by the laws of Solon into Greece; by the XII Tables into Rome. According to Tacitus, they were disallowed among the Germans, and since the Conquest, in England, lands could not be devised by will till this privilege was restored by parliament, temp. Hen. 8.

Q. What beneficial purposes result from extending the owner's power over his property beyond his life?

A. It invites to industry; it encourages marriage, and secures the dutifulness of children; but a limit must be assigned to the duration of this power. The utmost extent to which, by our law, entails are allowed to operate, is during the lives in existence at the death of the testator, and 21 years beyond these, after which there are means of setting them aside.

Q. What question may be determined by considering that wills are the creatures of the municipal law, which gives them their efficacy?

A. Whether the intention of the testator in an informal will be binding upon the conscience of those, who, by law, succeed to his estate? Generally speaking, the heir at law is not bound by the intention of the testator, and if a devisee was in possession of an estate, by a will in which a mere technical informality occurred, still he ought to give it up to the heir at law; nor would the heir at law be bound in conscience to resign his claim. For as the law gives the power of devising, any informality vitiates the instrument, and the claim of the heir-at-law comes into operation again.

Q. You would not have reasoned thus, if testamentary dispositions had been founded in natural right? A. No; for then I should have considered the law rather as refusing its assistance to enforce the right of the devisee, than as extinguishing or altering the right itself.

Q. From what does the regard due to kindred in the disposal of our fortune (except the case of lineal kindred which is different) arise ?

A. Either from the respect we owe to the presumed intention of the ancestor from whom we received our fortune, or from the expectations we have encouraged. Whoever, therefore, gives away, without cause, his patrimony from his brother's or sister's family is guilty, not so much of an injury to them, as of ingratitude to his parent.

Q. Is not a man disengaged from the above reasons, when he has done nothing to excite expectation, and his fortune is acquired by himself?

A. Certainly; he is then at liberty to leave his fortune as he will; but there is always a reason for providing for poor relations, because mankind, by an established consent, leave the reduced branches of good families to the bounty of their wealthy alli

ances.

Q. Are there not some effects which render the omission of making a will very culpable?

A. Yes, where it leaves daughters, or younger children, at the mercy of the eldest son; where it leaves an opening for litigation, or where it defrauds creditors; for, he who neglects to provide for their payment, extends, as it were, his sins beyond the grave.

Q. How does the peculiarity in English law happen, viz., that wills, and controversies relating to them, come within the cognizance of ecclesiastical courts ?

A. Anciently, when any one died intestate, the bishop took possession of his fortune to dispose of it in charitable uses for the benefit of the soul of the deceased. It became necessary, therefore, that the bishop should be satisfied of a will's authenticity before he resigned the right arising from intestacy.

Q. Must not succession to intestates be regulated by positive rules of law?

A. Yes, since there is no principle of natural justice whereby to ascertain the proportion of the different claimants. The statutes of Charles the 2nd, which adopt the Roman law in the distribution of personals are sufficiently equitable. They assign one-third to the widow and two-thirds to the children;

in case of no children, one half to the widow, and the other half to the next of kin, &c.

Q. Is the descent of real estates equally reason

able?

A. No-it was settled in ruder times; but there is little reason to complain of a rule which all may avoid, by so easy a provision as that of making his will; otherwise, our law in this respect is chargeable with some flagrant absurdities. Land being not so divisible as money, may be a reason for making a difference; still there ought to be none, but what is founded upon that reason. The Roman law made

none.

BOOK IH.

PART II.

Q. WHAT is the subject of the second Part?
A. Relative duties, which are indeterminate.

CHAPTER I.

Q. WHAT of the first Chapter ?

A. Charity; by which term I mean, neither bounty to the poor, nor benevolence to all mankind; but I apply it in a sense more commodious to my purpose, to signify the promoting of the happiness of our inferiors.

Q. Why do you take charity, in this sense, to be the principal province of virtue and religion?

A. Whilst worldly prudence will direct our beha viour to superiors and politeness to equals, there is little besides duty to produce a proper conduct to inferiors and dependents. There are three methods of promoting their happiness; 1. By the treatment of domestics and dependents. 2. By professional assistance. 3. By pecuniary bounty.

CHAPTER II.

Q. How is charity shown in the treatment of domestics and dependents?

A. Thus a party on a journey, soon find it to be the best for all sides, for one to direct the route, another to take charge of the horses, a third to procure lodgings and entertainment, &c., not forgetting, that as they were each equal when they set out, so they will also be at their journey's end. The same regard, respect, forbearance and mildness, as the director of the journey would show to his companions, ought we to observe towards those who happen to be placed in our power.

Q. What other reflection is there of a like tendency?

A. That our obligation to them is greater than theirs to us. The rich man maintains not his tenants or servants-they maintain him. Nor is there any foundation for the opinion that good usage is thrown away upon low and ordinary minds.

People in low