FROM THE WRITINGS

OF THE LATE

J. SYDNEY TAYLOR, A. M., &c.

Character of SIR SAMUEL ROMILLY.

FEW of the men who obtain distinction in the courts of law are ever remembered out of the pale of their profession: still fewer become identified with the civil or political history of their country. The system of modern forensic practice is generally hostile to the cultivation of the higher powers of the intellect, as well as to all sentiments of generous ambition; yet one department of it must be excepted. It is easy to conceive, that those who devote their talents to what is called constitutional law, should be competent to illustrate great public questions with the resources of liberal knowledge, and the cultivated power of a vigorous reason. There is not, perhaps, a nobler study for the mind of man, than that branch of our jurisprudence which involves the considerations of public rights, and guards the home, the liberty, and the life of the subject from the arbitrary encroachments of power. No man can be a great constitutional advocate, who is not capable of being the philosophical historian of a state. He must be able to survey, with clear intelligence, the most interesting events of empire-the contentions between the crown and the subject in exasperated times, out of the chaos of which arose the beauty and order of defined and limited government. He must be familiar with the ethics of politicians--the maxims of sages-and the conservative principles of civil wisdom; and he

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must be intrepid and eloquent enough to give an inspired utterance to the laws that protect the interests of humanity. Lawyers of this character are not often to be met with ;when they do appear, the causes that call forth their powers are full of great excitement. Their action is on the theatre of history. Their voice carries the sublime language of truth into palaces; and their triumphs are celebrated by the acclamations of a people.

Not before such an audience, nor on such an arena, is the lawyer of forms and subtle distinctions and technical ingenuity called to exercise his powers. His system is separated from the common reason and apprehension of mankind. If genius can survive an immersion into the practice of special pleading, it deserves to be immortal: nor do courts of equity favour the higher faculties of the mind. The intricate solemnities with which property is sacrificed on the altars of litigation, do not give exercise to those talents by which nations are preserved. The reputation that is obtained in those courts, therefore, does not attract the eye of History. There have been, however, a few splendid exceptions; and among them the name of ROMILLY is deservedly distinguished.

The brilliant and popular qualities of ERSKINE found their appropriate sphere of exertion in that department of law which comes home, more than any other, to the "business and bosoms of men." The institution of a jury gave stimulus and protection to his powers. The novel and wild agitation of the times in which he flourished, afforded the materials on which a great advocate works. He could influence the feelings and the passions of men, while he threw the sacred shield of the law over the life of an individual. He might, in the promotion of his cause, indulge in those bold or artful appeals of the orator that fix and charm the attention, and invoke to his aid the dictates of wisdom and the allurements of the imagination. But talents of a different order, and exercised in a different manner, conferred reputation upon ROMILLY. The one spoke of" man and his nature," and touched those chords to which the feelings of society are responsive: the other proved that the abstruse study and acuteness which are

requisite to eminence in the practice of chancery, could be united with the liberal acquirements of the scholar, and the comprehensive wisdom of the legislator.

By the death of this great man the bar lost its chief ornament; and the senate and humanity had to deplore the premature fate of one of the most sincere and able apostles of improvement that had ever been actuated by the spirit of a benignant philosophy: nor did he cultivate the high powers and energies which public life demands, at the expense of the milder virtues severe application improved the former—a life emphatically good gave exercise to the latter-simplicity adorned both.

As a lawyer, his habits qualified him for the eminent success which he attained in his profession; but nature had intended him for fame beyond it. In the confined and laborious practice which his legal duties imposed upon him, he did not sink the feelings that embrace the wide relations of humanity. His mind was not a mere volume of black-letter acquisition, that could take no other characters but what a court of equity impressed on it; he knew the principles and the mysteries of his profession as well as the most bigoted of its disciples: but he did not read only in the parchments of a court the history of mankind. His intellect was always open to the acquirement of more enlarged and less lucrative information; and his heart kept up a refreshing intercourse with the sentiments of truth and nature.

In the courts, ROMILLY was indeed a lawyer of the first rank -clear, erudite, subtle, and ingenious; but once out of them, he always appeared of a higher order of intelligence. There are men who sink into nothing when taken out of the atmosphere of their profession; but his mind only rose to its proper stature when he escaped beyond the narrow circle of his sect. He could encounter the learning or finesse of lawyers with legal tact and adroitness. He could cope with the details of any case, however intricate, and lay down the principles of any question, however novel and difficult, with such acumen and perspicuity, as would make it appear, at the moment, that he was the greatest lawyer of his day, and that only; but when

a liberal logic and less technical style were required, he had the good taste and the power to throw off from his mind the peculiarities of his profession.

In acquiring a knowledge of the laws that regulate the decisions of a court of equity, he reduced them as much as possible to the method and order in which scientific minds love to arrange their subjects. The mere pleader in a court of equity only knows its system as a collection of arbitrary maxims and decisions; and his greatest reverence is given to the sanctity of rules and forms. There are, indeed, too many of its decisions independent, and too many of its principles of uncertain application, not to affect the laws of property with confusion and embarrassment. In such cases, ordinary capacities completely sink; while their difficulties afford the greatest opportunity of luminous exertion to those talents that can combine and analyse intricate propositions with acuteness and facility. His skill in elucidating complicated cases was attributed to a peculiar and original sagacity. It was partly so:but he was not more indebted to nature than to the judicious mode by which his knowledge was acquired. He did not take the surface of the books and the practice of the courts, as the sufficient material of a lawyer's information: he inquired into the first elements-he went to the roots of law, while other minds lay bewildered in the foliage. He examined the principles in their original source: he was thence enabled to show their connexion when they were harmonious; and when they were not, he could at once point out their discrepancy. It was impossible to hear him argue on any case of difficult interest, without receiving some new gleams of intelligence on the obscurities of the system itself. Such was the arrangement, correctness, and order, both of the matter and expression of his arguments, that he appeared rather to recite the text of some established book, than to put together, by a sudden effort, the materials of knowledge acquired from various sources; so admirably did his luminous judgment remove from the memory

all confusion.

It was this systematic and well-digested erudition—this profound insight into all the organization of equity, so different

from mere plodding, superficial, or technical acquirement, which would have peculiarly fitted him to discharge the important functions of the highest authority on the bench. But the seat of BACON and THURLOW was not destined to shed its official laurels over him. There were those who said that other arts, which he did not choose to attain, were requisite, beside the qualifications of virtue and wisdom. However this may be, it was his honourable, but not singular fate, to die full of fame and without preferment.

As a senator, his legislative talents were more conspicuous than his oratorical powers or political address. In that capacity, he did not afford his audience the idea of one born to rule the waves of stormy debate, or agitate, with the power of an imperious intellect, the mixed feelings of a public assembly. He had not the eloquence which could strike fire from cold hearts, and touch the sources of human emotion. He appeared rather, as he stood in calm and unaffected dignity before the listening senate, like one of those sages of antiquity, who was calculated to lay the civil foundations of a rising state, and to fix deep in the ground-work of comprehensive legislation the rudiments of empire. The air of probity and frankness marked his demeanour. He showed on great questions a philosophic superiority to difficulties, and a simplicity that seemed hardly conscious of the intellect by which he enlightened others. He reasoned with plainness, originality, and vigour; and the aids which he borrowed of learning were without effort, and free from all ostentation. He never lost sight of the improvements which science, literature, and the advance of Christian sentiment had made upon the relations of society; and he would have accommodated the temper of legislation to the progress of the human mind. Uninfluenced by stubborn notions and legal bigotry, he did not venerate old institutions for their antiquity, but their usefulness: for he could discriminate between what wisdom made venerable, and what time only had consecrated. He had no absurd fondness for innovation-no quaint reverence for established abuse. He knew that our ancestors had done much which could not be done better; but he was also aware that experience is a powerful