pressly forbidden to resist; for, whosoever, in verse 2., must be as large as the, every soul, in the first.

That which the Doctor aims at in these words, is to make the whole parliament subject unto the king. And who denies them to be the king's subjects; and that as men, and Englishmen, they should not be subject unto the king? But if he means, that as a parliament, they should be subject to enact and do whatever he commandeth, then how is that true which he saith in pages 25, 26, That there is such an excellent temper of the three states in parliament, there being a power of denying in each of them: for what might follow if the king and lords without the commons, or these and the lords without the king, might determine, &c. Or if he means, that as a parliament jointly considered, they are to submit passively unto the unlawful commands of the king, and that passive obedience is commanded, only here in this Rom. xiii, then this is to straiten the text, as never any yet hath straitened it: neither indeed can any conscience think, that when the apostle commands us to be subject unto the higher powers, his meaning is only by way of suffering in his unlawful commands, and not by way of obedieuce in his lawful commands.

The Doctor saith, That the Roman state might challenge more by the fundamentals of that state, than our great council, he thinks, will or can.

But what then? Is it not therefore lawful for the subjects now to resist the higher power commanding things unlawful, because the apostle commanded there that we should not resist the higher powers in things that are lawful? Herein lies the Doctor's continued mistake: he thinks this command of the apostle was given to the christians to be obedient to Nero in his unlawful commands; whereas the apostle's command in this place reaches to all times, and is made to all that are christians: although they did live under Nero, yet it does not follow, that the apostle commanded them to be subject to him in unlawfuls. If indeed Nero's commandments were only unlawful, and this direction of the apostle was made only to the christians in those times, and that the subjection commanded were only suffering subjection, then this scripture might make much for his purpose. But though Nero was an enemy to the christians, yet some of his

commandments were lawful; and this direction of the apostle was not made only to the christians in those times, but as a general rule for all good men: and the obedience and subjection here commanded, was not only to be passive, but active, which I have proved already, wherein I also appeal to the Doctor's own conscience whether that this scripture doth not command active obedience and subjection to the prince, and therefore his interpretation thereof is exceeding wide, and his argument null.

Then the Doctor saith, If it be replied that that prohibition was temporary, and fit for those times, as it is said by some whom he answers;

I answer, that the Doctor here makes his own adversary, and fights with him. Many other answers he refutes also, it being not in my purpose to make good every pamphlet, but to satisfy men's consciences: only I cannot but here take notice, that the Doctor professes against arbitrary power, or such as conquerors use, as he did, (Sect. I,) profess, that he was much against arbitrary government. But I wish the Doctor would be pleased to consider his own principles, as he delivers them in these papers: for he says: That the Roman emperors were absolute monarchs, and did indeed rule absolutely and arbitrarily, and that they did make themselves such absolute monarchs by conquest. Then he says, This crown of England is descended by three conquests. And therefore, if one conquest is a reason for the arbitary government of the emperor, he cannot but think, though he conceal his mind, that his government also ought to be much more arbitrary.

What else remains in this section, I have either spoken to it already, or shall more aptly in the following discourse.

SECTION III.

THE Doctor saith, That for the proving this power of resistance there is much speech used about the fundamentals of this power; which because they lie low and unseen by vulgar eyes, being not written laws, the people are made to

believe that they are such as they that have the power to put new laws upon them, say they are.

Herein he turns the metaphor of fundamentals too far, as if because the fundamentals of a house cannot be seen, therefore the fundamental laws cannot be seen; which are not therefore called fundamental, because they lay under ground, but because they are the most essential upon which all the rest are built, as fundamental points of religion are most seen, and yet fundamental.

He says, these fundamentals are not written laws. The parliament say they are, and produce several written laws for what they do. The Doctor and those that are of his sense say, they are not: who should the people be ruled by in this case, but by the parliament, seeing the Doctor himself saith, none are so fit to judge of the laws as they?

Then the Doctor saith, Those that plead for this power of resistance, lay the first ground-work of their fundamentals thus; The power is originally in and from the people; and if when by election they have intrusted a prince with a power, he will not discharge his trust, then it falls to the people: or, as in this kingdom to the two houses of parliament, the representative body of this kingdom, to see to it: they may re-assume the power. This is the bottom of their fundamentals, as they are now discovered to the people.

We distinguish, as he doth, the power abstractively considered from the qualifications of that power, and the designation of a person to that power. The power abstractively considered, is from God, not from the people: but the qualifications of that power, according to the divers ways of executing in several forms of government, and the designation of the person that is to work under this power, is of man and therefore the power itself we never offer to take out of God's hand, but leave it where we found it. But if the person intrusted with that power shall not discharge his trust, then indeed it falls to the people, or the representative body of them to see to it; which they do as an act of selfpreservation, not an act of jurisdiction over their prince. It is one thing for them to see to it, so as to preserve themselves for the present, and another thing for so to re-assume the power, as to put the prince from his office. As for example, suppose there be a ship full of passengers at the

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sea in the time of a storm, which is in great danger to be cast away through the negligence and fault of the steersman; the passengers may for their own present safety, that they may not all be cast away, desire the steersman to stand by, and cause another to stand at the stern for the present, though they do not put the steersman out of his office. And this is our case: we do not say that the prince not discharging his trust, the people and parliament are so to re-assume the power, as if the prince were to be put from his office which the Doctor not distinguishing thus, would obtrude upon us; but only that the prince being abused by those that are about him, whereby the charge is neglected, the people, or representative body, may so look to it for the present, setting some at the stern, till the storm be over, lest the whole suffer shipwreck. And herein the Doctor does exceedingly wrong us, disputing against us, as if we went about to depose our king, which we contend not for, nor from these principles can be collected.

Then the Doctor saith, That however the fundamentals of this government are much talked of, this is according to them, the fundamental in all kingdoms and governments; for they say, power was every where from the people at first, and so this would serve no more for the power of resistance in England than in France or Turkey.

If it be the fundamental in all kingdoms, and governments, then it seems it does not lie so low, and unseen, as the Doctor said before, because all the world sees it.

of re

Whereas he saith, This will serve no more for power sistance in England, than in France or Turkey: he seems to insinuate that France and Turkey have no such power of resistance: but who doth not know that the protestants in France are of this judgment with us and practice? witness that business of Rochelle.

Then the Doctor saith, We will clear up these two particulars, whether the power be so originally, and chiefly from the people as they would have it; then whether they may not upon just causes re-assume that power; and saith, first of the original of power which they would have to be so from the people, as that it shall be from God only by a permissive approbation.

If the Doctor takes power for magistracy itself and suffi

VOL. V.

ciency of authority to command or coerce in the governing of a people abstractively considered, as distinguished from the qualification of that power, according to the divers ways of executing it in several forms of government, and the designation thereof unto some person, then I do not believe there is any man in the parliament, whom the Doctor especially disputes against, or of those who write for them, that hold that the power is from the people, and by permission and approbation only of God; neither can they for in that they contend so much for the parliament, it argues they are of opinion that authority and power in the abstract is from God himself and for the designation of a person, or qualification of the power according to several forms of government, the Doctor himself grants it in this Section to be the invention of man, and by God's permissive approbation.

Then the Doctor comes to prove this by three arguments, That power as distinguished from the qualification thereof, and designation is of divine institution.

Wherein he might have saved his labour in those three arguments, for none doth deny it: yet we will examine what he saith in the arguments: he saith, That the apostle speaks expressly," that the powers are of God,” Rom. xiii. 1, “ and the ordinance of God," verse 2, by which power he understands the power itself of magistracy as distinguished from the qualifications thereof or designation of any person thereto.

And if so, how is that true which he saith before (Sect. II), where he saith, that the higher power in Paul, Rom. xiii., is all one with the king as supreme, 1 Peter ii. 12; whereas he confesseth, that the government of a king or prince is the qualification of the power? so doth the apostle himself, calling it, aveρwin KTIσEI, a human constitution.

If by power here, Rom. xiii., be understood magistracy and authority itself in the abstract, then when we are commanded to submit thereunto, the meaning cannot be that the christians in those times must submit to the unlawful commands of the emperor, as the Doctor would have it before, seeing the way of governing by an emperor or prince, is but the qualification of the power; surely if by power we are now to understand magistracy and authority itself in the abstract, then all that is commanded in Rom. xiii. to submit thereunto, is to acknowledge a magistracy, and then all the Doctor's arguments, and