selves from that slavery? Thus doth the Doctor open the door to greater resistance than those that he disputes against. Though a prince should hold his right by conquest as the next right, yet if he hold it also by derivation from the people as the remote right, and the last be the more natural and just way; then arguments grounded on that remote right may be more valid, than those that are grounded on the next right. But thus it is with our prince, who although he doth succeed the conqueror, yet doth also take in the voluntary and free consent of the commonweale unto his crown, which a mere conqueror doth not, but rules without the consent and against the good liking of the people.

Then the Doctor saith, We tell them the Roman emperors were not to be resisted; they reply that they were absolute monarchs: was it any other way than by force and arms, the way that the Saxons, Danes and Normans made themselves masters of this people? Now in these words we see the Doctor's mind plainly, that he contends for an arbitrary government; for he saith, page 11, that the emperors did rule absolutely and arbitrarily, and here he saith, How came they of subjects to be absolute monarchs? was it any other ways than by force and arms? the way that the Saxons, Danes and Normans made themselves masters of this people, in whose right and lines, he saith before, the crown descended upon our king. What can be more plain than this for an arbitrary government? It seems the Doctor was conscious to himself that herein he had discovered himself, and therefore he says this: I speak not as if the kings of this land might rule as conquerors: but that will not heal it.

Then the Doctor comes to the matter of capitulation, or covenant, or oath, which the prince taketh to confirm what he promised; which, saith he, are so alleged, as if the breach or non-performance of the prince's part, were a forfeiture of his power. But we answer, saith he, the words capitulation or covenant, are now much used, to make men believe the king's admittance to the crown is altogether conditional; whereas our king is king before he comes to the coronation.

Herein the Doctor mistakes us: for though we acknowledge a covenant, yet we cannot be so weak as to think that any breach of the covenant is a forfeiture of the king's power, for then the best man could not be king long; but we

first affirm a covenant, for though the kings of Israel were monarchs, and immediately designed by God himself to their office, and so one would think there should be no need of their coming to the crown by a covenant, yet to shew the necessity of this oath and covenant, when they came to their crowns, they also took an oath, and entered into covenant with the people to protect their rights and persons. 1 Chron. xi. 3. We say that this mutual covenant betwixt the king and the people, binds the king to the people, as well as the people to the king; and that therefore it is as well unlawful for a king by force to oppress his subjects, and to take up arms against them, as for the subjects to take up arms against him.

That hence it follows that the king's power is limited.

From this covenant and capitulation we say, thereby it appears that the people do commit a trust to the king: which,

If he doth neglect, as he doth not always forfeit his power, so neither are they to forfeit their right of looking to themselves for the present. And therefore all that the Doctor says, that we urge the covenant and capitulation so much, as if our king were a conditional king; and that which he brings to prove that he is a king before coronation, is needlessly urged against us: for we say and speak plainly, that though the right that our king hath to the crown, is firstly by derivation of power from the people, yet he hath his right by inheritance, and is not such an elective king as is chosen for a time, and his life, if he rule well; and so his right to end in himself, but to continue upon his posterity: for the people do derive their power two ways, either so as to choose a man into office for his life only in case he rule well, and so our king's predecessors were not brought to the crown; or so as to commit the trust of the state unto him, to descend upon his posterity, which when his posterity comes to, hath both a right of election and inheritance; it being the right of inheritance as it is left by their forefathers, and the right of election in regard of its principle from whence it flowed: and thus we do estate our king in his throne, hereby establishing him more sure therein, and than the opposite opinion of conquest doth.

Then the Doctor tells us, that though the king do break

his covenant, or not make performance thereof, yet a forfeiture of his power doth not follow from thence: for, saith he, could they in this covenant shew us such an agreement between the king and his people, that in case he will not discharge his trust, then it shall be lawful for the states of the kingdom by arms to resist, and provide for the safety thereof, it were something.

To which I answer, we do not press the forfeiture of the king's power upon non-performance of covenant, but we say this, that the end of his trust being to look to the kingdom, though there be no such words expressed in the covenant or agreement betwixt the king and his people, that in case he shall not discharge his trust, then it shall be lawful for the state of the kingdom by arms to resist, and to look to their own safety: their safety being the end of this trust, and ratio legis being lex, in reason that must be implied. There is a covenant stricken between a man and a woman at marriage: when they marry one another, it is not verbally expressed in their agreement, that if one commit adultery, that party shall be divorced; and yet we know that that covenant of marriage carries the force of such condition. What follows in this section is either a repetition of what was before, or what in substance we have answered already.

Only at the last the Doctor moveth this question, What then if the prince take to himself more power, or not perform what he is bound to? and answers, Then may the subjects use all fair means as are fit to use: cries to God, petitions to the prince, denial of obedience to his lawful commands, denial of subsidies, &c., but are left without all means to compel by force or resistance.

The subjects are considered two ways: socially; severally. Severally, as private men; and so it hath been taken for granted, that in case of oppression the subjects have used no arms but tears and prayers. Before this parliament, how many oppressions were there upon the people, both in their estates and in God's worship, by those who had unduly gotten authority from the king; and yet we saw no forcible resistance made, but every man quietly subjecting himself under that suffering condition.

Socially and jointly; and so there is other remedy for the subjects than only prayers and tears, and that the subjects

are considered in this posture wherein now we are, professing that we take not up arms as we are private men barely, but as subjects united and joined in the representative body of the kingdom, which never yet was counted unlawful by any divines, as I have shewed before.

SECTION V.

THE Doctor comes unto that which he calls our last reason, the safety of the kingdom, where he saith, first, that we have many weapons sharpened for this resistance at the Philistines' forge, our arguments being borrowed from the Roman schools, as he saith.

But there is much difference between us and the papists in this particular. For, the papists contend for the lawfulness of deposing kings, which we do not. The papists plead for a power to depose a prince in case that he turn heretic, which we do not; for we hold, that though a prince may leave and change his religion, the subjects are not thereby excused from their allegiance. The papists do not only hold it lawful to depose and thus to depose their prince, but to kill him also ; yea, that a private man invested with the pope's authority may do thus: all which we abhor from. Why, therefore, should the Doctor charge us thus, and make the world believe that we favour the popish doctrine in this particular? But as the parliament's army is scandalized by the adversaries, saying, There are many papists in their army to help on their designs; so is our doctrine scandalized by our adversaries, saying that we make use of popish arguments to strengthen our opinion. But the truth of this we leave to all the world to judge of.

But to prove this, the Doctor saith further, that by this reason the pope assumes a power of curbing or deposing kings, for that if there be not a power in the church, in case the civil magistrate will not discharge his trust, the church hath not means for the maintenance of the catholic faith, and its own safety.

But what likeness is there between that of the papists and this of our's? The papists saying, the church hath a power

of preserving its own safety, and therefore the pope may depose; we say the kingdom hath a power to preserve itself, and therefore if the king neglect the trust, the state for the present is to look unto it. And as for the matter of the church, we turn the Doctor's argument upon himself, thus:

If the church cannot be preserved where the officer is an heretic, unless the church have a power to reject him after once or twice admonition; then cannot a kingdom have a power to preserve itself, when the officer is unfaithful, unless the kingdom have a power either to depose him, or to look to their own matters until things be better settled. But the church hath excommunication granted to it by Christ himself, for its own preservation; neither can we conceive how a church can preserve itself from evils and errors, unless it have a power to cast out the wicked officers. As in the body natural it cannot preserve itself, unless nature had given it a power to deliver itself from its own burdens; therefore the commonweale also, by the like reason, cannot have a power to preserve itself, unless it have a power to deliver itself from its burden. But in case that an officer be unfaithful, we do not say that it is lawful for the kingdom to depose him, therefore it may be lawful for themselves, socially considered statewise, in time of danger to help themselves. Neither herein, as the Doctor would, do we appropinquate to the Romish doctrine, for the papists from this power of the church, do infer a power unto the pope, and not unto the church or community.

The Doctor asks us this question by way of his next answer: If every state hath such means to provide for its safety, what means of safety had the christian religion under the Roman emperors, in or after the apostles' times; or the people then enslaved, what means had they for their liberty: had they this of resistance? Tertullian in his apology, says thus: The christians had number and force sufficient to withstand, but they had no warrant.

The question is wrong stated, it should have been made thus, If any state hath such means to provide for its safety: what means of safety had the Roman state under the Roman emperors, when as he doth say, what means of safety had the christian religion under the Roman emperors? christian religion, and the state are two different things.