doth not command what the second, nor the second lame because it doth not command what the third, nor the third lame because it doth not command what the fourth; so here, though God should command only active, not passive obedience in this text, this instruction would not be lame. But why should it be a lame instruction? The Doctor tells us, Because the Romans should not be sufficiently directed how to answer the unlawful commandments of princes: yes, surely, if God did here command them obedience to lawfuls, he should at once forbid them disobedience to unlawfuls; but, saith the Doctor, Then there will be a gap for rebellion, for how easily would men infer, therefore we may resist in things unlawful. I answer, The Doctor takes this for granted, which is to be proved, that all forcible resistance is rebellion. Suppose that true which himself granteth, in page 1 of the first book, that it is lawful to resist unlawful commands, though not with forcible resistance. And if so, then why might not the Romans as well say, This instruction you give us is lame, for you forbid resistance, and yet in some kind resistance is lawful, a suffering resistance lawful, and a forcible resistance unlawful. And yet you have not in this xiiith chapter given us any such distinction, so are we left in the dark, and your instruction lame. But, good Doctor, let us take off our own haltings, whilst we go about to charge the apostle with lame instructions, in case he come not just up to our opinions. But to put an end to this matter concerning this text, I appeal to the Doctor, whether he doth not think that these words, "higher powers," verse 1, did not include the Roman senate: I say, when the apostle commands, "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers," did he not command the christian Romans to be subject to the Roman senate? We know that after this epistle was written to the Romans, as Eusebius reports, the Roman senate was not only in being, but so potent and powerful, that when that was propounded to the senate, whether Christ should be acknowledged as God, that was in the senate's power to grant or refuse, and they refused. So Estius also saith,* that the governors of provinces were appointed by the senate, as well as by Cæsar, when Peter wrote his epistle. So that still, notwithstanding Cæsar, the Roman

*Præsides provinciis præficiebantur non tam authoritate Cæsaris quam senatus.-Estius Ep. Pet. i. 2.

Senate was a high power, and the higher powers unto the people; and if they were the higher powers, who were to be obeyed by this commandment of the apostles, then why doth the Doctor bring this scripture to urge our higher powers and senate to obey, especially when the Doctor himself confesses (page 62) that the two houses, as distinct from the king, fall under the words, "higher powers?" At last, in page 62, the Doctor comes to that place of Peter, 1 Epist. ii. 13, "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, whether to the king as supreme, or unto governors, as those that are sent by him." Where, after the Doctor hath a little stroked himself on the head, and laboured to spit some filth on our faces, he comes to that testimony of Calvin, for that which he says concerning Dr. Bilson is not much material, who proves that the pronoun him relates to God, and not to the king, for the reason which I alleged in my first book; now the Doctor replies, True, all are sent by God, but it is as true that the governors of the provinces were sent by the king, or the Roman emperor.

The reader may observe how the Doctor doth deal by the scripture again, for he sets down the words thus: To the king as supreme, or the governors as those that are sent by him: and thus indeed the word him must needs relate to the king, but conceals that part of the verse wherein the word God is expressed thus: "Submit yourself to every ordinance of God:" for the Doctor knew that if he had set down that part of the verse, the reader would have perceived that the pronoun him should have related to God, and not to the king. Then, again, observe what he answers: he tells us, that the governors of provinces were sent by the king or emperor; that is not the question now, but whom the pronoun him doth relate, whether God or the king. And for this he gives no reason, nor answers Calvin's, and therefore I need add no more; yet Estius' reasons are very full, proving that the pronoun him must relate to God and not the king: for says he,* The apostle Peter would move the people to obey the king

* In eo quod additur, tanquam ab eo missis pronomen eo ad regem referunt nonnulli, quod non placet, nam apostolus vult hoc in præsidibus istis considerari quod Deus eos miserat, id quod ad obediendum movere debet, ac ut taceam quod præsides provinciis præficiebant non tam authoritate Cæsaris quem senatus, illi alteri relat ioni non quodrat quod sequitur ad vindictam malefactorem, &c. quem

and governors, which argument is full, because they were sent by God; whereas if the pronoun him should relate to the king, here were no motive. Again, Because the apostle Peter saith that they are sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and the praise of them that do well, for which cause the wicked heathenish governors did not send the governors, it being known that they sent them for the punishment of those that were good, and for the praise of those that were evil; and therefore the pronoun him is to be carried on God, and to have relation to God, not to the king, in this place; and therefore what the Doctor brings from this place to set the parliament at a greater under than God would have, is nothing worth. The rest of the chapter is spent with his other adversaries. I having thus delivered the scriptures from his objections, shall be the more brief in answer to the after part of his discourse, because the only ground of conscience is God's word.

CHAPTER V.

IN Section X. of the Doctor's reply, I find little to hold us long; I had told him in my former book, that the parliamentary proceedings were an act of self-preservation, and used the similitude of a steersman, shewing that in case he do not his duty, even the very passengers in time of a storm, for their own preservation may look to the matter, which doth not imply the unofficing of a steersman; so in state, where the chief magistrate neglecteth his duty, &c. The Doctor replies (page 64), that the prince is not as the steersman, but as he that stands above, and commands to the starboard or larboard.

This is to hang upon the word, and let go the sense, for the reason holds to him that stands above, and commands, as well as the steersman, neither will common reason say, that

scopum mali reges non usque quaque habebant propositum, rectius igitur ad Deum refertur, qui hunc finem omnibus magistratibus præscribit, unde et Paulus de potestate Rom. xiii. Dei enim minister est tibi in bonum, &c. ex quo apparet missos a Deo hic intelligi debere non solum duces sed regem ipsum.-Estius in 1 Epist. Pet. ii.

he is unofficed, because the passengers for the present desire or cause him to stand by, that they may look unto their own safety in the time of a storm.

Then he comes to prove that authority and magistracy, abstractively considered from the qualification or several forms of government, is of divine institution; wherein we do all agree, only I excepted against some of his media, that he used to prove it thus: By those words, the powers that are ordained of God, the Doctor understands, the power itself of magistracy, distinguished from the qualification thereof, and the designation of persons thereto; how then did he say, (Sect.II.) the "higher power" in Paul, is the same with the "king as supreme" in Peter? The Doctor replies, The power of magistracy, abstractively taken, may by these words be proved to be of God, though the "higher powers" here be understood concretively with connotation of the persons that bear the power, for they are here proposed as objects of our obedience which cannot be directed but upon power in some person. And here it is said, as a ovoa, existent, &c.

But how doth this prove either what the Doctor would, or answer me? It is true the words, higher powers, note both, as I have shewed already, both the authority and persons in the authority. But then the word, relayuevas, I say, signifies, ordered, and so to be translated, not, ordained; for otherwise if the words, higher powers, note both the abstract and concrete, and this word be translated, ordained, then this scripture shall as well prove the qualification and designation to be of God, as authority itself: which thing the Doctor denies, and first brought this scripture to prove that magistracy is of God, in opposition to qualifications and designations. Some metaphysical notions about esse and existere the Doctor would find out in the word, ovoa, but I pass them as never intended by the apostle.

At last the Doctor promiseth, or rather threatens to give me a visit, for so he saith, page 65, I must come home to Master Bridge, to make him understand the force of my inference. I had said thus: In like manner the Doctor proves that power itself is of God, because the magistrate is called the minister of God: slipping from the power itself to the person designed, for the power itself is not called the minister of God. Whereupon the Doctor saith, I must come home

to Master Bridge; the mayor of N. is the king's minister, therefore his power is from the king; will Master Bridge reply, No, for the power itself is not the mayor, or called the minister of the king?

Thus whilst he comes home to me, he comes from his own home and reason, forgetting what he had said before (pages 60, 61), A lawful prince, though commanding unlawfully, is still the minister of God. So then it seems one may be the minister of God in that which is evil and it is true a penal minister one may be ; a man may sin in afflicting another, and yet he may be the minister of God to him that is afflicted; how, therefore, doth this argue, that because the magistrate is called the minister of God, that his authority is lawful? And therefore, whereas the Doctor saith the mayor of N. is the king's minister, therefore his power is from the king; will Master Bridge say, No? I answer, He will say, there is not the same reason in regard of God and the king, for a man cannot be the king's minister in a bad action, but he must receive power from him, but he may be God's minister, I mean penally, in an unlawful action, which God never gave him right or power to do.

In the after lines of this page the Doctor says, that both the Fuller Answer, and Master Bridge's, every where takes it for granted by me, that monarchy, aristocracy and democracy are equally the inventions of men? I answer, I do indeed, and the truth of it may appear from your own words (pages 13, 14 of your first book) as I have shewed already.

Lastly, saith the Doctor, Master Bridge concludes that my proving of the governing power to be of God, but the qualification of it, and designation of the person to be of man, gaineth nothing against resistance, or deposing a prince that doth not discharge his trust; for still the people may say, We may alter the government, and depose the person, because he was of our designing. Doctor Fearne says, Nothing so, for it they resist, they usurp authority, and invade the power that God hath given him; if they depose him, they quite take away that power which God and not they placed in him, because he is still the minister of God.

This seems to prove that people cannot depose their prince, or alter the government that is set up amongst them; but what is this to the reason that he pretends an answer to?