extent of the power of nature, perhaps, in any one thing, it does not follow that we know not the nature of any thing in some measure. For example, though I do not know the utmost extent of the power of fire, yet I cer tainly know that it is the nature of fire to burn; therefore, if I see three men taken off the street in their common wearing apparel, and, without any preparation, cast into the midst of a burning fiery furnace; and that the flame was so fierce that it burned up those men that threw them in,-while the persons who were thrown in should walk up and down in the bottom of the furnace, and I should see a fourth person with them of glorious appearance, like the Son of God; and that they should come up again out of the furnace without any harm, or so much as the smell of fire upon themselves or their clothes, I could not be deceived in thinking there was a stop put to the nature of fire as to these men, and, at the same time, that it had its effect upon the men whom it burned.

3. Leslie's four rules for distinguishing miraculous events from all impostures are the following: "First, That the matters of fact be such, as that men's outward senses, their eyes and ears, may be judges of it. Secondly, That it be done publicly in the face of the world. Thirdly, That not only public monuments be kept up in memory of it, but some outward actions be performed. Fourthly, That such monuments and such actions or observances be instituted, and do commence from the time that the matter of fact was done."

The first two rules make it impossible for any such matter of fact to be imposed upon men at the time when such matter of fact was said to be done, because every man's eyes and senses would contradict it. For example, suppose any man should pretend that yesterday he divided the Thames, in presence of all the people of London, and carried the whole city, men, women, and children, over to Southwark on dry land, the waters

standing like walls on both sides; I say, it is morally impossible that he could persuade the people of London that this was true, when every man, woman, and child, could contradict him, and say that this was a notorious falsehood, for that they had not seen the Thames so divided, or had gone over on dry land. Therefore I take it for granted, that no such imposition could be put upon men at the time when such public matter of fact was said to be done.

4. Therefore it only remains that such matter of fact might be invented some time after, when the men of that generation in which the thing was said to be done are all past and gone; and the credulity of after-ages might be imposed upon, to believe that things were done in former ages which were not. For this, the last two rules secure us as much as the first two rules in the former case; for whenever such a matter of fact came to be invented, if not only monuments were said to remain of it, but likewise that public actions and observances were constantly used ever since the matter of fact was said to be done, the deceit must be detected by no such monuments appearing, and by the experience of every man, woman, and child, who must know that no such actions or observances were ever used by them. For example, suppose I should now invent a story of such a thing done a thousand years ago, I might perhaps get some to believe it; but if I say, that not only such a thing was done, but that, from that day to this, every man, at the age of twelve years, had a joint of his little finger cut off; and that every man in the nation did want a joint of such a finger; and that this institution was said to be part of the matter of fact done so many years ago, and vouched as a proof and confirmation of it, and as having descended without interruption, and been constantly practised in memory of such matter of fact all along, from the time that such matter of fact was done: I say, it is impossible I should be believed in such a case, because every one could contradict me as to

the mark of cutting off a joint of a finger; and that being part of my original matter of fact, must demonstrate the whole to be false.

5. These four rules or marks all meet in the miraculous events by which the divine authority of the Mosaic and Christian dispensations was established, as will be shown afterwards.

6. The requisite conditions of a credible miracle are:

(I.) That the nature of the work or fact alleged be indubitably miraculous. It must be of such a nature as to exclude every possible solution from natural causes, and to be attributable only to the power of God. Thus, with a word to give sight to the blind, and to raise the dead, are manifestly works which none but God can perform.

7. (II.) The circumstances in which the miracle is wrought must be such as cannot possibly belong to any delusion or imposture. A fact may, in its own nature, appear to have been miraculous, and yet to have been published to the world in such a manner as to render its having been really so exceedingly doubtful. In order that all doubt be removed, it is necessary, first, that it be published to the world at the time when it is said to have been performed; secondly, that it be extensively published in the place where it has been wrought; thirdly, that the circumstances under which it is published are such as satisfy us that it underwent a careful examination, and must have been detected had it been an imposture. When these conditions are accurately applied to facts said to have been miraculous, they will form a certain rule whereby we may distinguish between that which is real and indisputable and that which is spurious.

CHAPTER V.

THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A MIRACLE MAY BE AUTHENTICATED BY TESTIMONY: THE FORCE OF THE EVIDENCE OF TESTIMONY NOT IMPAIRED BY LAPSE OF TIME.

1. THERE is no other evidence than that of testimony by which the miracles which were wrought in attestation of divine revelation can be rendered credible to us. This species of evidence is called probable in philosophical language, to distinguish it from that which is sensible or demonstrative, without reference to the measure of certainty attached to it. Our belief that Cæsar and Pompey really lived, and that the plague once visited London, is founded on probable evidence, that is, on the evidence of testimony, and the person who should doubt these facts, on that account, would be suspected of lunacy.

2. Miracles, like any other facts which are cognizable by the senses, are capable of being proved by testimony. It is just as certain that their reality can be certified by testimony as that their reality can be proved by the evidence of the senses. If I witnessed, in common with many others, a person who was known to be dead and buried, raised from the grave, and in the possession of life and health, walk abroad before our eyes, it was impossible that I, or any of those who saw this work, could have any doubt of its truly miraculous nature. But how are we who witnessed the miracle to produce conviction of its reality in the minds of those who did not witness it? This can only be done by the testimony of the witnesses; and we maintain, that in such a case as is now supposed, this testimony is sufficient. For, although the work certified to have been performed is a miracle, and is therefore contrary to the usual course of nature, and would indeed lose its beneficial office if it were not so, it cannot thence be inferred that it is a violation of the laws of nature,

allowing the term to include a regard to moral tendencies. The laws by which a wise and holy God governs the world, cannot, unless he is pleased to reveal them, be learned in any other way than from testimony; since, on this supposition, nothing but testimony can bring us acquainted with the whole series of his dispensations, and this kind of knowledge is absolutely necessary previously to our correctly inferring those laws. Testimony, therefore, must be admitted as constituting the principal means of discovering the real laws by which the universe has been regulated; that testimony assures us that the course of nature has often been interrupted to produce important moral effects; and we must not at random disregard such testimony, because, in estimating its credibility, we ought to look almost infinitely more at the moral than at the physical circumstances connected with any particular event."

3. We have already referred to Hume's objection to the sufficiency of testimony to authenticate miracles, and we deem it unnecessary to take any farther notice of it. We shall only mention the conditions under which a miracle may be authenticated by testimony.

(I.) The alleged miracle must have all the conditions mentioned in the last chapter, namely, that it was published to the world at the time when it is said to have been performed,-that it was extensively made known in the place where it was wrought, that the circumstances under which it was published are such as ought to satisfy us that it underwent a careful examination, and must have been detected had it been an imposture.

(II.) The opportunities of the witnesses must have been such as shall have given the fullest satisfaction. They must have had a sufficient knowledge of the facts which they attest. In short, nothing less than the evidence of their

Gregory's Letters, p. 179. Vinu's Sermons on the Credibility of Miracles.