PUBLISHED MONTHLY, AT FIVE DOLLARS PER ANNUM-THOMAS W. WHITE, EDITOR AND PROPRIETOR. VOL. VIII. RICHMOND, OCTOBER, 1842. THE LIBERTIES OF THE PEOPLE IN EUROPE. The people throughout Europe once enjoyed considerable liberties. But, in every state, those liberties were soon grasped by the hand at the centre; and, in many, were long retained, none having, till lately, been re-distributed amongst the Italians, or the Germans. NO. 10. Nor can we now say how far this moderation might have extended, had not the Ordinance of July, 1830, which destroyed the freedom of the press, aroused the spirit of the Parisians. Their brilliant courage, after transferring the crown from the Elder Bourbons, to the House of Orleans, left the deputies free to establish a constitution, which has not only abolished the censorship, and founded the This universal loss of liberty should arrest our liberty of the press on the trial by jury, but has attention. For, when we reflect that-excepting a extended the elective franchise from one hundred few liberties, such as those of Hungary, of the thousand to two hundred thousand FrenchmenTyrol, of Genoa, the Fueros of Spain, or the sta-separated the church from the state-put an end to menti in the island of Sardinia-all those which, the hereditary peerage-and imposed many saluaccording to ancient historians, the Europeans tary limitations on the royal prerogative. once enjoyed, were soon withdrawn and long with- Nor were the effects of this revolution confined held, either by the arms or the artifices of their princes, we perceive that liberty may be lost in monarchies, as well as in republics; but it makes less noise in the former, because there is less liberty to lose. The power of the crown was once very limited in France, but that of the people amounted to nothing, before the revolution of 1789. Then, for the first time, an accused had his defender-was confronted with his witnesses-and was tried by a jury, instead of by judges whose seats had been purchased. The Lettres de cachet were then suppressed; freedom was restored to conscience; the exorbitant revenues of the clergy were confiscated; and those laws annulled, which exempted a hundred thousand noblemen from an equal burden of taxes, which reserved for them all the commands in the army and protected them from punishment for injuring a citizen or soldier. The Constituent assembly first put an end to the servitude of one class, and the privileges of another; then it subdivided the kingdoms into departments, and conferred on the representatives of the people the power of imposing taxes. to Frenchmen. In less than two years, twentyone, of the twenty-two cantons of Switzerland, had introduced freer institutions. The Flemish Provinces, with those of Antwerp, South Brabant, Limburg, Liege, Namur, etc., (which were all transferred to Holland, against every principle that unites two people,) animated, no less by this glorious example, than stung by multiplied injustices, rent in twain that factitious Empire, and erected over themselves the freest monarchy on the continent. In England, sparks of discontent were kindled into enthusiasm for electoral reform. In Germany, the rapacious tyranny of the Elector of Hesse, no longer endured by the newly excited indignation of his subjects, compelled him to resign, into the hands of his son, a sceptre scarcely inferior to that which religious and political exciteinent induced Antony of Saxony to abandon to his nephew. Charles, Duke of Brunswick, having refused to reestablish the constitution, granted by the King of Great Britain when guardian of that Prince, escaped with difficulty, September, 1830, from the violence of the people, and ended his days in obscurity. Meanwhile, this spirit of change, awaThese liberties survived the reign of Napoleon, kened at Paris, ameliorated the institutions of Hanand were introduced into the charter granted by over, and renewed the clamors of those States of the Louis XVIII., to conciliate the French, when his Germanic Confederacy, which had not received the family was restored. Happy that family, had it constitutions that had been promised to induce them respected the liberties consecrated by that instru- to make extraordinary efforts against Bonaparte. ment! Still more happy, had it yielded to the spi-Across the Pyrenees, popular movements were rit of the age, instead of kindling, by open usurpa-crowned with partial success. Even an Austrian tion, the indignation and vengeance of the people! army could hardly suppress the resistance which They, recollecting the violence and disorder that was offered to tyranny, in Parma, Modena, and the were the companions of the republic-the noblesse, Papal States; as if, at the sounds wafted over the their past sufferings (which greatly enhanced the Alps, the Italians expected the genius of liberty to pleasures of the court);—and all, indeed, the con-rise out of the tombs of their ancestors. scription of Bonaparte and the sweetness of peace- These events display the magnitude of the one few were then found, who had not rather have suf- we describe, and the importance of understanding fered with moderation, than have exposed them-a constitution, which commends itself to our attenselves to new dangers, for the recovery of liberty. 'tion, less as the system of a great nation, united to VOL. VIII-78 us by many ties, than as the model of all the con- of vagabonds and beggars,"* has now arrived, in a stitutional monarchies on the continent. For whith-great measure by this means, to so great a height ersoever we turn our eyes-to Spain, Portugal, of power, as to decide, in a supreme manner, on Belgium, Holland, Hanover, Saxony, or Sweden, all "matters, ecclesiastical, temporal, civil, miliwe observe that French ideas, circulated through tary, maritime, and criminal;" whilst the crown, the French press, have caused the chief political which all parties then acknowledged was invested reform. with absolute authority, is now sunk into a respectable pageant of state. The present liberties of Europe are mere limita tions of royal authority. Thus, it is obvious, that the crown is the immediate source of that liberty, which Europeans now At the dawn of civilization, the Princes of Eu- enjoy, whether obtained by concession, open viorope, by violence or artifice, had withdrawn from lence, or secret encroachment. And this is conthe people their ancient liberties, and acquired an firmed by observation; for, throughout Europe, unlimited authority. For centuries, all acknow- whilst the subject exercises merely the power he ledged that this authority, by the grace of God, has obtained, the rest is exercised by the Prince, was inherent in the crown. And there it might whose prerogatives begin where those of the peostill have remained, had Princes conceded none to ple end. In some monarchies, all the liberties of the people in exchange for their services. But, to the people are now held at the pleasure of the conduct an enterprise or to secure their dominions, crown. A few years ago, the Pope, and the Emthey exchanged power for money and men. This peror of Austria, not only modified, but withdrew occurred in the time of the Crusades. It occurred, privileges which had been granted to their Italian too, in the reign of Edward I., who commanded subjects; and so great is the importance attached the English to elect representatives, (origin of the to this prerogative, (one superseding all others.) House of Commons,) that, by appearing to obtain that the present King of Prussia lately caused an their consent, he might levy taxes with greater author to be tried for maintaining, that the liberties ease to prosecute the war against Scotland. It just accorded to East Prussia were rights rather occurred in Spain, when the crown granted the than concessions. Fueros to induce the 'communes' to repel the inva- In France, however, the limitations on the presions of the Saracens: in Germany, when its rogative are deemed as sacred as the prerogative Princes promised constitutions to stimulate the itself. Yet the monarchy cannot be said to be people to unusual efforts against Bonaparte-founded on the sovereignty of the people. It is which is the origin of their present representa-true that, in July, 1830, one city, in three days, tive monarchies. At another time, power was con- drove the Prince from his throne; and that, in ceded to conciliate the people. Louis XVIII. seven more, a number of deputies (not large enough, granted a Charter in 1815, to conciliate the however, to vote on the ordinary matters for which French; and the Emperor of Austria, and several they were chosen) selected another, and framed a Italian Princes, have, for a similar reason, endowed constitution, which was announced by telegraphic Lombardy, &c. with a semblance of municipal freedom. dispatch to thirty-three millions of astonished citizens, who were permitted neither to amend the But, when these concessions were not made at charter, nor to discuss the prerogatives of the the appropriate time, the people sometimes ob- Prince; yet, if sovereignty, for a moment, was retained them by open violence; as, in the reign of stored to the people, in that moment they deprived King John, when the English extorted the Great themselves of it forever, since they have not reCharter, and, in 1688, when James II. was detained the power of changing their present constithroned, and the crown transferred to the Prince tution. It suffices, however, that it is still cusof Orange and his consort, as the French gave tomary for the crown to exercise all power which theirs, in 1830, to the House of Orleans, with limitations imposed on it. In some States, the people have obtained power from the crown, less by open violence, than by slow, quiet encroachment. A great deal of the authority, for example, which now resides in the Parliament of Great Britain, has been purloined from the crown, or amassed in accordance with an inevitable tendency of the British Constitution. The Parliament which "might," in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, "give directions for the due tanning of leather or milling of cloth-for the preservation of pheasants or partridges-for the reparation of bridges or highways-for the punishment is not expressly the people's; therefore, in estimating the liberties of the French, we ought to examine, not the Prince's authority, but the limitations imposed on it. I. The Two Chambers. The power which is lodged by the charter in these Chambers is the chief limitation of the King's authority: for no law can be made, suspended or modified, without their consent. They grant the supplies, and designate their objects; so that the number of public functionaries, the strength of the army and navy, and the preservation of peace, de * Hume. pend on their will; and, as every act of the crown | there be, in the ramparts there erected by the peomust be sanctioned by a ministry in the confidence ple against the crown, any passage or embrasure of the deputies, nothing can be executed without through which tyranny may enter. their consent. Such is the theory of the constitution; but, could the crown, through either the ELECTORS or the ELECTED, direct the will of the legislature, then would this limitation be merely apparent, and the worst of all governments established. Let us then first inquire into the Independence of the Peerage. And here it is obvious, that although Peers created for life by the Prince, without rank, riches, or privileges, may usefully investigate questions which do not arouse the spirit of party; yet, among the representatives of the people, public confidence will abandon them, until, finally, they become, first, a court of Register, then, an instrument in the hands of the King-never a check on his authority. Such, at this time, is the condition of the Peerage in France. It is now the custom of the Deputies, as soon as their business is finished, to return to the Provinces, leaving the most important bills to be presented to the Peers, who, unable to amend without rejecting measures indispensable to the nation, read elaborate reports, and adopt them without alteration. However, the Peerage is neither a dead, nor a fruitless branch on the trunk of this monarchy ;but it rather extends than limits the royal authority. Like the Senate of Poland, it confers on the crown a prerogative more formidable than is ever bestowed by an hereditary Peerage, which almost perpetuates itself; whilst this Chamber, as death Independence of the Deputies. Of the thirty-four millions in France, two hundred thousand contribute forty dollars apiece, and have a voice in State affairs. If their Deputies were independent, the King, without their consent, could do nothing that requires money. But his influence may pass through two channels into the Chamber through the electors and the elected. In consequence of the peculiar construction of this monarchy, there flows through the first of these channels, a copious stream of royal influence: for, minute local concerns being there conducted by the central government, officers in swarms are let loose in every direction, whose commissions are treated, at a distance, with a great deal of that deference which was paid to them in the reign of Louis XVI. Dispersed among two hundred thousand electors, are one hundred and thirty-eight thousand functionaries, who annually receive forty millions of dollars: so that, from the crown, which is the fountain, corruption may flow in a thousand rivulets through every section of the Empire. These functionaries (excepting a few) may not only aspire to sit in the Chamber, but to represent an arrondissement, or district, without possessing any property within its limits: in consequence of which privilege-of four hundred and fifty-nine members, one hundred and sixty-four now live upon the bounty of the crown. When a representative, thus elected, repairs to the capital, the insidious desire of advancement is ever at war with the integrity of his character. The custom of voting secretly, cuts off all communication between himself and his constituents, who diminishes its number, is replenished by the Prince with those who, having spent their lives in his service, are little likely to oppose his policy or wishes. An evil so obvious, has been partially removed in can never instruct him; else, in matters of imporother States on the continent. The members of tance, they might secure his independence by inthe First Chamber of the General Estates in Hol-structing him; for Instructions prevent corruption land and Wurtemburg, though created for life by by taking from the representative the power of the Prince, can neither propose measures, nor be selling himself. increased beyond sixty. As the King cannot veto a measure, (for it must be done with the consent of the ministry, which is always in a majority of the Deputies,) the Peers are often employed to arrest measures which his prerogative could not resist. For this purpose, during the ministry of M. de Cazes, fifty names were, at one time, added to the Peerage. Thus, in France, as in England, the veto has assumed a new shape, which has led some to deny that it ex isted, when, in truth, it was doubly formidable by the secresy of its operation! When, at length, the Chamber assembles, the crown may take the initiative. During the last session, (1840-'41,) only two measures (and they were lost) originated in the Chamber. In both Houses, the ministers of the crown, the highest desire to speak. They may, likewise, unite the executive officers, must be heard whenever they functions of a deputy with those which each already possesses, as a minister; so that, by the initiative, the crown may set the legislature in motion-by the right of speaking, may influence--and by that of voting, direct its course. II. Other Limitations. As it is needless to expect independence in a House which may be increased at the pleasure of Though the King's prerogative is greatly exthe crown, let us rather turn our eyes to the tended by influence, its exercise is very often Chamber of Deputies, (justly regarded as the cita- limited or restrained, not only by public opinion, del of French liberty,) in order to discover whether but by customs and political expedients. He may, for instance, appoint officers, and remove them ; yet |under a military régime, it ceases to be dangerous, he cannot freely exercise this prerogative, because for then the citizens are able to resist it. This plan custom now gives the functionary so good a title makes every citizen a soldier, and every soldier a to his office, that were removals for opinion's sake citizen. It was devised under the auspices of La to take place as extensively as we have seen them Fayette, at the breaking out of the Great Revoluin England and America, the dynasty itself might tion, to suppress disorder and robbery. At this be endangered by the public resentment. Minis- time, it comprises near two millions of citizens, try succeeds ministry without discharging him of independent occupations, who can well sustain whose duties are independent of his opinions. the loss of money and time, and throw no ridicule Whether officer, clerk, postmaster, or contractor, on the corps to which they belong. This system he rests unconcerned in his office, amidst the fre- presses with a gentle hand on industry, not at all quent ministerial explosions, which, like noisy but on poverty. It sends the voluptuous nobleman to empty thunder, break harmlessly over his head. guard the portals of the capital; but it leaves the blacksmith at his anvil, and the shoemaker at his last. It might be useful to inquire how far some plan of defence might be advantageously adopted here. No man has a right to live in a commonwealth, who refuses to prepare himself to bear arms in its Rotation in office may but slightly injure the public service; yet it is formidable to the public morals. A postmaster or collector may be relieved at the end of four years without a letter being lost, or the revenue diminished; (and what takes place in one city occurs throughout the country.) But when it becomes usual for leaders to reward with defence. Yet, in a free state, no plan can be inoffice the zeal of their followers, inviting prospects troduced so long as every citizen prefers his own are spread before them; and the city which expe- convenience to the honor and security of his rienced no inconvenience from the changes we country. Then, indeed, that a plan is expensive, have imagined, finds its citizens either bribed or is sufficient to make him believe that it is inexpedeluded, less by the public functionary than by the dient; or that a war is unproductive, to convince numerous expectants of the opposition, who, to re-him that it is dishonorable. Our army is small, and our territory is vast in commend themselves by their zeal, employ the We lie exposed on the South, the East, and the North. Danger from this exposure will There are, indeed, two classes of public func- increase as the nations around us grow powerful; tionaries. In the first, should be comprised those and as steam, by future improvement, shall enable (as ministers, members of the cabinet, &c.) whose others to send well-trained armies to attack us unduties are connected with their political views; and expectedly. But the reason which deserves to all those should be referred to the second, whose weigh heaviest on the mind, is derived from the duties have no connection with opinion whatever. character of our mixed population. Elsewhere, To preserve harmony in an administration, the the nation's strength is in a class inured to labor former might justly be discharged; but why should and course diet; but while our corresponding class a postmaster, who receives letters and dispatches cannot be entrusted with arms, the white man is them with regularity, be removed for his opinions enervated; and this contains within itself a new upon the subject of finance? Will he use his posi-reason for so organizing our militia, as to make it tion to influence the elections? Secure that, and a security against attack from abroad, and insurhe will have no reason for doing it. In truth, the rection at home. custom originated in England, and is perpetuated To return. We have now glanced at the chief here, because every administration finds precedent limitations which have been imposed on the preto sustain it; and zealous partizans, in the hour of rogatives of the King of the French. Others, devictory, seldom relinquish, voluntarily, the usual vised by the legislature to secure the rights of prorecompense of their toil. Hence, it must con-perty and the liberty of individuals against the tinue till it falls gradually under the reprobation of instruments of the crown, we deem of equal imporpublic opinion. tance; but we are compelled to pass them by. Limitations of royal authority in Italy and Ger The King of the French is commander of the many. army and of the navy; but the exercise of this prerogative, so formidable to liberty, is now restrained by various expedients. The Deputies, who grant The Princes of Italy have been extremely par the supplies, may diminish the army or navy at simonious in distributing power amongst the peopleasure. Over both departments have ministers ple. Lombardy, for example, (and all the kingbeen placed, for whose conduct the whole ministry doms of Italy enjoy power in nearly the same shape, is responsible whilst an admirable counterpoise to and to nearly an equal extent,) has been divided, the army has been found in the National Guard. by the Emperor of Austria, into two territories, Since the dangers of a standing army arise from the Territorio Milanese and the Territorio Vene its superior discipline, when the mass is brought to. Each territory, he has subdivided into provin ces, which have, in their turn, been cut up into guarantied, by the Diet, need the favor of some communes. In the latter, besides a Mayor, as ex- powerful ally. And hence the Emperor's influecutive officer, there is a Council, whose members, ence equals this need of his protection, as might first named by the Emperor, now supply the va- be abundantly exemplified; but in no instance more cancies that occur among themselves. Each pro- strikingly, than that of the Prince of Lichtenstein, vince has its provincial congregation (congrega-who has introduced into his principality, not only zione), which was likewise first filled by the Em- the political organization, but the civil and criminal peror, but is now replenished by the communal laws, of Austria.* councils, which send, each one, two deputies to the congregation, where three are selected, one of whom is appointed by the viceroy. There is, besides, both at Milan and at Venice, a central congregation, the members of which were first named by the Emperor, but are now selected by the communal councils and royal cities; each of which sends two names to the Provincial congregation, where all are eliminated except three. These three are presented to the central congregation, which selects one, whose nomination must finally be ratified at Vienna.* In the States of the second class (excepting Hanover) no law concerning the property or liberty of individuals, can be made, suspended, or modified, without the consent of the Estates; neither can any tax, whether direct or indirect, be imposed; and the ministers are there said to be responsible. But, in conceding these liberties, numerous precautions were taken to prevent their extension. Where the elections were made neither double nor triple, the elective franchise was extended to no more than one inhabitant in forty, who can exerThese assemblies, after being informed how cise the right but once in six or eight years, in much the crown requires of the Province, proceed choosing representatives, who assemble but every to distribute and collect the taxes, in the manner three. Then, by the constitutions of Germany, most agreeable to themselves. They assess, like- the elected is required to take oath, that he will wise, the military charges, in times of war as in not regard the interests of any locality, which cuts times of peace: they raise and administer the re-off all communication between him and his convenues of the 'communes ;' superintend the roads, stituents. When, finally, the two houses are asthe bridges, the weights and measures; regulate sembled, with one created by the crown, neither all charitable establishments; exercise legislative, can take the initiative. The supplies, in some judicial, or executive authority, in all cases sub- States, are voted for three years, instead of one; mitted to them by the Emperor; and offer counsel in others, for six; but, in all, it is expressly forto his majesty in relation to those matters which bidden to annex conditions to them as it was once touch the welfare of the Province. But the Em- the custom to do in England. Lest the representaperor has reserved (act 17) the power of exclu- tives of the nation, thus assembled in one body, ding any member who is unworthy of the confi- should refuse the supplies and thus extort condidence reposed in him, holding it as true, that tions from the monarch, Austria and Prussia have "franchises are but regal privileges in the hands perseveringly refused to establish a national asof a subject; and therefore may be lost or forfeit-sembly; they maintain the provisional ones, which ed, like offices, either by abuse or by neglect." act without concert, or even communication, and Such is a fair specimen of the liberty which the dare not make singly any sign of resistance, whilst Italians now enjoy. the supplies from one province enforce obedience from another;-these assemblies, all the while, subserving the purposes of despotism under an appearance of freedom. In Germany, since the downfall of Napoleon, liberty has progressed more rapidly. But that progress has been chiefly confined to the States of the second class as Bavaria, Wurtemburg, Saxony, and the Grand Duchy of Baden. In Austria, the Emperor, in one Province, maintains its ancient despotism; in another, he seems to give, in order to retain more securely. * Constitution of Lichtenstein, granted 9th Nov., 1819. It is remarkable, that there is no country in Europe where a representative is obliged to obey the instructions of the people. In nine-tenths, on the contrary, he is expressly enjoined by the constitution to disregard them. There are, indeed, some apparent exceptions; but, in every case, is one assembly that instructs the members of another. The Great Council of a Swiss Canton invinces may likewise instruct its deputy in the General structs its delegate in the Diet. One of the United Pro In Russia, the late King, notwithstanding his promises, perseveringly refused a general representation to his kingdom; but his successor, although likely to follow his example in this respect, has augmented the powers of the provincial assem-Estates of the Kingdom; and those who sit in the Diet of blies. Hungary obey the provincial assemblies. But these in In the constitutions of the smaller, but more nu-structions proceed from other representatives; whilst those merous, members of the Germanic Confederacy, we observe few signs of liberty: for those feeble Princes, whose laws are maintained, whose States *Constitution of Lombardy, promulgated 24th April, 1815. which are directed to the members of the Germanic Diet, proceed from the sovereign Princes and free cities of the confederacy. I once examined the constitutions of the South American Republics; but, as well as I remember, they contain no allusion to the subject. |