being general, it comprises, of course, whatever cannot be shown to be necessarily an exception to it.

"The only constitutional exception to the power of making treaties is, that it shall not change the Constitution, which results from this fundamental maxim, that a delegated authority cannot alter the constituting act, unless so explicitly authorized by the constituting power. An agent cannot new model his own commission. A treaty, for example, cannot transfer the legislative power to the Executive department, nor the power of the last department to the judiciary; in other words, it cannot stipulate that the President, and not Congress, shall make laws for the United States, that the judges, and not the President, shall command the national forces.

"Again there is also a National exception to the power of making treaties, as there is to every other delegated power, which respects abuses of authority in palpable and extreme cases. On natural principles, a treaty which should manifestly betray or sacrifice the private interests of the State, would be null. But this presents a question foreign from that of the modification or distribution of constitutional powers. It applies to the case of the pernicious exercise of a power, where there is legal competency. Thus the power of treaty, though extending to the right of making alliances offensive and defensive, might not be exercised in making an alliance so injurious to the State as to justify the non-observance of the contract. Beyond these exceptions to the power, none occurs that can be supported.”

"As to the intention of the Convention," Hamilton observed, "from the best opportunity of knowing the fact, I aver, that it was understood by all, to be the intent of the provision to give to that power the most ample latitude to render it competent to all the stipulations, which the exigencies of national affairs might requirecompetent to the making of treaties of alliance, treaties of commerce, treaties of peace, and every other species of convention usual among nations, and competent, in the course of its exercise for these purposes, to control and bind the legislative power of Congress; and it was emphatically for this reason, that it was so carefully guard

ed-the coöperation of two-thirds of the Senate being required to make any treaty whatever."

It had been objected, that the treaty with Great Britain conflicted with several of the legislative powers granted to Congress. After referring to these grants of power, and reconciling their exercise with the operation of the treaty power, Hamilton alludes to that authorizing Congress "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization. The power of Congress with respect to an uniform rule of naturalization is said to be interfered with by those provisions of the treaty which secure to the settlers, within the precincts of the British ports, the right of becoming citizens of the United States, and those which, in certain cases, remove the disability of alienism as to property." In respect to this objection, he remarked:

"Though Congress are authorized to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, yet this contemplates only the ordinary cases of internal administration. In particular and extraordinary cases, those in which the pretensions of a foreign government are to be managed, a treaty may also confer the rights and privileges of citizens; THUS THE ABSOLUTE CESSION AND PLENARY DOMINION of a province or district, possessed by our arms in war, may be accepted by the treaty of peace, on the condition, that its inhabitants shall, in their persons and property, enjoy the privileges of citizens."

This view is confirmed by reference to several treaties with Indians made under the Confederation, acquiring and ceding territory-a common feature of which, showing the extent of the power exerted, is, the withdrawing the protection of the United States from those of their citizens who intrude on Indian lands. Treaties with them, also, under this Constitution, regulated and changed the boundaries between them and the United States; and one relinquishes a large tract of land previously ceded.

This statement shows Hamilton's clear conviction, that

the United States had the power to acquire Louisiana by treaty; and, having acquired it, to stipulate for its inhabitants the privileges of citizens. A less power than this would involve the many dangerous consequences of compelling this nation, should emergencies lead it to purchase or compel it to conquer adjacent territory, to hold that territory as a dependency, without the right of conferring on its inhabitants the common privileges of this Union. Nor is it to be supposed, that the statesmen who framed the Constitution, long and recently as their attention had been directed to the securing an outlet to the trade of the Mississippi, were not looking to this acquisition, as an early instance for the exercise of the power of acquiring it by treaty, or by conquest. That the power of incorporating such territory into the Union was not intended to be excluded from the Constitution may be inferred from the alteration in the phraseology of that instrument, used in this respect. The "tenth Virginia resolution" declared-that provision ought to be made for the admission of States, lawfully arising within the limits of the United States. The articles reported by the committee of detail also contained this limitation ;-but, on the discussion of them, this limitation was expunged, and the broader suggestion of the Jersey scheme was carried into effect-language equivalent to that in Hamilton's plan* being adopted in these comprehensive terms"New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union," with the sole restriction as to "a State formed within the jurisdiction of another State," as had been contemplated in Pennsylvania and North Carolina—or, “by the junction of two or more States or parts of States ;"

In his Art. 9. Sec. 7. "The Legislature of the United States may admit new States into the Union."

that "the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of Congress" be a pre-requisite.

When, beside the other great motives to this acquisition, that of preserving by it an "Unity of Empire,” and the subsequent extension of this Republic over Northern America, thus enlarging its domain and filling up its glorious influences, are seen to have been primary considerations in Hamilton's mind, how strange to his ear would have sounded Jefferson's after language: "Whether we remain in one confederacy, or form into Atlantic and Mississippi confederacies, I believe not very important to the happiness of either part."*

* Jefferson to Priestley. Jan. 29, 1804. Jefferson's Works, iv. 525, ed.

1854.

CHAPTER CLXIV.

AFTER the enactment of the laws relating to Louisiana, the subject of impressment was revived by Logan; and a bill was introduced for the further protection of American seamen. It passed the House, but was postponed by a vote of two-thirds of the Senate.

An augmentation of the Navy, as the only efficient means of protecting the commerce of the country, was urged by the Federalists, but was opposed as involving an expenditure beyond its resources. The war with Tripoli had been long and unnecessarily protracted, until the wreck of a frigate, Jefferson declared, "renders it expedient to increase our force and enlarge our expenditure." The increased force was of two vessels to carry not more than sixteen guns, and as many gunboats as the President should choose to hire or accept on loan. The increased tax to meet the enlarged expenditure was an addition of two and an half per cent. to the existing ad valorem duties, and of ten per cent. on all imports in foreign vessels. The product of this tax would yield precisely the sum requisite to discharge the interest on the Louisiana debt. The loss of a frigate was the pretext for its imposition. It was called the "Mediterranean fund." Thus early was Hamilton's prediction verified, that the abolition of the internal revenues would induce