be confessed that there is an obvious difference as either religious or among individuals, even though they may pro- irreligious. fess a belief in the same religious doctrines, in respect of the habit of belief. There are in fact two grand classes, into which mankind have, under every modification of their moral circumstances, been visibly divided; viz. the religious, and the irreligious. Without losing sight for a moment of the essential difference between a superstitious fear of "The Unknown God," and an intelligent sense of the Divine Attributes, we may extend the application of the remark, to the times of the darkest ignorance, during which, while some of the heathen were occupied in blindly feeling after the Deity, if by any means they might find out the Almighty, others distinguished themselves by a wanton impiety, a profane indifference to all considerations respecting the Unseen Being, and an after-state. Profaneness is a degree lower in irreligion, than the very grossness of idolatry. The term profane, has, it is true, been frequently misapplied by the votaries of superstition, for even the first Christians were charged with Atheism; still, we must regard the conduct of those who, amid all the errors and delusions of paganism, discovered an anxious solicitude to discharge their obligations to their unknown Creator, as indicating principles at any rate superior to those of the sensual and irreligious

multitude. In some instances, there was certainly an approach to the character of genuine though uninstructed piety.

This essential difference in regard to the exercise of the religious principle, is not less observable, where the doctrines of Christianity are recognised by the nation at large as the rule of faith and worship. There is a carelessness about the consequences of admitted truths, evidenced in the practical disregard of all the considerations founded on religious belief, which may consist with an unhesitating assent to the evidence of Christianity, leaving the character of the individual to manifest its independence of the understanding by all the obvious qualities of irreligion. In what proportion of instances the admission of the truth of Christianity is unattended by any moral influence, it is unnecessary to inquire; the fact is unquestionable. The sense of a Divine Being, as an infinite reality, seems to be altogether latent in the minds of many individuals, whose apprehensions of religious doctrine are as accurate as instruction can impart; and although the outward conduct may be neither profane nor flagrantly immoral, all the appropriate evidences of devout belief are sensibly wanting. Religious instruction is the means of awakening the principle of belief, but it is perfectly manifest that it is not an instrument of inherent or universal efficacy. It is

not a cause adequate to produce that change in the disposition, which is involved in the individual's becoming habitually reverential towards the objects of faith, and consistent in the regulation of his conduct by the principles of religion. When we say that a man has changed his religion, it does not always imply that he has become religious; he may only have undergone a rational change of sentiment on certain subjects connected with Christian belief; a change which a Pagan or a Mahommedan may experience, and yet remain destitute of that faith which is the essence of true religion.

That change of sentiment which consists in a person's receiving as true, that of which he previously doubted from ignorance, is the effect of knowledge rather than of faith. It is no act of faith, for instance, to receive as true, upon the ground of external evidence, the historical records of the New Testament, since that evidence is of a nature which renders doubt irrational. There is a sense in which it may be said that we believe in all the objects of our knowledge; but the principle which the Holy Scriptures denominate faith, respects objects which can be known to the individual only in consequence of his believing in the testimony which assures him of their reality: it is a knowledge which consists in belief; not a simple apprehension of their existence, but a sense of their truth.

Operation

of the reli

gious principle.

The end of Religion is to bring the mind into immediate contact with the unseen objects of faith to reunite the soul to God in that actual intercourse of which spiritual beings are capable. It is evident, therefore, that Religion cannot consist in knowledge, because knowledge has no such property. The knowledge of the existence or of the qualities of an object, is not uniformly accompanied with a sense of its excellency. In order to its having any influence on our affections, there must exist in our moral nature some correspondence with its attributes or character. There must be some degree of likeness where desire exists. It is not then by a simple effort of the intellectual faculty, but by an exercise of the active powers of our nature, that our minds become so united to an object, as to receive its moral influence, and to derive. enjoyment from its presence. Faith, therefore, is not to be considered as a mere act of the understanding, because its properties, as described in Scripture, are such as are peculiar to the active principles of man: its tendency and design are to unite our minds to those invisible things which, by believing, we know to exist, assured of their reality by the very feelings-the hopes and joys which they inspire.

It is of vast importance to distinguish faith from religious knowledge, although the connexion which subsists between them, is inti

mate and essential. "Faith cometh by hear"ing:" but that in which our knowledge originates, is the means only, not the cause of our believing. We are commanded to believe; but did belief, in the scriptural acceptation, relate simply to the understanding, would it have been enjoined as an act of obedience? Is there any thing of a moral character in a mere exercise of reason, that should constitute it a matter of duty? Must not Faith, then, to be a moral act, relate to the disposition of the heart, as essentially involved in its exercise? Faith is, indeed, a rational act; it is nevertheless the result, not of reason, for then all men who can reason would believe, but of religious obedience, in respect of which, men of exactly the same intellectual advantages, differ infinitely. Faith or belief implies a certain degree of previous knowledge; but the measure of our knowledge is so far from being the measure of our duty, that we are encouraged to expect its increase as the effect and the reward of faith: "If any man will do the will of God, he shall "know of the doctrine, whether it be of God." There is as much scope for the exercise of that disposition of mind in which Faith originates, at the lowest degree of knowledge or of probability, as at the highest attainable points of clearness and certainty in the comprehension and assured persuasion of the truth,