2dly. What are the rights of government in regard to the public expression and dissemination of doctrines in religion. Here, too, we admit that it is rarely expedient, and of consequence rarely right, for government to interfere. Not that such interference, although by producing a powerful reaction, it may sometimes serve to extend, instead of checking the obnoxious opinions, would generally be ineffectual; but because the truth is most successfully discovered and propagated by an honest and free avowal of sentiments, and an independent and unrestrained discussion of opposite arguments; while such discussions are conducted with moderation and decency. This principle, however, is not without its limitations. Doctrines have been taught and may again be taught, as the precepts of religion, which strike at the very foundations of social order. Thus, when the Catholics inculcated upon their hearers, that no allegiance was due to a protestant ruler, and that even to assassinate such a one was doing God service, it cannot be doubted that such preaching might not only be forbidden but punished by the civil power, however sincerely the plea of conscience might be urged in justification.

3dly. In regard to actions, the sphere of government is more extensive. If any one should maintain, that government has no right to prohibit and punish actions, which are prompted by a sincere conscience, or even in some cases to require those which the conscience of the individual may forbid let him well consider to what consequences, such a principle might sometimes lead. When the fanatical guides of the mob at Munster led their followers to such enormities of indecency and extravagance, had the civil arm no right to interfere? And when Ravaillac raised his hand against the life of Henry IV. of France ;-when the Catholics of the Netherlands were taught, that the assassination of the Prince of Orange, the gallant defender of the cause of protestantism and liberty, would be a deed most acceptable in the sight of God, and the solemn duty of every Papist; had the civil arm no right to interfere? When many of the deluded followers of George Fox went naked through the streets, and into the assembled religious congregations of several of the principal cities of England, for a sign to the people; some of them at least were undoubtedly actuated by motives the most conscientious—and had the civil arm no right to interfere?-Nay, more; this very plea of conscience would destroy itself. The bloodiest persecutors, and many of them no doubt with sincerity, have professed the commands of conscience, no less than their victims. If conscience called the martyr to the stake, it was conscience also that bound him to it and lighted the faggots, which were to consume

him. It was the conscience no less than the cruelty of Philip II. which filled the prisons of the inquisition and kindled the fires of the auto da fe. Even the Apostle of the Gentiles thought that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth.

But it may be objected, Has not a man a right to act in obedience to the dictates of his conscience? Undoubtedly, he has not only a right, but it is his duty so to do. Conscience may be erroneous, but it is our only guide, and we are bound to follow it. Can then opposite rights exist; can I have a right to act in a certain way, and at the same time government a right to punish me for it? Not in the abstract nature of things; but in relation to human agents, with limited intelligence, it cannot be otherwise. If you think it your duty to take the life of your neighbour, without the forms of law, you are bound to do it; and it is the no less solemn duty of the law, to hang you for it; or should you be acquitted, it would not be on the ground of conscience, but of insanity. The guilt is in a vincible error-nay, this same conscience itself, sincere as it may be, is often founded on the habitual indulgence of the very vilest passions of our nature. What then is the conclusion? That even in matters of conscience, government must possess the abstract right to interpose its authority; and that the practical right of actual interposition depends not on the scrupulosity, or sincerity of the conscience of the subject; but on the nature and circumstances of the case, or in other words, on expediency. I am aware, that in these remarks upon the general rights of conscience, I shall seem to many to have been labouring to prove some of the plainest and most acknowledged principles of civil polity; and I have been thus particular, not because they appear to me to be necessarily connected with the question in debate, for I am unable to perceive that any provision of the third article of the bill of rights can be considered a violation of a conscience the most scrupulous; but because they have been so often introduced in the discussion.

Do you believe in any religion? If you do not, conscience has nothing to do with the subject; if you do, do you conceive your religion to be of any importance to society? If so, you must think it, in the same proportion, important that a knowledge of it should be diffused; and of consequence that is your duty, in proportion to your means, to aid in this diffusion. Or, will you say that this is a duty of religion, and therefore government has no right to interpose additional sanctions to those of the Divine law. But are you not aware, that the principle of this argument would bear equally against all human means; that it denies the right of gov

ernment to forbid or to command a single act, that is forbidden or commanded by the law of God? The law of God has said, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not kill has civil law then no right to punish theft or murder? Perhaps you will say, this is true only in relation to those acts, which are peculiarly of a religious nature. Is it wrong then for government to punish profaneness or blasphemy, because it is written, Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain ?

But the bill of rights may in its operation require you to assist in the support of a form of religion, in which you do not believe; nay, more, which you may think positively pernicious. It would here perhaps be enough to answer, that this is by no meus a necessary or a frequent case, that it is only one of those accidental evils, which must sometimes follow from the operation of the most wholesome general rules; but we are willing to meet the objection in its full force. When, therefore, you say, positively pernicious, you probably mean in comparison with the religion which you believe to be the true : since you will not, it is thought, deny, that any religion, which recognizes the great doctrine of retribution, and teaches a correct system of morals, is better than absolute atheism. Did the establishment of the legal teacher take from you the liberty of propagating your own opinions in the parish, there would be something in the objection. But you may labour by every means in your power, both by yourself and the preachers of your sect, to make proselytes of those around you, and should you succeed in gaining a majority, you become entitled to all the privileges of the prevailing party. You are not, therefore, required to aid in the support of a positive evil, but only of an inferior good; nor does even this preclude you from adopting every proper means, which you could otherwise use, for substituting what you believe to be the truth in the place of delusion. Let me ask any conscientious opposer of the principles I am supporting, should an estate in some Catholic country be devised to you, encumbered with the regular tithes to the catholic bishop, or an annuity to a convent, would you on this account hesitate to accept it? Yet were this same devise accompanied with a condition, that you should profess the religion of the Pope, you would undoubtedly reject the gift. What then is the difference, but that in the latter case there is a direct violation of conscience required, while in the former there is none. If, then, under such circumstances, it would be no violation of conscience to pay the tithes or the annuity, when called upon by the law of the land; how can it be a violation of conscience, to require you to contribute your proportion to the support of a form of religion, differing far less materially from your own. New Series-vol. III. .

5

You probably admit it to be the legitimate province of government to secure to every religious assembly the peaceable worship of God in their own way; and is not this an ordinance of government for the support of religion? and may it not impose restraints upon some as burthensome and as directly conducive to what they may conceive the advancement of error, as the requisition made in the former case of you? Consider the suspension of the occupations and labours of busy life upon sabbath. This is absolutely necessary, that christians may peaceably worship God on that day; yet might not the Jew urge every argument against it, which you can bring forward in the present case? You may say the bill of rights gives facilities for the propagating of the orthodox or the unitarian heresy, and takes from you the dollar, which you have earned. The Jew may say the Christian sabbath gives facilities for spreading the Christian heresy, and takes from him the opportunity of acquiring the dollar, he might otherwise have earned. The establishment of public schools by law is as truly a violation of conscience as the bill of rights; unless there were appended to every such law a positive prohibition, that any master of such school should either pray with his pupils, or give them any instruction touching religion.

I shall now make some remarks upon the second question, the only one, as it seems to me upon which a reasonable doubt can be entertained. Is it then to be expected that religion will be more widely disseminated and better taught, when supported by government, than if left to the voluntary contributions of the citizens?

A strong presumption in favour of the affirmative of this question arises from the universal practice of governments in this respect. Statesmen of all ages have considered the influence of the motives of religion essential to the support of civil laws, and that civil laws were no less necessary to the support of the influence of religion. So remarkable is this universality, that Bishop Warburton, as is well known, considers it a sufficient evidence of the divine legation of Moses, that he did not avail himself of the sanctions of a future state, to give authority to the Jewish ritual and law.

But here will be urged the old objection, the corruptions of religion, the persecutions, and the tyranny that have so generally attended the union of church and state. As well might we argue that because most of the governments of the old world have been oppressive, therefore government itself is an evil and to be abolished. To show the utter inapplicability of the objection, let us consider for a moment in what this union has consisted, and whence its evils have arisen. Take, for illustration,

the establishment of the English church, the purest, perhaps, which has been formed. It has a clergy consisting of different ranks, the higher orders of which are possessed of great wealth and power, and in a great degree dependent on the government not merely for support, but for their appointment and rise in the church; and all this patronage is confined to a single sect, guarded by creeds and subscriptions. What are the consequences? That freedom of inquiry is greatly restricted; that the valuable livings of the church are often made either the consideration or the reward of political subserviency, and the whole weight of clerical influence and ambition brought to aid the measures of the ministry.

I would be understood to speak here, not of the necessary, but the natural consequences. To these consequences there have been and are many noble exceptions. Now let me put it to any man's conscience, to say if either of these tendencies is to be found in the provisions of the Bill of Rights. So far from giving to any one sect the preponderance over another, it is expressly declared that no such preponderance ever shall be given. In freedom of inquiry and judgment, neither the minister nor his people are under any other restraint than that which arises from their mutual influence and from general opinion. Neither the legislature nor the executive have at their disposal the meanest parish in the commonwealth. They cannot deprive a single minister, increase his salary, or advance him to a higher station in the church. For every thing he is dependent on his parish. They elect him to his office, fix the measure of his support, and, when they please, will dismiss him from both. Under such circumstances, even were our executive a monarch and a portion of our legislature an hereditary aristocracy, there could be nothing to fear. But when it is further recollected, that the whole body of the government proceed annually from the bosom of the people, and by the free votes of the people, he, who talks of the dangerous union of church and state, must be either himself deluded by a name, or seek to impose that delusion on others.

Again, an argument against the necessity of the aid of government in the support of religion, is drawn from the history of the dissenters in England, and of several sects in our own country, and from the practice of some of the larger towns in the commonwealth. These facts may be readily admitted, and as easily explained.

As to dissenters, two general observations may be made. In the first place it may be remarked, that those who vary from the prevalent form of religion, still feel all the influence of the