CHA P. XII.

SLANDER.

SPEA

PEAKING is acting, both in philosophical ftrictnefs, and as to all moral purposes; for, if the mischief and motive of our conduct be the fame, the means which we use make no difference.

And this is in effect what our Saviour declares, Matt. xii. 37. By thy words thou"fhalt be juftified, and by thy words thou shalt "be condemned:" by thy words, as well that is, as by thy actions; the one shall be taken into the account, as well as the other, for they both poffefs the fame property of voluntarily producing good or evil.

Slander may be diftinguished into two kinds, malicious flander, and inconfiderate flander.

Malicious flander, is the relating of either truth or falfehood, for the purpose of creating mifery. I acknowledge that the truth or falfehood of what is related varies the degree of guilt confiderably;

derably; and that flander, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, fignifies the circulation of mischievous falsehoods: but truth may be made inftrumental to the fuccefs of malicious defigns as well as falfehood; and if the end be bad, the means cannot be innocent.

I think the idea of flander ought to be confined to the production of gratuitous mischief. When we have an end or intereft of our own to ferve, if we attempt to compafs it by falfehood, it is fraud; if by a publication of the truth, it is not without fome additional circumftance of breach of promife, betraying of confidence, or the like, to be deemed criminal.

Sometimes the pain is intended for the perfon to whom we are speaking; at other times an enmity is to be gratified by the prejudice or difquiet of a third perfon. To infufe fufpicions, to kindle or continue difputes, to avert the favour and efteem of benefactors from their dependants, to render fome one whom we diflike contemptible or obnoxious in the public opinion, are all offices of flander; of which the guilt must be measured by the intensity and extent of the misery produced.

The difguifes under which flander is conveyed, whether in a whisper, with injunctions of fecrefy,

by way of caution, or with affected reluctance, are all fo many aggravations of the offence, as they indicate more deliberation and design.

Inconfiderate flander is a different offence, although the fame mischief actually follow, and although the mischief might have been foreseen. The not being conscious of that design, which we have hitherto attributed to the flanderer, makes the difference.

The guilt here confifts in the want of that regard to the confequences of our conduct, which a juft affection for human happiness, and concern for our duty, would not have failed to have produced in us. And it is no anfwer to this crimination to say, that we entertained no evil defign. A fervant may be a very bad servant, and yet feldom or never defign to act in oppofition to his master's intereft or will; and his master may justly punish fuch fervant for a thoughtleffness and neglect nearly as prejudicial as deliberate difobedience. I accufe you not, he may fay, of any exprefs intention to hurt me; but had not the fear of my displeasure, the care of my intereft, and indeed all the qualities which conftitute the merit of a good fervant, been wanting in you, they would not only have excluded every direct purpose of giving me uneasi

nefs,

nefs, but have been fo far prefent to your thoughts, as to have checked that unguarded licentiousness, by which I have fuffered fo much, and inspired you in its place with an habitual folicitude about the effects and tendency of what you did or faid. This very much resembles the cafe of all fins of inconfideration; and, amongst the foremost of thefe, that of inconfiderate flander.

Information communicated for the real purpofe of warning, or cautioning, is not flander. Indifcriminate praise is the opposite of flander, but it is the oppofite extreme; and, however may affect to be thought excefs of candour, is commonly the effufion of a frivolous underftanding, or proceeds from a fettled contempt of all moral distinctions.

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VOL. I.

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MORAL