as I had made fuch a promise, it was prudent to perform it; or that, as my friend, when he went abroad, placed a box of jewels in my hands, it would be prudent in me to preferve it for him

till he returned.

Now, in what, you will afk, does the dif ference confift? inasmuch as, according to our account of the matter, both in the one cafe and the other, in acts of duty as well as acts of prudence, we confider folely what we ourselves fhall gain or lose by the act?

The difference, and the only difference, is this; that, in the one cafe we confider what we shall gain or lose in the prefent world; in the other cafe, we confider alfo what we shall gain or lofe in the world to come.

Those who would establish a system of morality, independent of a future ftate, muft look out for fome different idea of moral obligation; unless they can fhew that virtue conducts the poffeffor to certain happiness in this life, or to a much greater fhare of it, than he could attain by a different behaviour.

To us there are two great questions;

I. Will there be after this life any of rewards and punishments at all?

diftribution

II. If there be, what actions will be rewarded, and what will be punished?

The first question comprises the credibility of the Christian religion, together with the prefumptive fruits of a future retribution from the light of nature. The fecond queftion comprises the province of morality. Both questions are too much for one work. The affirmative therefore of the first, although we confess that it is the foundation upon which the whole fabric refts, must in this treatise be taken for granted.

CHAP. IV.

THE WILL OF GOD.

S the will of God is our rule, to inquire

As our or

what is our duty, or what we are obliged to do, in any inftance, is, in effect, to inquire, what is the will of God in that inftance? which consequently becomes the whole business of morality.

Now there are two methods of coming at the will of God on any point:

I. By his express declarations, when they are to be had, and which must be fought for in Scripture.

II. By what we can discover of his designs and difpofition from his works; or, as we ufually call it, the light of nature.

And here we may observe the absurdity of separating natural and revealed religion from each other. The object of both is the fame-to difcover the will of God-and, provided we do but discover it, it matters nothing by what means.

An ambaffador, judging by what he knows of his fovereign's difpofition, and arguing from what he has obferved of his conduct, or is acquainted with of his defigns, may take his meafures in many cases with fafety; and presume with great probability how his master would have him act on moft occafions that arife; but if he have his commiffion and instructions in his pocket, it would be ftrange not to look into them. He will naturally conduct himself by both rules when his inftructions are clear and pofitive, there is an end of all further deliberation (unless indeed he suspect their authenticity): where his inftructions are filent or dubious, he

will endeavour to fupply or explain them, by what he has been able to collect from other quarters of his master's general inclination or intentions.

Mr. HUME, in his fourth Appendix to his Principles of Morals, has been pleased to complain of the modern fcheme of uniting Ethics. with the Chriftian Theology. They who find themselves difpofed to join in this complaint will do well to obferve what Mr. HUME himself has been able to make of morality without this union. And for that purpose, let them read the second part of the ninth fection of the above effay; which part contains the practical application of the whole treatife-a treatife, which Mr. HUME declares to be " incomparably the best he ever "wrote." When they have read it over, let. them confider, whether motives there proposed are likely to be found fufficient to withhold men from the gratification of luft, revenge, envy, ambition, avarice, or to prevent the existence of thefe paffions. Unless they rife up from this celebrated effay, with ftronger impreffions upon their minds than it ever left upon mine, they will acknowledge the neceffity of additional fanctions. But the neceffity of these fanctions is not now the queftion. If they be in fact established

any

blished, if the rewards and punishments held forth in the gospel will actually come to pass, they must be confidered. Such as reject the Christian religion are to make the best shift they can to build up a fyftem, and lay the foundation of morality without it. But it appears to me a great inconfiftency in those who receive Christianity, and expect fomething to come of it, to endeavour to keep all fuch expectations out of fight in their reasonings concerning human duty.

The method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into "the tendency of the action "to promote or diminish the general happiness." This rule proceeds upon the presumption, that God Almighty wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures; and, confequently, that those actions, which promote that will and wish, must be agreeable to him; and the contrary.

As this prefumption is the foundation of our whole fyftem, it becomes neceffary to explain the reafons upon which it refts.

VOL. I.

F

CHAP.