CHAP. V.

W

THE DIVINE BENEVOLENCE.

HEN God created the human species, either he wished their happiness or he wished their mifery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about both.

If he had wished our mifery, he might have made fure of his purpose, by forming our senses to be as many fores and pains to us, as they are now inftruments of gratification and enjoyment; or by placing us amidft objects fo ill fuited to our perceptions, as to have continually offended us, instead of ministering to our refreshment and delight. He might have made, for example, every thing we tasted bitter; every thing we faw loathsome; every thing we touched a fting; every smell a ftench; and every found a difcord.

If he had been indifferent about our happiness or misery, we muft impute to our good fortune (as all defign by this fuppofition is excluded) both the capacity of our fenfes to re

ceive

ceive pleasure, and the supply of external objects fitted to produce it.

But either of these, and still more both of them, being too much to be attributed to accident, nothing remains but the firft fuppofition, that God, when he created the human species, wished their happiness; and made for them the provifion which he has made, with that view, and for that purpose.

The fame argument may be propofed in different terms, thus: Contrivance proves defign; and the predominant tendency of the contrivance indicates the difpofition of the designer. The world abounds with contrivances; and all the contrivances which we are acquainted with, are directed to beneficial purposes. Evil no doubt exists; but is never, that we can perceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache; their aching now and then is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps infeparable from it or even, if you will, let it be called a defect in the contrivance; but it is not the object of it. This is a diftinction which well deferves to be attended to. In defcribing implements of husbandry, you would hardly fay of the fickle, that it is made to cut the reaper's fingers, though, from the conftruction of the

inftrument, and the manner of ufing it, this mischief often happens. But if you had occafion to describe inftruments of torture or execution, this engine, you would fay, is to extend the finews; this to dislocate the joints; this to break the bones; this to fcorch the foles of the feet. Here pain and mifery are the very objects of the contrivance. Now nothing of this fort is to be found in the works of nature. We never difcover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil purpose. No anatomift ever discovered a fyftem of organization, calculated to produce pain and disease; or, in explaining the parts of the human body, ever faid, this is to irritate; this to inflame; this duct is to convey the gravel to the kidneys; this gland to fecrete the humour which forms the gout: if by chance he come at a part of which he knows not the use, the most he can say is, that it is useless; no one ever fufpects that it is put there to incommode, to annoy, or torment. Since then God hath called forth his confummate wisdom to contrive and provide for our happiness, and the world appears to have been conftituted with this design at first, so long as this conftitution is upholden by him, we must in reason fuppofe the fame defign to continue.

The

The contemplation of universal nature rather bewilders the mind than affects it. There is always a bright spot in the prospect, upon which the eye refts; a fingle example, perhaps, by which each man finds himself more convinced than by all others put together. I feem, for my own part, to see the benevolence of the Deity more clearly in the pleasures of very young children, than in any thing in the world. The pleasures of grown perfons may be reckoned partly of their own procuring; especially if there has been any industry, or contrivance, or pursuit, to come at them; or if they are founded, like music, painting, &c. upon any qualification of their own acquiring. But the pleasures of a healthy infant are fo manifeftly provided for it by another, and the benevolence of the provision is fo unquestionable, that every child I fee at its fport affords to my mind a kind of fenfible evidence of the finger of God, and of the dispofition which directs it.

But the example, which strikes each man moft ftrongly, is the true example for him; and hardly two minds hit upon the fame; which fhews the abundance of fuch examples about

us.

We conclude, therefore, that God wills andwishes

F 3

T

wishes the happiness of his creatures. And this conclufion being once established, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon it, namely, "that the method of coming at the "will of God, concerning any action, by the "light of nature, is to inquire into the ten"dency of that action to promote or diminish "the general happiness.".

CHA P. VI.

4

UTILITY.

O then actions are to be estimated by their tendency*. Whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone which conftitutes the obligation of it.

* Actions in the abstract are right or wrong, according to their tendency; the agent is virtuous or vicious, according to his defign. Thus, if the question be, Whether relieving common beggars be right or wrong? we inquire into the tendency of such a conduct to the public advantage or inconvenience. If the queftion be, Whether a man remarkable for this fort of bounty, is to be esteemed virtuous for that reafon? we inquire into his defign, whether his liberality sprung from charity or from oftentation. It is evident that our coneern is with actions in the abstract.

But