even though it does differ from that of irresponsible and self-constituted judges.

Any such differences of opinion, however, refer to ships of the lower classes. As to those of the first and second, the first line of battle, the Admiralty have represented the case in its appalling nakedness: the fact that within four years France and Russia will have forty-nine such ships, while England, as at present announced, will only have thirty-four, is one that cannot be explained away. And in a question of shipbuilding, four years hence is the present time. Much has lately been said about the shorter time required in this country to turn a battle ship out of hand. It does not appear that there is much, if any, difference between the rate in this country and in France. In both the requisite time seems to vary between three and four years, and thus the programme of each now must be accepted as the effective list of four years hence. The knowledge that this is so, the knowledge that our numbers are far below those of France and Russia, and the refusal of the Government to take the country into its confidence, gave rise to a very general uneasiness, which the speech of Mr. Gladstone on December 19, showing a profound ignorance of and indif ference to the subject, naturally increased in a serious degree; for how was it possible to believe the interests and the honour of the country safe in the hands of a Minister who, with the figures we have quoted before him, could say that the navy was adequate to perform its duties and to 'meet all contingencies in a manner adequate to the wants of the country; or who, when pressed on this point, could answer, 'When I spoke of the adequacy of the navy, I 'spoke of the navy of the year, and I did not anticipate the navy of the coming year or the year after.' The outcry which followed this speech has been such as would have convinced any Minister less entirely swathed in self-complacency, and apart from the Minister, now no longer in office, cannot but have had an important influence on the Ministry.

6

,

This revolt of the nation against the negligence of the Government is no new thing in our history. Something similar may be traced back for upwards of five hundred years, as when, in 1372, after the defeat off Rochelle, the Commons memorialised the king on the ruin of our naval. power. Twenty years since,' they said, and always before that time, the navy of the kingdom was so great and so ' numerous that our Lord was everywhere called "King of

VOL. CLXXIX. NO. CCCLXVIII.

H H

"the Sea," and our country the more dreaded both by sea and land. And now it is so decreased and weakened that there is scarcely sufficient for the defence of the country in case of need, so that there is great danger to the kingdom.' Seventy years later, the victories of Henry V. having intervened, we have the record of another moan which, though in different language, is in spirit identical with that of the present time. It is given by Capgrave, under date 1441 * :—

'What good is it for us to read the examples of the great men of former days if we do not imitate them? It is the opinion of many that if the sea was kept by our navy much good would be the result. Our merchants would have safe-conduct, our fishermen a secure approach, our people would have peace and quiet, and our kings great glory. As it is, our enemies laugh at us and say, "Take that ship off your money, and stamp a sheep on it instead, as an emblem of your cowardice," since we, who used to be everywhere victorious, are now beaten by everybody. Our forefathers said that the sea was England's wall; and when our enemies are on the wall, what, think you, they will do to the unprepared inhabitants ? This matter has been neglected for many years, and thus it happens that now our ships are few and our sailors scarce, ignorant and undisciplined. May the Lord take away our reproach and kindle a spirit of bravery in our people.'

The plaint produced little effect, and during the troublous times which followed our navy almost disappeared; otherwise Henry of Richmond might have found his landing in Wales a more difficult matter than it was. We may suppose that he himself, and the able men who advised him, understood this, and began, with such speed as was possible, to remedy the past neglect, not by founding, but by reconstructing the navy and reorganising it. Since then the history of the navy is almost the history of England in its foreign relations and colonial developement. In it, as was most clearly realised by the great Earl of Chatham, was the true embodiment of the might of the nation; and it was during Chatham's term of office that our navy achieved a greatness till then unequalled. Afterwards, under the corrupt Administration of Sandwich, it sank far below the needs of the country, to rise again, higher than ever, during

*Johannis Capgrave Liber de Illustribus Henricis' (Rolls Series),

p. 134.

...

† Capgrave's words are: 'Tollite navem . . et imprimite ovem.' Mr. Kingston, the editor, has pointed out that the pun appears only in English, and that the reproach is therefore of English manufacture, not a jeer of our enemies.'

the wars of the French Revolution and Empire. The transcendent brilliance of the great victories of Howe, or Jervis, or Nelson, rendered the service more popular; and whereas it had previously been very much the fashion to represent the sailor of drama or romance as a filthy ruffian who was not hanged only because he might be utilised afloat, it became, under the pen of Dibdin and Marryat, or the art of T. P. Cooke, more customary to portray him as an honest, brave, simple-minded man, whose heart was his Poll's, whose rhino was his friend's, and whose life was his king's, whilst through all dangers and chances a sweet little cherub was specially appointed by Providence to watch over him.

But all along the navy was officially recognised as the national service, the service from which no danger to the Constitution or to the liberty of the people was to be apprehended; whilst there were many who believed that a standing army was a continual peril. Hence arose the curious fiction that the navy is a standing force, that the army is levied year by year; in accordance with which, Acts for the government of the navy, when once passed, remain effective till it seems necessary to amend them, the Mutiny Bill dies and is re-enacted every year. In reality, the navy was never a standing force, properly so called, till after the Russian War, when the continuous-service system was introduced; and in consequence of the liability of ropes and masts and ships and boilers to decay, wear out, or become obsolete, neglect has frequently produced a worse effect on it than even the caprice of Parliament on the sister service. The army, at any rate, required active interference to hurt it; the navy was in need of active interference to keep it going.

This has been more particularly the case during the last forty years, by reason of the continual changes in the construction of ships of war since the first application of steam and armour. During the last century and the first half of this a ship of war, once built, remained effective till she was on the point of falling to pieces from age and decay; under pressure of circumstances, till she actually did fall to pieces.*

The foundering of the Royal George' at Spithead in 1782 attracted more remark, but was by no means the only instance of a line-of-battle ship breaking up and going to the bottom, with or without her crew. Amongst others may be named the 'Temple' and the 'Marlborough,' both in 1762; the Leviathan' in 1780; and the 'Blenheim,' with Sir Thomas Troubridge and all her men, in 1807.

Since 1850 this has no longer been so. In the Russian War it was quickly decided that sailing line-of-battle ships were no longer to be relied on as effective, and within a couple of years later they ceased to be commissioned for active service. But it took both the country and the Admiralty some time to realise the consequence of this: to understand that the English navy was brought down to a level with the French, and that the numerical superiority on which we had been accustomed to insist had to be created de novo. Encouraged, it may be, by the knowledge of this fact; guided, too, by the Man of Destiny,' who is said to have believed himself to be-among other things-the appointed instrument of Providence to break down the naval power of England, the French Government made great efforts, while the English Government allowed things to drift along in their wonted course. As a result, it was found in 1858, at the time of the celebrated episode of the French 'Colonels,' that the French had actually afloat and ready for service exactly the same number of screw line-of-battle ships that the English had-twenty-nine; that of the twentynine English, nine were inferior both in guns and horsepower to any of the French; and that, according to the programme as it then stood, the relative fighting force of the two navies at the end of 1859 would be

and of the English ships, nine, as has been said, were of inferior quality. The public announcement of this, joined to the strained relations between the two countries, might easily have given rise to a panic, had it not been for the prompt and judicious declaration of Sir John Pakington, then at the head of the Admiralty. He took the House of Commons and the country into his confidence, showed them that he understood the danger, and had already taken steps for guarding against it. By hurrying on advanced ships then building and converting others, mostly three-deckers cut down, to 90-gun ships, the English programme was modified so as to promise by the end of the year sixteen additional ships instead of seven, raising the English numbers to forty-five. So far as the navy was directly.

Hansard, February 25, 1859.

concerned the incident passed with the warning, which was presently forgotten; but the nation, more sensitive than the Admiralty, rose to arms and enrolled the Volunteers, who are with us to this day; and, in another direction, Lord Palmerston obtained the sanction of Parliament for a gigantic and costly scheme of military defence, which ought to have been unnecessary, but for which the supineness of the Admiralty seemed to offer an excuse.

Scarcely, however, had the so-called reconstruction of the navy by Sir John Pakington been determined on, than the end of ships of the line came in view. The French Gloire,' followed within a short time by the English Warrior,' suggested that ironclad ships were to be the men of war of the future; and the experience of the Americans in Hampton Roads fully proved it. A second reconstruction had to be undertaken, France having already in some degree anticipated the movement. At this time, however, there was but little uneasiness. In the Duke of Somerset, then First Lord of the Admiralty, the navy had a chief in whom it trusted, and the confidence of the navy reacted on the country. The reconstruction was proceeded with, without hurry but without delay, although it was always felt that the work was in a transitional or tentative stage, and that no one could say when or in what direction another change might take place. But with First Lords of the Admiralty less single-minded than the Duke of Somerset, or with Premiers less firm in their foreign policy than Lord Palmerston, this uncertainty might always be, and frequently was, put forward as a plausible reason for not bringing the navy up to its full strength, and for keeping down the estimates. France, on the other hand, holding the one object steadily in view, has, so far as her circumstances have permitted, steadily advanced. The aim which her successive Governments seem to have had before them is to approximate the strength of their navy to that of the English. And the different policy followed in the two countries has frequently brought it very near to the same numerical standard; whilst the concurring evidence of our naval officers is, that in point of quality, both of ships and men, it is still nearer to it than in mere numbers. So from time to time the English people suddenly wake up; they begin to see unexpected possibilities of danger, and something more or less like a scare, or even a panic, follows. That during the last twenty years there have been many such scares is not creditable either to the country or to the constitution of the navy.