Sect. 1. Man hath his being, and all the good which he possesseth, from God, as the sole, first efficient by creation.

Sect. 2. Therefore, God alone is the universal, grand Benefactor of the world, besides whom they have no other, but merely subordinate to him.

No creature can give us any thing which is originally its own, having nothing but what it received from God: therefore, it is no more to us, but either a gift of God, or a messenger to bring us his gift; they have nothing themselves but what they have received; nor have we any sort of good, either natural, moral, of mind or body, or fortune, or friends, but what is totally from the bounty of our Creator, and as totally from him, as if no creature had ever been his instrument.

Sect. 3. As God's goodness is that by which he communicateth being, and all good, to all his creatures, and is his most completive attribute in point of efficiency; so is it that attribute which is in genere causæ finalis, the finis, ultimatè-ultimus of all his works. God can himself have no ultimate end but himself; and his rational creatures can have no other lawful, ultimate end. And in himself, it' is his goodness which is completely and ultimately that end. a

Here I am to show, I. That God himself can have no ultimate end but himself. II. That man should have no other. III. That God, as in his goodness, is ultimatè-ultimus, the end

of man.

I. 1. That which is most beloved of God, is his ultimate end: but God himself is most beloved of himself, therefore he is his own ultimate end.

The reason of the major proposition is, because to be the ultimate end, and to be maximè amatum, is all one. Finis quærentis hath respect to the means of attainment, and is that cujus amore media eliguntur et applicantur. This, God is not capable of, (speaking in propriety,) because he never wanteth his end. Finis fruitionis is that, which amando fruimur, which we love, complacentially, in full attainment: and so God doth still enjoy his end, and to have it in love is to enjoy it.

The minor is past controversy.

Quis dubitare potest, mi Lucili, quin Deorum immortalium munus sit quod vivimus.-Prope Deus est, tecum est, intus est: ita dico, Lucili, sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, bonorum malorumque nostrorum observator et custos. Hic prout à nobis tractatur, ita et nos tractat ipse. Bonus verò vir sine Deo nemo est. An potest aliquis supra formam, nisi ab illo, adjutus exurgere. Ille dat consilia, magnifica et erecta, in unoquoque bono viro.-Sen.

Object. But if God have not finem quærentis, then in every instant he enjoyeth his end: and if so, then he useth no means at all, for what need any means be used for that end which is not sought, but still enjoyed. And, consequently, where there is no means, there is no end.

Answ. As finis signifieth nothing but effectum, viz., perfectionem operis, which is but finis terminativus, so it is not always at present attained; and God may be said to use means, that is, subordinate efficients, or instruments, to accomplish it. But as it signifieth Causam finalem, scil. cujus amores res, fit, so far as it may, without all imperfection, be ascribed to him, he must be said continually to enjoy it: and yet to use means for it, but not as wanting it, but in the same instant using and enjoying; that is, he constantly communicateth himself to his creature, and constantly loveth himself so communicated. He is the first, efficient and ultimate end, without any interposing instant of time, were eternity divisible; but in order of nature, he is the efficient before he is the end enjoyed, but not before the end intended. He still sendeth forth the beams of his own glory, and still taketh pleasure in them so sent forth. His works may be increased, and attain perfection, (called finem operis by some,) but his complacency is not increased or perfected in his works, but is always perfect as if the sun took constant pleasure in its own emitted light and heat, though the effects of both on things below were most various. God is still pleased in that which still is, in all his own works, though his works may grow up to more perfection.

Or, if any think fit to say, that God doth quærere finem, and that he may enjoy more of it at one time than another, yet must he confess, that nothing below the complacency of his own will, in his own emitted beams of glory, shining in his works, is this his ultimate end.

2. That which is the beginning, must be the end: but God is the beginning of all his works, therefore he is the end of all. He himself hath no beginning or efficient, and consequently no final cause of himself, but his works have himself for the efficient and for their end: that is, he that made them, intended in the making of them, that they should be illustrious with his communicated beams of glory, and thereby amiable to his will, and should all serve to his complacency.

If the end were lower than the beginning, there would be no proportion, and the agent would sink down below himself.

3. If any thing besides God were his ultimate end, it must thereby be in part deified, or his actions debased by the lowness of the end: but these are impossibilities. The actions are no more noble than their end, and the end is more noble than the means as such.

4. The ultimate end is the most amiable and delectable. The creature is not to God the most amiable and delectable : therefore, the creature is not his ultimate end. The first argument was from the act; this from the object.

5. The ultimate end is that in which the agent doth finally acquiesce: God doth not finally acquiesce in any creature. Therefore, no creature is his ultimate end.

6. That which is God's ultimate end, is loved simply for itself, and not as a means to any higher end. The creature is not loved by him simply for itself, but as a means to a higher end, viz., his complacency in his glory shining in it; ergo, it is not his ultimate end. The ultimate end hath no end; but the creatures have an end, viz., the complacency of God in his glory shining in the creature.b

Object. But you confound the final object and the final act. God's complacency of love is his final act, but our inquiry is of the final object.

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Answ. The finis cui, or personal end, is most properly the ultimate, to him for whose sake, or for whom the thing is done but this is God only, and therein he is both the act and object. He that did velle creaturas, did velle eas ad complacentiam propriæ voluntatis. The question is not of the actus complacentiæ, but of the actus creandi vel volendi creaturarum existentiam: which he doth propter voluntatis impletionem, et inde complacentiam, which is the final act, and the final object of the creating act; but for the actus complacentia, it is not actus intentionis, but fruitionis, and therefore hath no end above itself. And the final object of that complacency, is not the creature itself, but the impletion of the divine will in the creature; yea, the image of his omnipotency, wisdom, and goodness shining in the creation, is not loved propter se, ultimately, but for the sake of that divine essence and perfection

b That the finis cui is properly the ultimate end, and the finis cujus is subordinate to it, Cicero showeth in Piso's 'Speech,' (1. 5. de Finib. p. 188.) In nobis ipsis ne intelligi quidem, ut propter aliam quampiam rem, verbi gratiâ, propter voluptatem, nos amemus. Propter nos enim illam, non propter eam nosmetipsos diligimus. Quid est quod magis perspicuum est, non modo carum sibi quemque, verum etiam vehementer carum,

of which it is the image, as we love the image of our friend for his sake; so that when all is done, God himself is his own end in all his works, so far as, very improperly, he may be said to intend an end.

Or, if you could prove the creature to be the objectum finale, that proveth him not to be properly the finis ultimus. For that is a difference between man's agency and God's. Man is an agent made and acting for his final object, and more ignoble than his object, (as the eye of a fly that beholdeth the sun): but God is an agent more noble than the object, who gave the object itself its being, and made it of nothing for himself; and so the object is for his final act.

Object. But God, being perfect, needeth nothing, nor can receive any addition of perfection or blessedness; and, therefore, it is not any addition of good to himself which he intendeth in the creation, and consequently it is his ultimate end to do the creature good.

Answ. All the antecedent part is granted, and is, anon, to be further asserted, but the last consequence is denied; because there is another end besides the addition of good to himself, which God may intend, so far as he may be said to intend an end. He doth all the good to the creature which it receiveth, but not ultimately, for the creature's sake.

II. That man should have no ultimate end but God, that is, ultimate-ultimus, as it is called, is proved in what is said; and the fuller opening of it belongeth to the next chapter.

III. It is God in all his perfections, omnipotency, wisdom, and goodness, that is man's ultimate end; but it is the last which supposeth both the other, and to which man's will, which must perform the most perfect, final act, is most fully suited, and therefore is, in a special sort, our ultimate end. The omnipotency of God, is truly the efficient, dirigent, and final cause of all things, but it is most eminent in efficiency. The wisdom of God is truly the efficient, dirigent, and final cause of all things, but it is most eminent in direction and government. The goodness of God is truly the efficient, dirigent, and final cause, but it is most eminent in being the perfective, efficient, and final

cause.

Sect. 4. God's ultimate end in creation and providence, is not any supply or addition of perfection or blessedness in himself, as being absolutely perfect in himself, and capable of no addition,

But those who think that God doth produce all things ex necessitate naturæ from eternity, say, That as the tree is not perfect without its fruits, so neither is God without his works.' They say, with Balbus (in Cicero,) and other stoics, That the world is the most excellent being, and that God is but the soul of the world;' and though the soul be a complete soul, if it had no body, yet it is not a complete man: and as the tree is complete, in genere causa, without the fruit, yet not as a totum containing those effects ab essentia, which are its part and end so, say they,' God may be perfect without the world, as he is only the soul and part of the world, but he is not a complete world, nor in toto.'

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Answ. 1. That God is not the soul or constitutive cause of the world, but somewhat much greater, is proved before and also that it was not from eternity, and consequently that he created it not by natural necessity; the foundation, therefore, being overthrown, the building falleth. Those that hold the foresaid opinion, must hold that God is, in point of duration, an eternal, efficient, matter, form, and end; and that, in order of nature, he is first an efficient principle, causing matter; and secondly, he is an efficient with matter; and in the third instant, he is the form of the effected matter; and in the fourth instant, he is the end of his operations herein. And if you call the efficient principle only, by the name of God, then you grant what I prove, and you seemed to deny; but if he be not God as the mere efficient and end, but also the matter, then you make every stone, and serpent, and every thief, and murderer, and devil, to be part of God, and make him the subject of all the sin and evil, all the weakness, folly, and mutations, which be in the world, with the other absurdities before mentioned. And if you say, that he is God, as efficient, form, and end, and not as matter, then you contradict yourself, because the form and matter are parts of the same being: and whether you call him God as the form only, and so make him but part of being, and consequently imperfect, and consequently not of God, or as matter and form also, and so make him a compounded being, still you make him imperfect in denying his simplicity or unity, and as guilty of all the imperfections of matter and of composition, and you make one part of God more imperfect than the rest, as being but an effect of it. All which are inconsistent with the nature of God, and with the nature of man and every creature, who is hereby made a part of God.

Chap. iv.