very apt to be mistaken for the order of na

ture.

For which reason, I fufpect, that a fyftem of morality, built upon inftincts, will only find out reafons and excufes for opinions and practices already established-will feldom correct or reform either.

But farther, fuppofe we admit the exiftence of thefe inftincts, what, it may be asked, is their authority? No man, you fay, can act in deliberate oppofition to them, without a fecret remorfe of conference but this remorse may be borne with

and if the finner choose to bear with it, for the fake of the pleasure or profit which he expects from his wickedness; or finds the pleasure of the fin to exceed the remorfe of confcience, of which he alone is the judge, and concerning which, when he feels them both together, he can hardly be mistaken, the moral-inftinct-man, fo far as I can underfland, has nothing more to offer.

For, if he alledge, that these instincts are so many indications of the will of God, and confequently prefages of what we are to look for hereafter, this, I answer, is to refort to a rule and a motive, ulterior to the instincts themselves, and at which rule motive we shall by and by arrive by a furer road— I say surer, so long as there remains a controversy whether there be any inftinctive maxims at all; or any difficulty in afcertaining what maxims are inftinctive.

This celebrated queftion therefore becomes in our fyftem a queftion of pure curiofity; and as fuch we difmifs it to the determination of those who are more inquifitive, than we are concerned to be, about the natural hiftory and conftitution of the human species.

СНАР.

CHA P. VI.

TH

HE word happy is a relative term; that is, when we call a man happy, we mean that he is happier than fome others, with whom we compare him; than the generality of others; or than he himfelf was in fome other fituation: thus, fpeaking of one who has juft compaffed the object of a long purfuit, "now," we fay, "he is happy," and in a like comparative fenfe, compared, that is, with the general lot of mankind, we call a man happy who poffeffes health and competency.

In ftrictness, any condition may be denominated happy, in which the amount or aggregate of pleafure exceeds that of pain; and the degree of happinefs depends upon the quantity of this excefs.

And the greateft quantity of it ordinarily attainable in human life, is what we mean by happiness, when we inquire or pronounce what human happiness confifts in. *

In

If any pofitive fignification, diftinct from what we mean by pleature, can be affixed to the term "happiness," I fhould take it to denote a certain ftate of the nervous fyftem in that part of the human frame in which we feel joy and grief, paffions and affections. Whether this part be the heart, which the turn of moft languages would lead us to believe, or the diaphragm, as Buffon, or the upper orifice of the ftomach, as Van Helmont thought; or rather be a kind of fine net-work, lining the whole region of the præcordia, as others have imagined; it is poffible, not only that each painful fenfation may violently shake and dif turb the fibres at the time, but that a series of fuch may at length fo derange the very texture of the fyftem, as to produce a perpetual irritation, which will fhew itfelf by fretfulness, impatience, and reftleffnefs. It is poffible alfo, on the other hand, that a fucceffion of pleasurable fenfations may have fuch

an

In which inquiry I will omit much ufual declamation upon the dignity and capacity of our nature; the fuperiority of the foul to the body, of the rational to the animal part of our conftitution; upon the worthiness, refinement, and delicacy of fome fatisfactions, or the meanness, groffnefs, and fenfuality of others: because I hold that pleasures differ in nothing, but in continuance and intensity; from a juft computation of which, confirmed by what we obferve of the apparent cheerfulness, tranquillity, and contentment of men of different taftes, tempers, ftations, and pursuits, every queftion concerning human happiness muft receive its decifion. It will be our business to show, if we can,

I. What Human Happiness does not confift in: II. What it does confift in.

FIRST then, Happiness does not confift in the pleasures of fenfe, in whatever profufion or variety they be enjoyed-- By the pleasures of fenfe I mean, as well the animal gratifications of eating, drinking, and that by which the fpecies is continued, as the more refined pleasures of mufic, painting, architecture, gardening, fplendid fhews, theatric exhibitions, and the pleasures, laftly, of active fports, as of hunting, fhooting, fishing, &c. For,

ift, Thefe pleasures continue but a little while at a time. This is true of them all, especially of the groffer fort of them. Laying aside the preparation,

an effect upon this fubtile organization, as to cause the fibres to relax, and return into their place and order, and thereby to recover, or, if not loft, to preferve that harmonious conformation which gives to the mind its fenfe of complacency and fatisfaction. This state may be denominated happiness, and is fo far diftinguishable from pleasure, that it does not refer to any particular object of enjoyment, or confift, like pleasure; in the gratification of one or more of the fenfes, but is rather the fecondary effect which fuch objects and gratifications produce upon the nervous fyftem, or the flate in which they leave it. These conjectures belong not, however, to our province. The comparative fenfe, in which we have explained the term happiness, is more popular, and is fufficient for the purpose of the prefent chapter.

and

and the expectation, and computing strictly the actual fenfation, we shall be furprized to find, how inconfiderable a portion of our time they occupy, how few hours in the four and twenty they are able to fill up.

2dly, Thefe pleasures, by repetition, lose their relish. It is a property of the machine, for which we know no remedy, that the organs, by which we perceive pleasure, are blunted and benumbed, by being frequently exercised in the fame way. There is hardly any one who has not found the difference between a gratification, when new, and when familiar; or any pleasure which does not become indifferent as it grows habitual.

3dly, The eagerness for high and intenfe delights takes away the relifh from all others; and as fuch delights fall rarely in our way, the greater part of our time becomes from this caufe empty and uneasy.

There is hardly any delufion by which men are greater fufferers in their happiness, than by their expecting too much from what is called pleasure; that is, from those intense delights, which vulgarly engrofs the name of pleasure. The very expectation spoils them. When they do come, we are often engaged in taking pains to perfuade ourselves how much we are pleased, rather than enjoying any pleasure, which fprings naturally out of the object. And whenever we depend upon being vaftly delighted, we always go home fecretly grieved at mifling our aim. Likewife, as hath been obferved juft now, when this humour of being prodigiously delighted has once taken hold of the imagination, it hinders us from providing for, or acquiefcing in, thofe gently foothing engagements, the due variety and fucceffion of which, are the only things that fupply a continued ftream of happiness.

What I have been able to obferve of that part of mankind, whofe profeffed purfuit is pleasure, and who are withheld in the purfuit by no reftraints of

fortune

fortune, or fcruples of confcience, correfponds fufficiently with this account. I have commonly remarked in such men, a restless and inextinguishable paffion for variety; a great part of their time to be vacant, and fo much of it irkfome; and that, with whatever eagerness and expectation they fet out, they become, by degrees, faftidious in their choice of pleasure, languid in the enjoyment, yet miferable under the want of it.

The truth feems to be that there is a limit, at which these pleasures foon arrive, and from which they afterwards decline. They are by neceflity of fhort duration, as the organs cannot hold on their emotions beyond a certain length of time; and if you endeavour to compenfate for this imperfection. in their nature by the frequency with which you repeat them, you lofe more than you gain, by the fatigue of the faculties, and the diminution of fenfibility.

We have faid nothing in this account of the lofs of opportunities, or the decay of faculties, which, whenever they happen, leave the voluptuary, defti. tute and defperate; teafed by defires that can never be gratified, and the memory of pleasures which must return no more.

It will also be allowed by thofe who have experienced it, and perhaps by thofe alone, that pleasure which is purchased by the incumbrance of our fortune, is purchased too dear; the pleasure never compenfating for the perpetual irritation of embarraffed circumstances.

Thefe pleasures, after all, have their value: and, as the young are always too eager in their pursuit of them, the old are fometimes too remifs; that is, too ftudious of their eafe, to be at the pains for them, which they really deserve.

SECONDLY, Neither does happiness confift in an exemption from pain, labour, care, bufinefs, fufpenfe, moleftation, and "thofe evils which are without," fuch a ftate being ufually attended not