would produce a permanent and active sense of gratitude; that the granting of it to prayer would put others upon praying to him, and by that means preferve the love and fubmiffion of his fubjects, upon which love and fubmiffion, their own happiness, as well as his glory, depended; that, befide that the memory of the particular kindness would be heightened and prolonged by the anxiety with which it had been fued for, prayer had in other refpects fo difpofed and prepared the mind of the petitioner, as to render capable of future fervices him who before was unqualified for any might not that prince, I fay, although he proceeded upon no other confiderations than the ftrict rectitude and expediency of the measure, grant a favour or pardon to this man, which he did not grant to another, who was too proud, too lazy, or too bufy, too indifferent whether he received it or not, or too infenfible of the sovereign's abfolute power to give or to withhold it, ever to ask for it, or even to the philofopher, who, from an opinion of the fruitleffnefs of all addreffes to a prince of the character which he had formed to himself, refused in his own example, and difcouraged in others, all outward returns of gratitude, acknowledgments of duty, or application to the fovereign's mercy or bounty; the difufe of which (feeing affections do not long fubfift which are never expreffed) was followed by a decay of loyalty and zeal amongst his subjects, and threatened to end in a forgetfulness of his rights, and a contempt of his authority? Thefe, together with other affignable confiderations, and fome perhaps infcrutable, and even inconceivable by the perfons upon whom his will was to be exercifed, might pafs in the mind of the prince, and move his counfels; whilft nothing, in the mean time, dwelt in the petitioner's thoughts but a sense of his own grief and wants; of the power and goodness of which alone he was to look for relief; and of his obligation to endeavour, by

future

future obedience, to render that perfon propitious to his happiness, in whofe hands, and at the disposal of whofe mercy, he found himself to be.

The objection to prayer fuppofes, that a perfectly wife being muft neceffarily be inexorable: but where is the proof, that inexorability is any part of perfect wisdom; especially of that wisdom, which is explained to confift in bringing about the most be. neficial ends by the wifeft means?

The objection likewife affumes another principle, which is attended with confiderable difficulty and obfcurity, namely, that upon every occafion, there is one, and only one mode of action for the beft; and that the divine will is neceffarily determined and confined to that mode: both which pofitions prefume a knowledge of human nature much beyond what we are capable of attaining. Indeed when we apply to the divine nature fuch expreffions as thefe, "God "must always do what is right," "God cannot, "from the moral perfection and neceflity of his "nature, act otherwife than for the beft," we ought to apply them with much indeterminatenefs and referve; or rather, we ought to confefs, that there is fomething in the fubject out of the reach of our apprehension for in our apprehenfion, to be under a neceffity of acting according to any rule is inconfiftent with free agency; and it makes no difference, which we can understand, whether the neceffity be internal or external, or that the rule is the rule of perfect rectitude.

But efficacy is afcribed to prayer without the proof, we are told, which can alone in fuch a fubject produce conviction, the confirmation of experience. Concerning the appeal to experience, I fhall content myself with this remark, that if prayer were fuffered to disturb the order of fecond caufes appointed in the univerfe too much, or to produce its effect with the fame regularity that they do, it would introduce a change into human affairs, which in fome important refpects would be evidently for

the

the worse. Who, for example, would labour, if his neceflities could be fupplied with equal certainty by prayer? How few would contain within any bounds of moderation thofe paffions and pleasures, which at prefent are checked only by disease or the dread of it, if prayer would infallibly restore health? In short, if the efficacy of prayer were fo conftant and obfervable as to be relied upon beforehand, it is easy to foresee that the conduct of mankind would, in proportion to that reliance, become careless and diforderly. It is poffible in the nature of things, that our prayers may, in many inftances, be efficacious, and yet our experience of their efficacy be dubious and obfcure. Therefore, if the light of nature inftruct us by any other arguments to hope for effect from prayer; ftill more, if the fcriptures authorize thofe hopes by promiles of acceptance; it seems not a fufficient reafon for calling in question the reality of fuch effects, that our observation of them are ambiguous: especially fince it appears probable, that this very ambiguity is neceffary to the happiness and safety of human life.

But fome, whofe objections do not exclude all prayer, are offended with the mode of prayer in ufe amongst us, and with many of the fubjects, which are almost univerfally introduced into public worship, and recommended to private devotion. To pray for particular favours by name, is to dictate, it has been faid, to divine wifdom and goodnefs to intercede for others, especially for whole nations and empires, is ftill worfe; it is to presume that we poffefs fuch an intereft with the Deity, as to be able, by our applications, to bend the most important of his counfels; and that the happiness of others, and even the profperity of communities, is to depend upon this interest and upon our choice. Now how unequal foever our knowledge of the divine œconomy may be to the folution of this difficulty, which requires perhaps a comprehenfion of

the

the entire plan, and of all the ends of God's moral government, to explain fatisfactorily, we can understand one thing concerning it, that it is after all nothing more than the making of one man the inftrument of happiness and mifery to another; which is perfectly of a piece with the courfe and order that obtain, and which we must believe were intended to obtain, in human affairs. Why may we not be alfifted by the prayers of other men, who are beholden for our support to their labour? Why may not our happiness be made in fome cafes to depend upon the good offices of our neighbours? The happinefs and mifery of great numbers we fee oftentimes at the difpofal of one man's choice, or liable to be much affected by his conduct: what greater difficulty is there in fuppofing, that the prayers of an individual may avert a calamity from multitudes, or be accepted to the benefit of whole communities?

СНАР.

С Н А Р. III.

OF THE DUTY AND EFFICACY

OF PRAYER,

AS

TH

KEPRESENTED IN SCRIPTURE.

HE reader will have obferved, that the reflections ftated in the preceding chapter, whatever truth and weight they may be allowed to contain, rife many of them no higher, than to negative arguments in favour of the propriety of addrefing prayer to God. To prove that the efficacy of prayers is not inconfiftent with the attributes of the Deity, does not prove that prayers are actually efficacious; and in the want of that unequivocal teftimony, which experience alone could afford to this point, but which we do not poffefs, and have feen good reafon why we are not to expect, the light of nature leaves us to controverted probabilities, drawn from the impulfe by which mankind have been almoft univerfally prompted to devotion, and from fome beneficial purposes, which, it is conceived, may be better anfwered by the audience of prayer, than by any other mode of communicating the fame bleffings. The revelations which we deem authentic, completely fupply this defect of natural religion. They require prayer to God as a duty; and they contain politive affurances of its efficacy and acceptance. We could

have no reasonable motive for the exercife of prayer, without believing that it may avail to the relief of our wants. This belief can only be founded, either in a fenfible experience of the effect of prayer, or in promises of acceptance fignified by divine authority. Our knowledge would have come to us in the former way, lefs capable, indeed, of doubt, but fubjected to the abufes and inconveniences briefly defcribed