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times found to be in a rich old mifer, without family to provide for, or friend to oblige by it, and to whom confequently it is no longer (and be may be fenfible of it too) of any real use or value: yet is this man as much overjoyed with gain, and mortified by loffes, as he was the first day he opened his fhop, and when his very fubfiftence depended upon his fuccefs

in it.

By there mears the custom of approving certain actions commenced; and when once fuch a cuftom hath got footing in the world, it is ro difficult thing to explain bow it is tranfmitted and continued; for then the greateft part of those who approve of virtue, approve of it from authority, by imitation, and from a habit of approving fuch and fuch actions, inculcated in early youth, and receiving, as men grow up, continual acceffions of ftrength and vigour, from cenfure and encouragement, from the books they read, the converfations they hear, the current application of epithets, the general turn of language, and the various other causes, by which it univerfally comes to pals, that a fociety of men, touched in the feebleit degree with the fame palion, foon communicate to one another a great degree of it. This is the cafe with most of us at prefent; and is the caufe alfo, that the process of afficiation, described in the last paragraph but one, is little now either perceived or wanted.

“From intances of popular tumults, feditions, factions, panic, and of al p.tfans, which are thared with a multitude, **we may learn the influence of fociety, in excit ng and fupporting any eiro n; while the mot ungovernanie disorders are rated, we find, by that means, from the fichtel and most ** frivolous or calon —He mult be more or lets than man, who "k ces not in the com.non blaze. What wonder then, that "gral feet.nents are found of fuch influence in he, though 17 ring from priv pies, which may appear, at first fight,

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**tɔ ewhat for all and delicate ?”

Hume's Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,

Sep. IX p. 3:6.

Amorgit

Amongst the causes affigned for the continuance and diffufion of the fame moral fentiments amongst mankind, we have mentioned imitation. The efficacy of this principle is most obfervable in children; indeed, if there be any thing in them, which deferves the name of an inftinct, it is their propensity to imitation. Now there is nothing which children imitate or apply more readily than expreffions of affection and averfion, of approbation, hatred, refentment, and the like; and when these paffions and expreffions are once connected, which they foon will be by the fame affociation which unites words with their ideas, the paffion will follow the expreffion, and attach upon the object to which the child has been accustomed to apply the epithet. In a word, when almost every thing elfe is learned by imitation, can we wonder to find the fame cause concerned in the generation of our moral fentiments?

Another confiderable objection to the system of moral instincts is this, that there are no maxims in the fcience, which can well be deemed innate, as none perhaps can be affigned, which are abfolutely and univerfally true; in other words, which do not bend to circumstances. Veracity, which feems, if any be, a natural duty, is excufed in many cafes towards an enemy, a thief, or a madman. The obligation of promifes, which is a firft principle in morality, depends upon the circumftances under which they were made: they may have been unlawful, or become fo fince, or inconfiftent with former promises, or erroneous, or extorted; under all which cafes, inftances. may be suggested, where the obligation to perform the promife would be very dubious, and fo of most other general rules, when they come to be actually applied.

An argument has been alfo proposed on the fame fide of the question of this kind Together with the inftinct, there must have been implanted, it is faid, a clear and precife idea of the object upon which it was to attach. The inftinct and the idea of the ob

ject

times found to be in a rich old mifer, without family to provide for, or friend to oblige by it, and to whom confequently it is no longer (and he may be fenfible of it too) of any real ufe or value: yet is this man as much overjoyed with gain, and mortified by loffes, as he was the first day he opened his fhop, and when his very fubfiftence depended upon his fuccefs in it.

By thefe means the custom of approving certain actions commenced; and when once fuch a custom hath got footing in the world, it is no difficult thing to explain how it is tranfmitted and continued; for then. the greatest part of those who approve of virtue, approve of it from authority, by imitation, and from a habit of approving fuch and fuch actions, inculcated in early youth, and receiving, as men grow up, continual acceffions of ftrength and vigour, from cenfure and encouragement, from the books they read, the converfations they hear, the current application of epithets, the general turn of language, and the various other caufes, by which it univerfally comes to pass, that a fociety of men, touched in the feebleft degree with the fame paffion, foon communicate to one another a great degree of it. This is the cafe with most of us at prefent; and is the cause alfo, that the process of affociation, defcribed in the last paragraph but one, is little now either perceived or wanted.

44

"From inftances of popular tumults, feditions, factions, panics, and of all paflions, which are shared with a multitude, we may learn the influence of fociety, in exciting and fup"porting any emotion; while the most ungovernable diforders

44

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are raised, we find, by that means, from the flightest and most "frivolous occafions.-He must be more or lefs than man, who "kindles not in the common blaze. What wonder then, that "moral fentiments are found of fuch influence in life, though fpringing from principles, which may appear, at first fight, fomewhat small and delicate ?"

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Hume's Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.

Seat. IX. p. 326.

Amongst

in

Amongst the causes affigned for the continuance and diffufion of the fame moral fentiments amongst mankind, we have mentioned imitation. The efficacy of this principle is most observable in children; deed, if there be any thing in them, which deferves the name of an inftinct, it is their propenfity to imitation. Now there is nothing which children imitate or apply more readily than expreffions of affection and averfion, of approbation, hatred, refentment, and the like; and when these paffions and expreffions are once connected, which they foon will be by the fame affociation which unites words with their ideas, the paffion will follow the expreffion, and attach upon the object to which the child has been accustomed to apply the epithet. In a word, when almost every thing elfe is learned by imitation, can we wonder to find the fame caufe concerned in the generation of our moral fentiments?

Another confiderable objection to the fyftem of moral inftincts is this, that there are no maxims in the fcience, which can well be deemed innate, as none perhaps can be affigned, which are abfolutely and univerfally true; in other words, which do not bend to circumstances. Veracity, which feems, if any be, a natural duty, is excufed in many cafes towards an enemy, a thief, or a madman. The obligation of promises, which is a first principle in morality, depends upon the circumstances under which they were made: they may have been unlawful, or become fo fince, or inconfiftent with former promifes, or erroneous, or extorted; under all which cafes, inftances. may be suggested, where the obligation to perform the promife would be very dubious, and fo of most other general rules, when they come to be actually applied.

An argument has been alfo propofed on the fame fide of the question of this kind Together with the inftinct, there must have been implanted, it is faid, a clear and precife idea of the object upon which it was to attach. The inftinct and the idea of the ob

ject

ject are infeparable even in imagination, and as neceffarily accompany each other as any correlative ideas whatever that is, in plainer terms, if we be prompted by nature to the approbation of particular actions, we must have received alfo from nature a diftinct conception of the action we are thus prompted to approve; which we certainly have not received.

But as this argument bears alike against all inftincts, and against their existence in brutes as well as in men, it will hardly, I fuppofe, produce conviction, though it may be difficult to find an anfwer to it.

;

Upon the whole, it seems to me, either that there exift no fuch inftincts as compose what is called the moral fenfe, or that they are not now to be diftinguished from prejudices and habits on which account they cannot be depended upon in moral reafoning: I mean that it is not a fafe way of arguing, to affume certain principles as fo many dictates, impulfes, and inftincts of nature, and then to draw conclufions from these principles, as to the rectitude or wrongnefs of actions, independent of the tendency of fuch actions, or of any other confideration what

ever.

Ariftotle lays down, as a fundamental and felfevident maxim, that nature intended barbarians to be flaves; and proceeds to deduce from this maxim a train of conclufions, calculated to juftify the policy which then prevailed. And I queftion whether the fame maxim be not ftill felfevident to the company of merchants trading to the coaft of Africa.

Nothing is fo foon made as a maxim; and it appears from the exampie of Ariftotle, that authority and convenience, education, prejudice, and general practice, have no fmall fhare in the making of them; and that the laws of cuftom are

very

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