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And the reafon is, that the general confequence is the fame.

The want of this diftinction between particular and general confequences, or rather the not fufficiently attending to the latter, is the caufe of that perplexity which we meet with in ancient moralifts. On the one hand, they were fenfible of the abfurdity of pronouncing actions good or evil, without regard to the good or evil they produced. On the other hand, they were ftartled at the conclufions to which a steady adherence to confequences feemed fometimes to conduct them. To relieve this difficulty, they contrived the To gtxov, or the boneftum, by which terms they meant to conftitute a measure of right, diftinct from utility. Whilft the utile ferved them, that is, whilft it correfponded with their habitual notions of the rectitude of actions, they went by it. When they fell in with fuch cafes as thofe mentioned in the fixth chapter, they took leave of their guide, and reforted to the boneftum. The only account they could give of the matter was, that these actions might be useful; but, because they were not at the fame time honefta, they were by no means to be deemed juft or right.

From the principles delivered in this and the two preceding chapters, a maxim may be explained, which is in every man's mouth, and in most men's without meaning, viz. " not to do evil that good may come:" that is, let us not violate a general rule, for the fake of any particular good consequence we may expect. Which is for the most part a falutary caution, the advantage feldom compenfating for the violation of the rule. Strictly Speaking, that cannot be "evil," from which "good comes;" but in this way, and with a view to the diftinction between particular and general confequences, it may.

We will conclude this fubject of confequences with the following reflection. A man may imagine,

that

that any action of his, with refpect to the public, must be inconfiderable: fo alfo is the agent. if his crime produce but a fmall effect upon the univerfal intereft, his punishment or deftruction bears a small proportion to the fum of happinefs and mifery in the creation.

CHAP. IX.

R

OF RIGHT.

IGHT and obligation are reciprocal; that is, wherever there is a right in one perfon, there is a correfponding obligation upon others. If one man has a "right" to an eftate; others are obliged" to abftain from it :-If parents have a right" to reverence from their children; children. are obliged" to reverence their parents; and fo in all other instances.

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Now, because moral obligation depends, as we have feen, upon the will of God, right, which is correlative to it, muft depend upon the fame. Right therefore fignifies, confiftency with the will of God.

But if the divine will determine the distinction of right and wrong, what elfe is it but an identical propofition, to fay of God, that he acts right, or how is it poffible even to conceive that he fhould act wrong? yet these affertions are intelligible and fignificant. The cafe is this: by virtue of the two principles, that God wills the happinefs of his creatures, and that the will of God is the measure of

right and wrong, we arrive at certain conclufions; which conclufions become rules, and we foon learn to pronounce actions right or wrong, according as they agree or disagree with our rules, without looking any farther: and when the habit is once established of flopping at the rules, we can go back and compare with thefe rules even the divine conduct itself, and yet it may be true (only not obferved by us at the time) that the rules themselves are deduced from the divine will.

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Right is a quality of perfons or of actions.

Of perfons; as when fay, fuch a one has a right" to this eftate; parents have a "right" to reverence from their children; the king to allegiance from his fubjects; mafters have a "right" to their fervants labour; a man has not a "right" over his own life.

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Of actions; as in fuch expreffions as the following it is "right" to punish murder with death; his behaviour on that occafion was "right;" it is not "right" to fend an unfortunate debtor to jail, he did or acted" right," who gave up his place, rather than vote against his judgment,

In this latter fet of expreffions, you may fubftitute the definition of right above given for the term itself, v. g. it is "confiftent with the will of "God" to punish murder with death-his behaviour on that occafion, was "confiftent with the will "of God"-it is not "confiftent with the will of "God" to fend an unfortunate debtor to jail-he did, or acted" confiftently with the will of God," who gave up his place, rather than vote against his judgment.

In the former fet, you must vary the phrafe a little, when you introduce the definition instead of the term. Such a one has Such a one has a "right" to this eftate, that is, it is "confiftent with the will of God," that fuch a one fhould have it-parents have a right" to reverence from their children, that is,

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it is "confiftent with the will of God," that children should reverence their parents; and the fame of the reft.

С НА Р. X.

THE DIVISION OF RIGHTS.

RIGHTS,

IGHTS, when applied to persons, are

Natural or adventitious.

Alienable or unalienable.

Perfect or imperfect.

I. Rights are natural or adventitious.

Natural rights are fuch as would belong to a man, although there fubfifted in the world no civil government whatever.

Adventitious rights are fuch as would not.

Natural rights are, a man's right to his life, limbs, and liberty; his right to the produce of his perfonal labour; to the ufe, in common with others, of air, light, water. If a thousand different perfons, from a thousand different corners of the world, were caft together upon a defert island, they would from the first be every one entitled to these rights.

Adventitious rights are, the right of a King over his fubjects; of a General over his foldiers; of a Judge over the life and liberty of a prifoner; a right to elect or appoint magistrates, to impofe taxes, decide difputes, direct the descent or difpofition of property; a right, in a word, in any one man, or particular

particular body of men, to make laws and regulations for the reft. For none of these rights would exist in the newly inhabited island.

And here it will be asked how adventitious rights are created; or, which is the fame thing, how any new rights can accrue, from the establishment of civil fociety; as rights of all kinds, we remember, depend upon the will of God, and civil fociety is but the ordinance and institution of man. For the folution of this difficulty, we must return to our first principles. God wills the happiness of mankind, and the existence of civil fociety, as conducive to that happiness. Confequently, many things, which are useful for the fupport of civil fociety in general, or for the conduct and confervation of particular focieties already established, are, for that reafon, "confiftent with the will of God," or "right," which, without that reafon, i. e. without the eftablishment of civil fociety, would not have been fo.

From whence alfo it appears, that adventitious rights, though immediately derived from human appointment, are not, for that reafon, lefs facred than natural rights, nor the obligation to refpect them lefs cogent. They both ultimately rely upon the fame authority, the will of God. Such a man claims a right to a particular eftate. He can fhew, it is true, nothing for his right, but a rule of the civil community to which he belongs; and this rule may be arbitrary, capricious, and abfurd. Not withstanding all this, there would be the fame fin in difpoffeffing the man of his eftate by craft or violence, as if it had been affigned to him, like the partition of the country amongst the twelve tribes, by the immediate defignation and appointment of heaven.

II. Rights are alienable or unalienable.
Which terms explain themselves.

The

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