The right we have to most of those things, which we call property, as houfes, lands, money, &c. is alienable, The right of a prince over his people, of a huf band over his wife, of a mafter over his fervant, is generally and naturally unalienable. The diftinction depends upon the mode of acquiring the right. If the right originate from a contract; and be limited to the perfon by the exprefs terms of the contract, or by the common interpretation of fuch contracts (which is equivalent to an exprefs ftipulation), or by a perfonal condition annexed to the right, then it is unalienable. In all other cafes it is alienable. The right to civil liberty is alienable; though in the vehemence of men's zeal for it, and in the language of fome political remonftrances, it has often been pronounced to be an unalienable right. The true reason why mankind hold in deteftation the memory of those who have fold their liberty to a tyrant, is, that together with their own, they fold commonly, or endangered, the liberty of others; which certainly they had no right to difpofe of. III. Rights are perfect or imperfect. Perfect rights may be afferted by force, or, what in civil fociety comes into the place of private force, by course of law. Imperfect rights may not. Examples of perfect rights. A man's right to his life, perfon, houfe; for if these be attacked, he may repel the attack by inftant violence, or punish the aggreffor by law; a man's right to his eftate, furniture, clothes, money, and to all ordinary articles of property; for if they be injuriously taken from him, he may compel the author of the injury to make reftitution or fatisfaction. Examples of imperfect rights. In elections or appointments to offices, where the qualifications are prescribed, the best qualified candidate has a right to to fuccefs; yet, if he be rejected, he has no remedy. He can neither feize the office by force, nor obtain redress at law; his right therefore is imperfect. A poor neighbour has a right to relief; yet if it be refufed him, he must not extort it. A benefactor has a right to returns of gratitude from the perfon he has obliged; yet if he meet with none, he must acquiefce. Children have a right to affection and education from their parents; and parents on their part, to duty and reverence from their children; yet if these rights be on either fide withholden, there is no compulfion to enforce them. It may be at first view difficult to apprehend, how a person should have a right to a thing, and yet have no right to use the means neceffary to obtain it. This difficulty, like most others in morality, is refolvable into the neceffity of general rules. The reader recollects, that a perfon is faid to have a "right" to a thing, when it is "confiftent with "the will of God" that he fhould poffefs it. So that the question is reduced to this; how it comes to pafs, that it should be confiftent with the will of God, that a perfon fhould poffefs a thing, and yet not be confiftent with the fame will that he should ufe force to obtain it? The answer is, that by reafon of the indeterminatenefs, either of the object, or of the circumstances of the right, the permiffion of force in this cafe, would, in its confequence, lead to the permiffion of force in other cafes, where there exifted no right at all. The candidate above defcribed has, no doubt, a right to fuccefs; but his right depends upon his qualifications, for instance, upon his comparative virtue, learning, &c; there must be fomebody therefore to compare them. The existence, degree, and refpective importance of these qualifications are all indeterminate; there must be fomebody therefore to determine them. To allow the candidate to demand fuccefs by force, is to make him the judge of his own qualifications. You cannot cannot do this, but you must make all other candidates the fame; which would open a door to demands without number, reason, or right. In like manner, a poor man has a right to relief from the rich, but the mode, feason, and quantum of that relief, who fhall contribute to it, or how much, are not afcertained. Yet thefe points must be afcertained, before a claim to relief can be profecuted by force. For to allow the poor to afcertain them for themselves, would be to expofe property to so many of these claims, that it would lofe its vafo lue, or cease indeed to be property. The fame observation holds of all other cafes of imperfect rights; not to mention, that in the inftances of gratitude, affection, reverence, and the like, force is excluded by the very idea of the duty, which must be voluntary, or not at all. Wherever the right is imperfect, the corresponding obligation is fo too. I am obliged to prefer the beft candidate, to relieve the poor, be grateful to my benefactors, take care of my children, and reverence my parents; but in all these cafes, my obligation, like their right, is imperfect. on. I call these obligations "imperfect," in conformity to the established language of writers upon the fubject. The term however feems ill chofen on this account, that it leads many to imagine, that there is less guilt in the violation of an imperfect obligation, than of a perfect one. Which is a groundless notiFor an obligation being perfect or imperfect, determines only whether violence may or may not be employed to enforce it; and determines nothing elfe. The degree of guilt incurred by violating the obligation is a different thing, and is determined by circumstances altogether independent of this diftinction. A man, who by a partial, prejudiced, or corrupt vote, disappoints a worthy candidate of a ftation in life, upon which his hopes, poffibly, or livelihood depends, and who thereby grievously discourages merit and emulation in others, commits, I am perfuaded, not do this, but you must make all other candis the fame; which would open a door to deds without number, reason, or right. In like ner, a poor man has a right to relief from the but the mode, feafon, and quantum of that of, who fhall contribute to it, or how much, are afcertained. Yet these points must be afcered, before a claim to relief can be profecutby force. For to allow the poor to ascertain m for themselves, would be to expofe property to many of these claims, that it would lofe its vae, or cease indeed to be property. The fame ob-"vation holds of all other cafes of imperfect rights; ot to mention, that in the instances of gratitude, Fection, reverence, and the like, force is excluded y the very idea of the duty, which must be volunary, or not at all. Wherever the right is imperfect, the correspondng obligation is fo too. I am obliged to prefer the beft candidate, to relieve the poor, be grateful to my benefactors, take care of my children, and reverence my parents; but in all these cafes, my obligation, like their right, is imperfect. I call these obligations "imperfect," in conformity to the established language of writers upon the fubject. The term however seems ill chosen on this account, that it leads many to imagine, that there is less guilt in the violation of an imperfect obligation, than of a perfe one. Which is a groundlefs notion. For an ol determines or be employed else. The d obligation is circumstance tion. A m rupt vote, on in life, being perfect or imperfect, wor late of a ftati ibly, or livelivoufly difconommits, I am perfaded, |