fupreme authority of law, unless he could fhew, that the law intended to interpofe its fupreme authority, to acquit men of debts, of the existence and juftice of which they were themselves fenfible. Again, to preferve youth from the practices and impofitions, tò which their inexperience exposes them, the law compels the payment of no debts incurred within a certain age, nor the performance of any engagements, except for fuch neceffaries as are fuited to their condition and fortunes. If a young perfon therefore perceive that he has been practifed or impofed upon, he may honestly avail himself of the privilege of his nonage to defeat the circumvention. But, if he shelter himself under this privilege, to avoid a fair obligation, or an equitable contract, he extends the privilege to a cafe, in which it is not allowed by intention of law, and in which confequently it does not, in natural juftice, exift. As property is the principal subject of Justice, or "of the determinate relative duties," we have put down what we had to fay upon it in the first place: we now proceed to ftate thefe duties in the best order we can. СНАР. CHAP. V. PROMISE S. FROM whence the obligation to perform promises arifes. II. In what fenfe promifes are to be interpreted. I. From whence the obligation to perform promifes arifes. They who argue from innate moral principles, fuppose a sense of the obligation of promises to be one of them; but without affuming this, or any thing elfe, without proof, the obligation to perform promises may be deduced from the neceffity of such a conduct, to the well being, or the existence, indeed, of human fociety. Men act from expectation. Expectation is in most cafes determined by the affurances and engagements which we receive from others. If no dependance could be placed upon these affurances, it would be impoffible to know what judgment to form of many future events, or how to regulate our conduct with refpect to them. Confidence therefore in promises is effential to the intercourse of human life; because, without it, the greatest part of our conduct would proceed upon chance. But there could be no confi dence in promifes, if men were not obliged to perform them: the obligation therefore to perform promifes is effential, to the fame end, and in the fame degree. Some may imagine, that, if this obligation were fufpended, a general caution and mutual diftruft would enfue, which might do as well; but this is imagined, without confidering, how every hour of our lives we truft to, and depend upon others; and how impoffible it is, to stir a step, or, what is worse, to fit ftill a moment, without fuch truft and dependance. I am now writing at my ease, not doubting (or rather never diftrufting, and therefore never thinking about it) but that the butcher will send in the joint of meat, which I ordered; that his fervant will bring it; that my cook will drefs it; that my footman will serve it up; and that I fhall find it upon table at one o'clock. Yet have I nothing for all this, but the promise of the butcher, and the implied promife of his fervant and mine. And the fame holds of the most important, as well as the moft familiar occurrences of focial life. In the one the intervention of promifes is formal, and is feen and acknowledged; our inftance, therefore, is intended to fhow it in the other, where it is not fo diftinctly obferved. II. In what fenfe promises are to be interpreted. Where the terms of a promise admit of more fenfes than one, the promife is to be performed "in "that fenfe in which the promiser apprehended at "the time that the promisee received it." It is not the fenfe in which the promifer actually intended it, that always governs the interpretation of an equivocal promife; becaufe, at that rate, you might excite expectations, which you never meant, nor would be obliged, to fatisfy. Much lefs is it the fenfe, in which the promisee actually received the promise; for according to that rule, you might be drawn into engagements which you never defigned to undertake. It must therefore be the fenfe (for there is no other remaining) in which the promifer believed that the promifee accepted his promife. This will not differ from the actual intention of the promifer, where the promise is given without collufion or referve; but we put the rule in the above form, to exclude evafion in cafes in which the the popular meaning of a phrafe, and the strict grammatical fignification of the words differ, or, in general, wherever the promiser attempts to make his escape through fome ambiguity in the expreffions which he used. Temures promised the garrison of Sebaftia, that, if they would furrender, no blood should be shed. The garrifon furrendered; and Temures buried them all alive. Now Temures fulfilled the promife, in one fenfe, and in the fenfe too in which he intended it the time; but not in the fenfe in which the garrifon of Sebaftia actually received it, nor in the fenfe in which Tamures himself knew that the gar rifon received it; which laft fenfe, according to our rule, was the fenfe he was in confcience bound to have performed it in. From the account we have given of the obligation of promises, it is evident, that this obligation depends upon the expectations which we knowingly and voluntarily excite. Confequently, any action or conduct towards another, which we are fenfible excites expectations in that other, is as much a promife, and creates as ftrict an obligation, as the most exprefs affurances. Taking, for instance, a kinfman's child, and educating him for a liberal profeffion, or in a manner fuitable only for the heir of a large fortune, as much obliges us to place him in that profeffion, or to leave him fuch a fortune, as if we had given him a promise to do fo under our hands and feals. In like manner, a great man, who encourages an indigent retainer; or a minifter of ftate, who diftinguishes and careffes at his levee, one who is in a fituation to be obliged by his patronage, engages, by fuch behaviour, to provide for him. This is the foundation of tacit promifes. You may either fimply declare your prefent intention, or you may accompany your declaration with an engagement to abide by it, which conftitutes a complete promife. In the firft cafe, the duty is fatisfied, if you were fincere, that is, if you enter entertained at the time the intention you expreffed, however foon, or for whatever reason, you afterwards change it. In the latter cafe, you have parted with the liberty of changing. All this is plain; but it must be obferved, that most of those forms of fpeech, which, ftrictly taken, amount to no more than declarations of prefent intention, do yet, in the ufual way of understanding them, excite the expectation, and therefore carry with them the force of abfolute promifes. Such as, "I in"tend you this place."-" I defign to leave you "this eftate." I purpose giving you my vote." "I mean to ferve you."-In which, although the "intention," the "defign," the "purpose," the "meaning," be expreffed in words of the prefent time, yet you cannot afterwards recede from them, without a breach of good faith. If you choose therefore to make known your prefent intention, and yet to reserve to yourself the liberty of changing it, you must guard your expreffions by an additional claufe, as " I intend at prefent"-if I dont alter-or the like-and after all, as there can be no reason for communicating your intention, but to excite fome degree of expectation or other, a wanton change of an intention which is once difclofed, always disappoints fomebody; and is always, for that reafon, wrong. There is, in fome men, an infirmity with regard to promifes, which often betrays them into great diftrefs. From the confufion, or hesitation, or obfcurity, with which they exprefs themselves, efpecially when overawed, or taken by furprise, they fometimes encourage expectations, and bring upon themselves demands, which, poffibly, they never dreamed of. This is a want, not fo much of integrity, as of prefence of mind. III. In what cafes promifes are not binding. 1. Promiles are not binding, where the performance is impoffible. But |