My method of writing has conftantly been this; to extract what I could from my own ftores and my own reflections in the first place; to put down that; and afterwards to confult upon each fubject fuch reading as fell in my way: which order, I am convinced, is the only one whereby any person can keep his thoughts from fliding into other men's trains. The effect of fuch a plan upon the production itself will be, that whilft fome parts in matter or manner. may be new, others will be little eife than a repetition of the old. I make no pretenfions to perfect originality: I claim to be fomething more than a mere compiler. Much no doubt is borrowed: but the fact is, that the notes for this work having been prepared for fome years, and fuch things having been from time to time inferted in them as appeared to me worth preferving, and fuch infertions made commonly without the name of the author from whom they were taken, I fhould, at this time, have found a difficulty in recovering these names with fufficient exactnefs to be able to render to every man his own. Nor, to fpeak the truth, did it appear to me worth while to repeat the fearch merely for this purpose. When authorities are relied upon, names must be produced: when a discovery has been made in science, it may be unjust to borrow the invention without acknowledging the author. But in an argumentative treatife, and upon a subject which allows no place for discovery or invention, properly fo called; and in which all that can belong to a writer is his mode of reasoning, or his judgment of probabilities; I fhould have thought thought it fuperfluous, had it been easier to me than it was, to have interrupted my text, or crowded my margin with references to every author, whofe fentiments I have made ufe of There is, however, one work to which I owe fo much, that it would be ungrateful not to confefs the obligation: I mean the writings of the late Abraham Tucker, Efq. part of which were published by himself, and the remainder fince his death, under the title of "The Light of nature purfued, by Edward Search, Efq." I have found in this writer more original thinking and obfervation upon the several subjects that he has taken in hand, than in any other, not to say, than in all others put together. His talent alfo for illufiration is unrivalled. But his thoughts are diffufed through a long, various, and irregular work. I fhall account it no mean praise, if I have been fometimes able to difpofe into method, to collect into heads and articles, or to exhibit in more compact and tangible maffes, what, in that otherwife excellent performance, is fpread over too much furface. The next circumftance for which some apology may be expected, is the joining of moral and political philofophy together, or the addition of a book of politics to a fyftem of ethics. Against this objection, if it be made one, I might defend myself by the example of many approved writers, who have treated de officiis hominis et civis, or, as fome choose to exprefs it, "of the rights and obligations of man, in his "individual and focial capacity," in the fame book. I might allege alfo, that the part a member member of the commonwealth fhall take in political contentions, the vote he shall give, the counfels he fhall approve, the fupport he shall afford, or the oppofition he shall make, to any fyftem of public measures, is as much a queftion of perfonal duty, as much concerns the confcience of the individual who deliberates, as the determination of any doubt which relates to the conduct of private life; that confequently political philofophy is, properly fpeaking, a continuation of moral philofophy; or rather indeed, a part of it, fuppofing moral philofophy to have for its aim the information of the human confcience in every deliberation that is likely to come before it. I might avail myself of these excufes, if I wanted them; but the vindication upon which I rely is the following. In ftating the principle of morals, the reader will obferve, that I have employed fome induftry in explaining the theory, and fhewing the neceffity of general rules without the full and conftant confideration of which, I am persuaded that no system of moral philofophy can be fatisfactory or confiftent. This foundation being laid, or rather, this habit being formed, the difcuffion of political fubjects, to which, more than to almoft any other, general rules are applicable, became clear and eafy. Whereas, had these topics been affigned to a diftinct work, it would have been neceffary to have. repeated the fame rudiments, to have established over again the fame principles as thofe which we had already exemplified, and rendered familiar to the reader, in the former parts of this. In a word, if there appear to any ; one one too great a diverfity, or too wide a diftance between the fubjects treated of in the course of the present volume, let him be reminded, that the doctrine of general rules pervades and connects the whole. It may not be improper, however, to admonish the reader, that, under the name of politics, he is not to look for thofe occafional controverfies, which the occurrences of the present day, or any temporary fituation of public affairs may excite; and most of which, if not beneath the dignity, it is beside the purpose of a philofophical inftitution to advert to. He will perceive that the several difquifitions are framed with a reference to the condition of this country, and of this government: but it feemed to me to belong to the defign of a work like the following, not fo much to discuss each altercated point with the particularity of a political pamphlet upon the fubject, as to deliver thofe univerfal principles, and to exhibit, as well as I was able, that mode and train of reafoning in politics, by the due application of which every man might be enabled to attain to juft conclufions of his own. I am not ignorant of an objection that has been advanced against all abstract fpeculations concerning the origin, principle, or limitation of civil authority; namely, that such speculations poffels little or no influence upon the conduct either of the ftate or of the fubject, of the governors or the governed; nor are attended with any useful confequences to either: that in times of tranquillity they are not wanted; in times of confufion they are never heard. heard. This representation however, in my opinion, is not juft. Times of tumult, it is true, are not the times to learn; but the choice men make of their fide and party, in the most critical occafions of the commonwealth, may nevertheless depend upon the leffons they have received, the books they have read, and the opinions they have imbibed, in seasons of leisure and quietnefs. Some judicious perfons, who were prefent at Geneva during the troubles which lately convulfed that city, thought they perceived in the contentions there carrying on, the operation of that political theory, which the writings of Rouffeau, and the unbounded esteem in which these writings are held by his countrymen, had diffused amongst the people. Throughout the political disputes that have within these few years taken place in Great Britain, in her fifter kingdom, and in her foreign dependencies, it was impoffible not to obferve, in the language of party, in the refolutions of popular meetings, in debate, in converfation, in the general strain of thofe fugitive and diurnal addreffes to the public, which fuch occafions call forth, the prevalency of thofe ideas of civil authority which are difplayed in the works of Mr. Locke. The credit of that great name, the courage and liberality of his principles, the fkill and clearnefs with which his arguments are propofed, no less than the weight of the arguments themselves, have given a reputation and currency to his opinions, of which, I am perfuaded, in any unfettled ftate of public affairs, the influence would be felt. As this is not |