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In the treatises that I have met with upon the subject of morals, ! appear to myself to have remarked the following imperfections ;-either that the principle was erroneous, or that it was indisa tincily explained, or that the rules deduced from it were not sufficiently adapted to real life and to actual situations. The writings of Grotius, and the larger work of Puffendorff, are of too forensic a cast, too much mixed up with the civil law and with the jurisprudence of Germany, to answer precisely the design of a system of ethics—the direction of pri. vate consciences in the general conduct of human life. Perhaps, indeed, they are not to be regarded as institutes of morality calculated to instruct an individual in his duty, so much as a species of law books and law authorities, suited to the practice of those courts of justice, whose decisions are regu. lated by general principles of natural equity, in conjunction with the maxims of the Roman code ; of which kind, I understand, there are many upon the Continent. To which may be added, concerning both these aathors, that they are more occupied in describing the rights and usages of independent communities, than is necessary in a work which professes not to adjust the correspondence of nations, but to delineate the offices of domestic life. The profusion also of classical quotations with which many of their pages abound, seems 10 me a fault from which it will not be easy to excuse them. If these extracts be intended as decorations of style, the composition is overloaded with orna
ments of one kind. To any thing more than ornia ment they can make no claim. To propose them as serious arguments, gravely to attempt to establish or fortify a moral duty by the testimony of a. Greek or Roman poet, is to trife with the attention of the reader, or rather to take it off from all just principles of reasoning in morals.
of our own writers in this branch of philosophy, I find none that I think perfectly free from the three objections which I have stated. There is likewise a fourth property observable almost in all of them, namely, that they divide too much the law of Nature from the precepts of Revelation; some authors industriously declining the mention of Scripture authorities, as belonging to a different province; and others reserving them for a separate volume : which appears to me much the same defect, as if a commentator on the laws of England should content himself with stating upon each head the common law of the land, without taking any notice of acts of parliament; or should choose to give his readers the common law in one book, and the statute law in another. • When the obligations of morality are taught,” says a pious and celebrated writer, “ let the sanctions of Christianity never be forgotten : by which it will be shown that they give strength and lustre to each other : religion will appear to be the voice of reason, and morality will be the will of God."*
The manner also in which modern writers have treated of subjects of morality, is, in my judgment, liable to much exception. It has become of late à fashion to deliver moral institutes in strings or series of detached propositions, without subjoining a continued argument or regular dissertation to any of them. This sententious apophthegmatizing style, by crowding propositions and paragraphs too fast upon the mind, and by carrying the eye of the reader from subject to subject in too quick a succession, gains not a sufficient hold upon the attention, to leave either the memory furnished, or the understanding satisfied. However useful á sylla
* Preface to “The Preceptor," by Dr. Johnson.
bus of topics or a series of propositions may be in the hands of a lecturer, or as a guide to a student, who is supposed to consult other books, or to institute upon each subject researches of his own, the method is by no means convenient for ordinary readers; because few readers are such thinkers as to want only a hint to get their thoughts at work upon; or such as will pause and tarry at every proposition, till they have traced out its dependency, proof, relation, and consequences, before they permit themselves to step on to another. A respectable writer of this class* has comprised his doctrine of slavery in the three following propositions
“ No one is born a slave; because every one is born with all his original rights."
“No one can become a slave; because no one from being a person can, in the language of the Roman law, become a thing, or subject of property.
“ The supposed property of the master in the slave, therefore, is matter of usurpation, not of right.”
It may be possible to deduce from these few adages, such a theory of the primitive rights of human nature, as will evince the illegality of slavery; but surely an author requires too much of his reader, when he expects him to make these deductions for himself; or to supply, perhaps from some remote chapter of the same treatise, the several proofs and explanations which are neceasary to
render the meaning and truth of these assertions 1 intelligible.
There is a fault, the opposite of this, which some moralists who have adopted a different, and I think a better plan of composition, have not always been careful to avoid ; namely, the dwelling upon verbal and elementary distinctions, with a labour and prolixity proportioned much more to the subtlety of the question, than to its value and importance in the prosecution of the subject. A writer upon the
* Dr. Ferguson, author of " Institutes of Mocal Philosophy.':
law of nature,* whose explications in every part of philosophy, though always diffuse, are often very successful, has employed three long sections in endeavouring to prove that “permissions are not laws." The discussion of this controversy, however essential it might be to dialectic precision, was certainly not necessary to the progress of a work designed to describe the duties and obligations of civil life. The reader becomes impatient when he is detained by disquisitions which have no other object than the settling of terms and phrases ; and what is worse, they for whose use such books are chiefly intended, will not be persuaded to read them at all.
I am led to propose these strictures not by any propensity to depreciate the labours of my predecessors, much less to invite a comparison between the merits of their performances and my own; but solely by the consideration, that when a writer offers a book to the public, upon a subject on which the public are already in possession of many others, he is bound by a kind of literary justice to inform his readers, distinctly and specifically, what it is he professes to supply, and what he expects to improve. The imperfections above enumerated, are those which I have endeavoured to avoid or remedy. of the execution the reader must judge; but this was the design.
Concerning the principle of morals it would be premature to speak: but concerning the manner of Unfolding and explaining that principle, I have somewhat which I wish to be remarked. An experience of nine years in the office of a public tutor in one of the universities, and in that department of education to which these chapters relate, afforded me frequent occasions to observe, that in discoursing to young minds upon topics of morality, it required much more pains to make them perceive the difficulty, than to understand the solution : that, unless the subject was so drawn up to a point, as to exhibit the full force of an objection, or the exact place of a doubt, before any explanation was en
* Dr. Rutherforth, author of "Institutes of Natural Law."