ernment of reason: it is a government of policy, and not of principle. It is regulated by the perceptions of the natural man, finite and uncertain as they are: it is under the controul of objects which are outward and deceitful. But the different views upon this subject, proceed mostly from man not being willing to come under the government of the cross of Christ: it is contrary to every feeling of his nature; that nature, which would exalt itself to an equality with God.

If man is not entirely accountable for his time, where shall we draw the line of distinction? No person can do it. Let him throw aside his reason, and his self-will upon the subject, and see what his feelings will tell him! Whether God loves a divided heart!Let him ask himself, whether he is not indeed a steward of the gifts which are intrusted to him. And then see, whether he is accountable for a part only of his time, his talents, or his money. Such an idea would, probably, be considered absurd, if the case had not been prejudged; and prejudged, too, by people, who pretend to take scripture for their

guide; but who make no difficulty in passing over those passages already quoted.

It is not pretended, but that the exercise of reason, even as a judging principle, may in some cases be needful: yet a state in which reason governs, and a state of war, are closely allied. In the one case, man has a dependance upon the natural powers of the mind; and in the other, on the natural powers of the flesh; but these cases can only exist, as a consequence of sin.

The excellent John Woolman, in his journal, speaks of doing every thing from a conviction of right. "When I proceed to business, says he, without some evidence of duty, I have found by experience, that it tends to weakness." Many other instances might be given, of pious individuals, who have expressed the same sentiments; but like him, they have been liable to the epithets of fanatics and enthusiasts; because, the world cannot receive such doctrine. The "strong man that keeps the house," is unwilling to give up the government of it; and hence their offerings are only of "the lame, the halt, and the blind."

This reason, by which we judge from consequences, leads often to a very erroneous estimate of things.

The man who contributes to the relief of his neighbour, does a good moral act; yet, inasmuch as he looks simply to the end to be produced, it is to himself an act, at most, approaching to an innocent act, neither good nor evil. If in doing it he has had his own ends in view, has gratified his pride and ostentation, it is selfish, and is really a wicked act; yet his reason would be very apt to persude him, as the end produced was good, it was a good act. To make it what it ought to be, a real good act, as respects himself, it should be done in simple obedience to the divine manifestations in his own mind.

It is just the same with actions, which the world calls wicked; there is no certain judgment to be formed of them out of the truth. Man, depending upon his natural powers, is constantly liable to be deceived.

Morality is not so far connected with religion, but that a man may be a very moral man, without being a religious man.-In the case cited, a man does a good moral act, and yet

it is so far from being a religious act, that it is absolutely wicked.

In every work upon morality, there is a great deal said about the moral principle: it is blended with religious principle; and thus two things are united, which are not necessarily connected. Hence arises a great deal of confusion. Authors are totally at a loss, clearly to define what morality is; and what is of much more consequence, they loose sight of this certain truth-that religion is wholly in the mind; separate them, and every enigma is unravelled: morality relates to man, religion to God. Morality is action, without any regard to religion; religion is principle, without regard to action. Morality is outward, and I believe, capable of demonstration; religion is entirely spiritual. The one has its union with man, the other is a union with God. Simple morality is a system, in which man acts in a dependance on himself: pure religion, is an entire dependance upon God. And yet, it is not pretended, but that moral actions may be the result of religious principles, proceeding directly from the manifestations of

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revealed truth; and such may be termed religious acts; though a moment's consideration will convince us, that an act itself is never religion; but that the religion is entirely in the principle. This kind of morality is pure and undefiled; but the same act which may proceed from religious principle, may also proceed from man himself; and this is simple morality. The moral good that is done, is alike in both cases; and the world in its outward estimate of things, calls all alike virtue. There is a nice but as clear a distinction between them, as there is between real good and evil.

An action must be productive of good to our fellow men, to be a moral act; intention to do a service to our neighbour, never can be morality; neither can those acts be called moral acts which have no bearing upon society but there is no action of our lives, that is not either religious or irreligious.

A man placed out of society, on an island by himself, may be a religious man, without being a moral man; morality or immorality cannot exist as regards him, his actions have no influence upon society; but they are equal