An Explanation of the Difficulties connected with the Genealogy of our Lord. By REV. G. W. BUTLER, M.A. London: MacIntosh, Paternoster Row. 1875. Pp. 32. AN ingenious pamphlet. Mr. Butler holds that Matthew's list is shorter than Luke's, because it is "a purged list"-the names that had been polluted by sin being kept out. Then as to the diversity of the names, our author states the result of his whole essay in a single sentence; "Matthew's genealogy appears to be a list of surnames, entered amongst the chronicles of state, probably after the death of the individual; that in Luke's Gospel, a list of names imposed in infancy, and entered there in the temple register. In both cases, the genealogies represent the direct lineal ancestry of our Saviour through Joseph, his earthly father according to the law." Farewell Sermon preached by the REV. ROBERT WALLACE, in the Evangelical Union Church, Coupar Angus, on Sabbath, 12th March, 1876, on the occasion of his departure for Glasgow. Perth: W. Macfarlane & Co. WE neglected in last issue to notice this discourse. In it Mr. Wallace reviews his twenty years' ministry in Coupar-Angus, detailing his exertions in the fields of temperance, health, and especially of the everlasting Gospel. The discourse is, in every respect, a model one, and must be treasured, especially by the preacher's former friends, as a memorial of a man, who, like his Saviour, went about continually doing good. Photography has in this case also given to the readers a life-like representation of the preacher. Spontaneous Evolution and the Germ Theory of the Propagation of Low Forms of Life, with Experiments on the Limits of Vital Resistance to Heat. By NEIL CARMICHAEL, M.D., C.M., F.F.P.S.G. Read before the Philosophical Society of Glasgow, March, 10, 1876. IN this paper, Dr. Carmichael, by a series of very interesting and successful experiments, refutes Dr. Bastian's assertion that scientific men can, under certain conditions, secure the development of life from infusions in which there is no life. Ought we to Obey the New Court? By ORBY SHIPLEY, M.A. Pickering, Piccadilly, W. 1872. Pp. 48. A wail from the High Church, or Romanizing party in the Church of England against Mr. Disraeli's Public Worship Regulations Act.-Peniel an Advocate of Scriptural Holiness. Langley, Warwick Lane, London. An earnest and well-meaning monthly, devoted to the exposition of Dr. Boardman's view of holiness.- -We are indebted also to "R. K., 7 King Street, Snow Hill, London," for sending us specimen copies of striking and beautiful gospel leaflets, admirably adapted for distribution in railway carriages or steamboats. These are written in French, Italian, and Spanish, as well as in the English language. THE EVANGELICAL REPOSITORY. SIXTH SERIES. No. X.-DECEMBER, 1876. IMMORTALITY IN THE LIGHT OF NATURE. (Concluded from page 47.) WITH most people, the doctrine of immortality will be held as practically established, when it has been shown that the soul is capable of surviving the body; inasmuch as it is chiefly from the corpse, the shroud, the coffin, and the grave, that their fears proceed. But to place the strict immortality of the soul beyond the possibility of doubt, it is not enough to show that the soul can, or even that it will, outlive the body. For though death, which is proper to the body, leaves the inherent powers of the soul untouched, may there not be some other kind of catastrophe to which souls are as liable as bodies to decay and disintegration? May there not be a posthumous existence that, nevertheless, falls short of a neverending life? The finitude of the soul precludes the possibility of demonstrating, from its own nature alone, the impossibility of its ever ceasing to exist. Even though it were satisfactorily shown, that the soul is not the creature of the body, it would be unwarrantable to conclude that it is absolutely independent that there is nothing whatever external to itself conditioning its existence-otherwise we should have reason to believe in its eternal existence a parte ante, as well as a parte post. Until we know the cause of the soul's existence, we cannot argue with confidence regarding its destiny. But how shall we know the nature of the cause, except by the nature of the effect? The cause on which the soul depends must be capable of accounting for a being gifted with intelligence and freedom. And what cause but a personal God is capable of producing such an effect? Such, certainly, is the God whose offspring No. 10. F Vol. we are, and with faith in such a God, our prospect of immortality brightens considerably. Let us now look at the Moral Argument, to which great importance has been attached by some thinkers, conspicuously by Kant, who trusted in it to the exclusion of every other. The Moral Argument has more sides than one; but by that argument is generally meant a necessity for a future state, in which the actions of the present life shall meet with a more adequate retribution than is dealt out to them here. It dwells on the anomalies, so frequently encountered, of righteousness oppressed and wickedness triumphant; and asserts that these can only be temporary disturbances, to be rectified in a future world, where the righteous shall have their "good things," and the wicked their "evil things." On the Moral Argument, thus understood, I beg to offer the following criticisms: If we have no idea of retribution but what is furnished by experience, it is clearly incompetent to infer from the present system of retribution, declared to be imperfect, the necessity of a future more exact administration of justice. If experience be our only guide in the matter, what warrant have we for characterizing the present administration as imperfect, or for expecting that the retribution of the future, if such a retribution there be, will be administered with greater exactitude? Keeping to experience alone, at the most we could only expect that" that which hath been, is that which shall be." Can the alleged necessity be more successfully maintained on à priori grounds? Granted that we instinctively connect the idea of evil desert with evil doing; yet, as à priori judgments are essentially formal, they do not enable us to determine what retribution is suitable to what act, nor to adjudicate on the question, whether a future life is necessary in order that justice may be done to the present. For, if retribution is necessary, I see a system of retribution already in operation. There never yet was a virtuous act performed, that did not carry a blessing to the agent; nor a sinful act that failed to injure its author. One therefore may hold a doctrine of retribution, without holding the doctrine of immortality. In the Old Testament there is no doctrine more emphatically asserted than the doctrine of retribution, and yet there is none more obscurely stated, or less applied to practical purposes, than the doctrine of immortality. The ancient Israelites believed strongly in the present divine government of the world, and do not seem to have felt the necessity of a future life for mere retribution's sake. No doubt they were sometimes confounded by facts of experience that seemed to mock their faith. The Psalmist, when he sees the "wicked flourish as a green bay-tree," cries again and again, "How long, O Lord, how long?" But, on further reflection, he was satisfied that the advantage of the wicked over the righteous was only apparent; and that he had no reason to "fret himself because of evil doers," or to be "envious against the workers of iniquity." In the present state, it is true, wealth and other things held in worldly estimation, are not distributed exactly according to the moral character of individuals. There are natural, as well as moral conditions of prosperity; and natural advantages of mind, body, and circumstances, sometimes give the worldly superiority to a man of inferior character. But is it necessary to a system of retribution, that the natural should be entirely eliminated as a factor of human happiness? and that all should be made to depend on the moral? If retribution demanded that men should experience no good, and suffer no evil but what corresponded to some good or evil which they had done, then, indeed, retribution has at present no place among us; for the wicked are sometimes distinguished by their advantages, and the righteous by their disadvantages. Such a Draconian system of retribution, moreover, besides absolutely excluding the operation of divine grace, would starve itself to death by preventing the possibility of those moral products which any system of retribution necessarily presupposes. The continuance of natural good is the basis of responsibility; man cannot act unless something is first given him. Sometimes, no doubt, the consequences of an evil act extend themselves even discernibly over the space of many years; yea, an act committed at the beginning of a lifetime is sometimes still affecting the experience of its author at the close of his days; and let the individual live ever so long, he would still acknowledge himself, in view of that offence, a sinner, and not to speak of other consequences, would at least experience all the humiliation which such a confession involves; and, if his life were prolonged beyond the grave, then even what we witness here would constrain us to believe that the "actions done in the body" would continue to be followed by appropriate retributive consequences. If death were the end of conscious existence, it is manifest that the last actions of a man would not have the same extent of consequences as those committed earlier in life; and, if it were necessary that they should be rewarded on the same scale, it would be necessary that his existence should be continued beyond the grave. But, to justify this argument, it must be shown that our life here is prolonged from hour to hour, in order that we may reap the consequences of our past actions; and the converse doctrine that, because our life is prolonged, the consequences are prolonged, must be shown to be untenable. As to the alleged anomalies of the present state of existence, it should not be forgotten that a "man's life consists not in the abundance of his possessions "-that the greatest happiness is not always associated with the greatest worldly prosperitythat, if we suffer much that we do not deserve, we also enjoy much to which we are not entitled. And, in such cases as that of the righteous persecuted, perhaps, even unto death, wherein lies the root of the anomaly? Is it not in the sin that persecutes? And can any system of retribution prevent sin? In the future life, which the Moral Argument alleges to be necessary for the redress of grievances, is it certain that the lamented anomalies of the present will disappear? On the contrary, is it not certain that, if sin is still committed-and that it will be who can doubt ?-the so-called anomalies of the present will only be perpetuated, and perhaps on a larger scale, in the future? But whatever doubt may remain on our mind, as to the necessity of a future life for mere retribution's sake, there cannot, I think, be any doubt that a future life, if we had reason to believe in it, would exercise a salutary influence on the present. The grandeur of the scale of being would tend to elevate the tone of life. Under the assurance that death would not rob us of the hard-won fruits of our earthly toil, all our nobler powers would work with redoubled energy. Undoubtedly we ought to do what is right, whether there is a future life or not. But may we not affirm, that the intellectual and moral nature of man requires the belief, and, if the belief, the fact of immortality, in order to its fullest development? Without forgetting or disparaging the immediate rewards of virtue, we may boldly say, that nature holds out but scanty encouragement to men to do the right, to do their best, if after toiling hard for perfection, rigorously denying themselves, they are flung ignominiously into the dust of the grave, to find the end of all their endeavouring there : "And he, shall he, "Man, her last work, who seem'd so fair, "Who loved, who suffer'd countless ills, It is worthy of observation, that the desire of immortality is strongest in the best minds, and in the best moods of the best |