Christian fathers on freedom of the will.

Justin Martyr.

bers of the churches have held a different doctrine; but I say that their number is so small, and the multitude so great and continuous who have taught the contrary doctrine, that it stands, unimpeached and unbroken, as the universally received doctrine of the orthodox christian church in all ages.

I begin with the doctrine of the christian fathers, as quoted by Dr. Scott, in his remarks on Tomline's Refutation of Calvinism.

It is, however, to be remembered, and noted carefully in reading this testimony of the fathers, that by free will,' they mean a will free as opposed to the coercion of fate-the supposed necessity of a series of natural causes, by which the wills of God and man were controlled. The question whether the will is free in a moral sense, as biased to evil since the fall, or impartial and unbiased, had not then come up in the church. The moral bias to evil was admitted, taken for granted, and not publicly controverted till the time of Pelagius. Their doctrine of free will, therefore, is not the Pelagian or Arminian doctrine, but the anti-fatalism doctrine of mind free as uncoerced in choice, and with the power always of contrary choice; and in this view, I begin with Justin Martyr, A. D. 140.

'But lest any one should imagine, that I am asserting that things happen by a necessity of fate, because I have said that things are foreknown, I proceed to refute that opinion also. That punishments and chastisements and good rewards are given according to the worth of the action of every one, having learnt

Freedom of the will-Tatian, Irenæus.

it from the Prophets, we declare to be true: since if it were not so, but all things to happen according to FATE, nothing would be in our power; for if it were decreed by fate, that one should be good, and another bad, no praise would be due to the former, or blame to the latter. And again, if mankind had not the power, by free will, to avoid what is disgraceful and to choose what is good, they would not be responsible for their actions.' p. 13.

'Because God from the beginning endowed angels and men with free will, they justly receive punishment of their sins in everlasting fire. For it is the nature of every one who is born, to be capable of virtue and vice; for nothing would deserve praise, if it has not the power of turning itself away.' p. 25.

This language of Justin is as plain as it can be. That to free agency and accountability, the natural ability of choice with power to the contrary, is indispensable.

Tatian, A. D. 172.-'Free will destroyed us. Being free, we became slaves; we were sold, because of sin. No evil proceeds from God. We have produced wickedness; but those who have produced it have it in their power again to remove it.' p. 31. [i. e. the natural power of choosing life or death.]

Irenæus, A. D. 178.-But man being endowed with reason, and in this respect like to God, being made free in his will, and having power over himself, is the cause that sometimes he becomes wheat and sometimes chaff. Wherefore he will also be justly condemned; because, being made rational, he lost true

Freedom of the will-Clement, Tertullian.

reason; and living irrationally, he opposed the justice of God, delivering himself up to every earthly spirit, and serving all lusts.' p. 35.

'But if some men were bad by nature, (i. e. by a natural necessity) and others good-neither the good would deserve praise, for they were created so, nor would the bad deserve blame, being born so. But since all men are of the same nature, and able to lay hold of and do that which is good, and able to reject it again, and not do it, some justly receive praise, even from men, who act according to good laws, and some much more from God; and obtain deserved testimony of generally choosing and persevering in that which is good: but others are blamed, and receive the deserved reproach of rejecting that which is just and good. And therefore the Prophets enjoined men to do justice and perform good works.' p. 42.

Clement of Alexandria, A. D. 194. Neither praise nor dispraise, nor honors nor punishments, would be just, if the soul had not the power of desiring and rejecting-if vice were involuntary." p. 54. 'As therefore he is to be commended, who uses his power in leading a virtuous life; so much more is he to be venerated and adored, who has given us this free and sovereign power, and has permitted us to live-not having allowed what we choose or what we avoid to be subject to a slavish necessity.' p. 54.

Tertullian, A. D. 200.—I find that man was formed by God with free will and with power over himself, observing in him no image or likeness to God more than in this respect:-for he was not formed

Freedom of the will-Origen.

after God, who is uniform in face, bodily lines, &c. which are so various in mankind, but in that substance which he derived from God himself: that is, the soulanswering to the form of God; and he was stamped with the freedom of his will.

The law itself, which was then imposed by God, confirmed this condition of man. For a law would not have been imposed on a person who had not in his power the obedience due to the law; nor, again, would transgression have been threatened with death, if the contempt also of the law were not placed to the account of man's free will.

'He who should be found to be good or bad by necessity, and not voluntarily, could not with justice receive the retribution either of good or evil.' p. 64. This demands no comment.

Origen, A. D. 220.-Whence, consequently, we may understand, that we are not subject to necessity, so as to be compelled by all means to do either bad or good things, although it be against our will. For if we be masters of one will, some powers, perhaps, may urge us to sin, and others assist us to safety; yet we are not compelled by necessity to act either rightly or wrongly.'

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According to us, there is nothing in any rational creature, which is not capable of good as well as evil. There is no nature that does not admit of good and evil, except that of God, which is the foundation of all good.' p. 66.

'We have frequently shown in all our disputations, that the nature of rational souls is such as to be capa

Freedom of the will--Cyprian, Lactantius, Eusebius.

ble of good and evil. Every one has the power of choosing good and choosing evil.' p. 67.

'A thing does not happen because it was foreknown; but it was foreknown, because it would happen. This distinction is necessary. For if any one so interprets what was to happen as to make what was foreknown necessary, we do not agree with him; for we do not say that it was necessary for Judas to be a traitor, although it was foreknown that Judas would be a traitor. For in the prophecies concerning Judas, there are complaints and accusations against him, publicly proclaiming the circumstance of his blame; but he would be free from blame, if he had been a traitor from necessity, and if it had been impossible for him to be like the other apostles.' pp. 80, 81.

Cyprian, A. D. 248. Yet did he not reprove those who left him or threaten them severely, but rather turning to the apostles said, "Will ye also go away?" preserving the law, by which man, being left to his own liberty and endowed with free will, seeks for himself death or salvation.' p. 84.

Lactantius, A. D. 306.- That man has a free will [i. e. able to choose either way] to believe or not to believe-see in Deuteronomy, "I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing, therefore choose life that both thou and thy seed may live." p. 88.

Eusebius, A. D. 315.-The fault is in him who chooses, and not in God. For God has not made nature or the substance of the soul bad; for he who is good can make nothing but what is good. Every