Give me the fathers of ten thousand orphans, Both mine and every Swede's, whose patriot breast 5 Bleeds in his country's woundings. Oh! thou canst not Thou hast outsinned all reckoning! Give me, then, My all that's left, my gentle mother there, And spare yon little trembler. Crist. Yes, on terms 10 Of compact and submission. Gust. Ha! with thee! Compact with thee! and mean'st thou for my country, For Sweden? No,-so bold my heart but firm, Although it wring for 't, though blood drop for tears, 15 And at the sight my straining eyes dart forth,— They both shall perish first! LESSON CCXXVII.-TAMERLANE AND BAJAZET.- -Rowe. Tam. When I survey the ruins of this field, 5 That half our Eastern world this day are mourners ;) Baj. Make thy demand of those that own thy power! Know, I am still beyond it; and though fortune 10 Has stript me of the train and pomp of greatness, That outside of a king; yet still my soul, Fixed high, and of itself alone dependent, Is ever free and royal; and even now, As at the head of battle, does defy thee. 15 I know what power the chance of war has given, And dare thee to the use of 't. This vile speeching, This after-game of words, is what most irks me: Spare that, and for the rest 't is equal all, 20 Be it as it may. Tam. Well was it for the world, When, on their borders neighboring princes met, The sanctity of leagues so often sworn to. Canst thou believe thy prophet, or, what's more, That Power Supreme, which made thee and thy prophet, 5 Of sacred faith given to the royal Greek? Baj. Thou pedant talker! ha! art thou a king Baj. Can a king want a cause, when empire bids The noble appetite which will be satisfied, 20 And, like the food of gods, makes him immortal. Tam. Henceforth, I will not wonder we were foes, Since souls that differ so by nature, hate, And strong antipathy forbid their union. Baj. The noble fire, that warms me, does indeed 25 Transcend thy coldness. I am pleased we differ, Nor think alike. Tam. No: for I think like a man, Thou like a monster; from whose baleful presence 'Tis true, I am a king, as thou hast been; 35 But though I dare face death, and all the dangers Baj. Confusion! wouldst thou rob me of my glory? Would, like a tempest, rush amidst the nations, My angry thunder on the frightened world. Tam. The world! 't would be too little for thy pride: 5 Thou wouldst scale heaven.. Baj. I would. Away! my soul Tam. Thou vain, rash thing, That, with gigantic insolence, hast dared 10 To lift thy wretched self above the stars, 15 And mate with power Almighty, thou art fallen! And scorns to make acquaintance with ill fortune. Make room to entertain the vast idea. Oh! had I been the master but of yesterday, I would have caged thee for the scorn of slaves. Tam. Well dost thou teach me What justice should exact from thee. Mankind, Baj. Do it, and rid thy shaking soul at once Tam. Why slept the thunder 40 That should have armed the idol deity, And given thee power, ere yester sun was set, To shake the soul of Tamerlane? Hadst thou an arm To make thee feared, thou shouldst have proved it on ma When, through the tumult of the war I sought thee, Baj. Oh! blast the stars That fated us to different scenes of slaughter! As now, been in my power, and held thy life I bid thee live. So much my soul disdains 10 That thou shouldst think I can fear aught but Heaven. 15 This royal tent, with such of thy domestics Hard terms of peace; but such as thou mayst offer LESSON CCXXVIII.-AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY.-JAMES A. BAYARD. Mr. Chairman, I am confident that the friends of this measure are not apprized of the nature of its operation, nor sensible of the mischievous consequences which are likely to attend it. Sir, the morals of your people, the peace 5 of the country, the stability of the government, rest upon the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. It is not of half the importance in England, that the judges should be independent of the crown, as it is with us, that they should be independent of the legislature. Am I ask10 ed, Would you render the judges superior to the legisla ture? I answer, No, but coördinate. Would you render them independent of the legislature? I answer, Yes, independent of every power on earth, while they behave themselves well. The essential interest, the permanent 15 welfare of society, require this independence; not, sir, on account of the judge; that is a small consideratin; but on account of those between whom he is to decide. You calculate on the weaknesses of human nature, and you suffer the judge to be dependent on no one, lest he should be 20 partial to those on whom he depends. Justice does not exist where partiality prevails. A dependent judge can 15 not be impartial. Independence is, therefore, essential to the purity of your judicial tribunals. Let it be remembered, that no power is so sensibly felt by society, as that of the judiciary. The life and property 5 of every man, are liable to be in the hands of the judges. Is it not our great interest to place our judges upon such high ground, that no fear can intimidate, no hope seduce them? The present measure humbles them in the dust; it prostrates them at the feet of faction; it renders them 10 the tools of every dominant party. It is this effect which I deprecate; it is this consequence which I deeply deplore. What does reason, what does argument avail, when party spirit presides? Subject your bench to the influence of this spirit, and justice bids a final adieu to your tribunals. We are asked, sir, if the judges are to be independent of the people. The question presents a false and delusive view. We are all the people. We are, and as long as we enjoy our freedom, we shall be, divided into parties. The true question is, Shall the judiciary be perma20 nent, or fluctuate with the tide of public opinion? I beg, I implore gentlemen to consider the magnitude and value of the principle which they are about to annihilate. If your judges are independent of political changes, they may have their preferences; but they will not enter into the spirit of 25 party. But let their existence depend upon the support of the power of a certain set of men, and they cannot be impartial. Justice will be trodden under foot. Your courts will lose all public confidence and respect. The judges will be supported by their partisans, who, in 30 their turn, will expect impunity for the wrongs and violence they commit. The spirit of party will be inflamed to madness; and the moment is not far off, when this fair country is to be desolated by a civil war. Do not say, that you render the judges dependent only 35 on the people. You make them dependent on your president. This is his measure. The same tide of public opinion which changes a president, will change the ma jorities in the branches of the legislatu re. The legislature will be the instrument of his ambition; and he will have 40 the courts as the instrument of his vengeance. He uses the legislature to remove the judges, that he may appoint creatures of his own. In effect, the powers of the govern ment will be concentrated in the hands of one man, who will dare to act with more boldness, because he will be |