1853.]

IT

is now just twenty years since

the clear blue waters off Cape Sigæum, and the funereal mounds that rise on the surrounding shores, witnessed a sight scarcely equalled since the old day when the hollow ships of the Achæans approached those shores in swarming numbers, not indeed to cast anchor there, but to be hauled up on the beach, safe from every blast that might sweep either from woody Ida, or from the rugged Imbros-"Iμßpov παιπαλοέσσης.

On a sunny morning, in the month of July, 1833, an English squadron of six sail of the line and a few frigates, led by the old Britannia, approached the island of Tenedos and Besika Bay. This squadron, however, was but the weather division of a fleet. To leeward six other ships, with frigates and sloops, formed another column: but these were ships of France, and the small tri-coloured flag at the foremast of the leading one, told the observer that she bore a French vice-admiral, a gallant and good officer, old Admiral Roussin. All was harmony in this allied fleet; Sir Pulteney Malcolm's movements were as carefully followed by the French Admiral as though the red flag at the Britannia's mast head had been the flag of a full admiral of France.

Tenedos was weathered, and, as a fresh breeze from the north-west made the ships breast on their way speedily towards the mouth of the Dardanelles, a casual observer, watching the movements in and between the decks of each ship, would have noticed indications that something of no ordinary interest occupied the minds of the officers, old and young. All was ready for anchoring-yet no one expected that the fleet would anchor. No drum had beaten to quarters, yet was there a more than usual readiness. Every lashing was examined, and seen to be unencumbered, as though the word clear for action' was expected to be heard; and gunners and captains of guns, lieutenants and midshipmen, might have been seen inspecting minutely the state of their

VOL. XLVIII. NO. CCLXXXIV.

respective batteries. And why was all this? Not a syllable had been formally uttered by superior officers; but something had oozed out, and, right or wrong, the belief obtained that the fleet was about to force the Dardanelles.

our

We may briefly remind readers what was the then condition of affairs in the East, a state of things widely different, indeed, from that of the present time, but which yet brought the fleets of England and France in unwonted amity to the Trojan waters, even as now they are riding, with the same old Britannia as their leader, in those same waters of Besika Bay.

The Pasha of Egypt was in open rebellion against his suzerain. The hardy stunted troops of the Nilotic plains, led on by İbrahim, had defeated a superior army of 60,000 Turks, at Koniah, and captured their General, Redshid Pasha. Nothing seemed to intervene between the Sublime Porte and the victorious rebel, who advanced in apparent expectation of a triumphant entry. England and France had been appealed to, but in vain. They were willing to protest and to remonstrate but protests and remonstrances hindered not the advance of the Pasha's host. Fleets and armies were the aid which Turkey needed from her allies, and these she did not obtain. In utter desperation she appealed to Russia, and had not to repeat her appeal. A fleet from Sebastopol anchored, in the month of February, at the mouth of the Bosphorus,

and,

in April, 15,000 Russian soldiers landed at Scutari, on the Asiatic shore of the dividing strait. And now Turkey trembled before the protectors she had invoked. Constantinople was in actual, though not nominal, possession of that steadily advancing foe, who long and warily had looked for such a day of adversity, to pounce upon her prey. Concession was speedily made to the demands of Egypt: the Pashalik of Aleppo was ceded, everything was done, every argument used, to induce Ibrahim to retreat, in order that there might remain no reason

for the delay of the feared, though invited Russians. But they did not stir.

England and France now became sensible of the error they had committed, in not sooner assisting the Sultan, and ordered their fleets and ambassadors to take prompt action. We speak of England and France, as though their wishes and interests had been the same, but we would especially remind our readers, that, at that very time, France was secretly upholding the Pasha of Egypt, anxious that the Porte should be humbled, and that Egypt should be advanced at her expense, never anticipating the Sultan's appeal to Russia. French influence was paramount at Alexandria, and France had already fully entered upon that line of policy which led to the events of 1840, when the en tente cordiale was broken, and our statesmen took a decided part in supporting the Ottoman throne against the protegé of France.

France, then, as we have said, sided with Egypt, against the Porte, and against the steadily pursued policy of England, but was glad to join us, when she found that Russian troops were actually at Constantinople; and while nominally one with us, and while our fleets were riding side by side, she was secretly continuing that very course of action which had brought about the crisis she was uniting with us to avert.

There is thus a remarkable parallel between the events of 1833 and 1853, which we leave our readers to follow out at their leisure. Now, as then, the policy of France afforded an excuse for the aggression of Russia; Louis Napoleon's pretensions touching the Holy Places have led to Nicholas's claims for headship of the Greek subjects of Abdul Medjid.

But, to return to the fleets as we saw them in July, 1833. As they neared the Trojan shore, both fleets slackened sail, and every eye was turned to where the narrow line of. sea parts the two continents, marked out by the rugged rising of Chersonesus on the European side. By this time it was generally known that the ambassadors of England and France had intimated to Russia and to the Porte, that unless the

Russian army quitted Scutari before a given day, the allied fleet would force its way up the Dardanelles, and cast anchor off the Golden Horn. We pretend to no secret or intimate knowledge of the diplomacy of that time: we relate what we saw On the appointed day, the fleet was steering for the Castle of Asia, and Sir Pulteney Malcolm only waited for the return of his tender, the Hind cutter-the little Hind, so distinguished at Navarino. At length her gaff-top-sail was seen over the flat alluvial plain of the Scamander, rapidly advancing, with wind and current in her favour, just as a sail is often seen amongst the meadows of England, revealing the existence of an unsuspected canal. Three flags were soon hoisted, and hauled down-and again and again was this repeated, and then all eyes were directed to the flag ship, as she, in her turn, hoisted a general signal to the fleet to stand off from the shore. The Russians had retreated.

In our former paper we showed, that in the minds of French admirals and French statesmen, there existed a deeply-seated feeling ofwhat must we call it? hatred, or envy, or jealousy? at all events, a feeling that bodes not well for the maintenance of peace between England and France. Surely, it will be said, the present state of things must change the aspect of matters. The fleets are now working together; officers and men must feel that their present mission is a just and a righteous one; they must see the value to Europe of such a union as that which now exists. Moreover, kindly feelings will be engendered between the two nations; indeed we hear that it is so. The flag of England will no longer be thought of as that of a deadly foe; and, while a noble emulation will arise of excelling our seamen in skill and dexterity, and of equalling our navy in all its points of excellence, the grosser and baser desire which kindles the passions of the Prince de Joinville, the desire of revenge for past reverses, will wear itself out and become effaced. Would that this may be the happy result! and were this the first occasion of a junction of our fleets we might hope for this result. But experience tells us another tale. It is no new thing,

the habitude of those manœuvres on a grand scale which are necessary to make good flag officers-indispensables pour les officiers généraux.' M. Daru replied again that many naval officers had confessed to him that they were so ignorant of the navigation of the Channel and North Seas, that if called to service there they might be exposed to serious misfortunes, arising from their inexperience, as often happened with the navy of former times.

Two naval members of the Commission, MM. Laîné and Charnier, agreed with M. Daru as to the necessity of the two squadrons, and other members spoke for and against M. Daru's proposition. At last a new line of argument was entered upon, and to this we shall call our readers' attention more particularly.

M. Daru, in reply to some remarks of M. Collas, said that the North Sea was not the only scene to be selected for the evolutions of the ocean fleet, and that the shores of England, of France, and of Portugal as far as the Antilles, offer a wider field than the Mediterranean. He then proceeded to express his astonishment that there had always existed a sort of scruple about letting their fleets appear in the British Channel, and added,—

This sea belongs to us as well as to our neighbours, and we must not, through an exaggerated fear of wounding the jealous feelings of England, (de froisser les sentiments jaloux de l'Angleterre,) deprive our ships of the navigation of this sea, to which they will be especially called, as soon as a maritime war shall be declared. (Le jour où la guerre maritime sera déclarée.)

that the fleet was kept in the Mediterranean, and M. Hernoux, another naval member, asserted that, during nine months of the year the navigation of the Mediterranean was as difficult and perilous as that of the ocean.

Finally, M. Dahirel, one of the secretaries of the Commission, supported the opinion of M. Daru, that there should be two fleets for

manœuvres :

The Commission, he remarked, had heard two sailors, M M. Laîné and Charnier, whose opinion ought to have much weight, and who assert that, for the sake of the instruction of the officers and seamen, one fleet or squadron should navigate the ocean. And if the opinion, that ocean navigation is more difficult than that of the Mediterranean be only a prejudice, even this prejudice ought to be respected. And if the English have the impression that our sailors are most at home in the Mediterranean, we must show them that they can behave equally well in the Channel. (Et, si les Anglais sont convaincus que nos matelots sont plus à leur aise dans la Mediterranée, il faut leur faire voir qu'ils feraient également bonne contenance dans la Manche.)

As to the fear of wounding the susceptibilities of England by causing our ships to navigate that sea, we need not trouble ourselves about it (il ne faut pas s'en préoccuper). Indeed it is much to be regretted that, in 1840, we in some sort gave way to England (nous avions en quelque sorte lâché pied derant l'Angleterre), and caused our fleet to return to Toulon, when its presence would have been so necessary on the theatre of

events.

a fleet in the Channel:

This sea (he said), in spite of what may have been said, is of much more difficult navigation than the Mediterranean. Our sailors are but little acquainted with it, and if proof of this statement be wanted, one need only refer to what happened to the fleet (l'escadre des dunes*) in 1831. At that period our crews, little accustomed to the navigation of that station, met with almost insurmountable difficulties in accomplishing their mission.

M. de Montebello said that it was not from any fear of offending England, but from political exigencies

whether together or divided, depend upon political events.

Without any comment upon the above we will remind our readers of a slight incident which occurred late in 1850. To many the matter seemed worthy of no notice whatever, and was forgotten as soon as it occurred. It was not so with thinking men, and the deliberations of the Commission of Enquiry now fully justify the suspicions that were entertained at the time.

On Monday afternoon, late in the month of October, 1850, the French