plished? Not merely by saying that they may be separated for proof, not assertion, is what is wanted. Nor by saying, that in order to wicked creatures being punished for ever, it is requisite that wicked creatures as such shall exist for ever: for, the assertion that wicked creatures, or, which is the same thing, that wickedness shall exist for ever, is again assuming the very point of which scriptural proof is demanded. Nay, to maintain that wickedness shall exist for ever, is actually to hazard an assertion inconsistent with, and in direct opposition to, scriptural evidence to the contrary of the very strongest kind. For, passing over a variety of other arguments which might be adduced,* is not everlasting existence, properly speaking, an attribute of the Supreme Being? and as such is it not synonymous with perfect existence? And is not perfection of existence in Him, necessarily connected with perfection of every other kind? Who would attempt to separate perfect existence in Him, from perfect wisdom, perfect power, perfect goodness, and perfect happiness? Now, is there any man so blind as not to perceive the impossibility of reconciling these facts with popular notions of theology? According to the ordinary classes of religionists, beings who continue wicked hereafter possess everlasting existence. That is, beings who in respect of moral qualities are imperfect, are nevertheless perfect in respect of existence ! But we have seen, that perfection of existence cannot be separated from perfection of every other kind in the

* For a specimen of these, see a work of the author's, entitled, Three questions proposed and answered, &c. Answer to question 3d.

Creator himself; or, that perfection in every respect constitutes the divine nature. And if so, is it conceivable, that qualities which cannot be separated in the Creator himself, should be capable of being separated as communicated by Him to His creatures? Is it conceivable, that the Supreme Being should impart everlasting or perfect existence,-which is one of the attributes of His own perfect nature,-to beings, all whose other attributes are absolutely and completely at variance with it? Our opponents allege, that in the case of the wicked hereafter, everlasting or perfect existence stands connected with sin and suffering, which are obviously qualities of an imperfect intelligent being. That is, they suppose a being who has become perfect in one respect, to continue imperfect in every other:-they suppose a being who has become possessed of the divine nature in one respect, to continue possessed of the nature of the Devil in every other. But is the existence of such a Being really conceivable? The nature of an intelligent being imperfect in every respect, and therefore consistent with itself, we can conceive of; for such is the nature of Adam :and the nature of an intelligent being perfect in every respect, and therefore consistent with itself, we can likewise form some idea of; for such is the nature of Christ. But who can conceive of a nature destined to last for ever, and therefore perfect in respect of existence, all the other attributes of which, however, continue imperfect? Who can conceive of a moral-monster,-a spiritual chimera? Is not such a nature as much opposed to the scriptures of truth, as it is to

sound philosophy? Strange and inconceivable, however, as the idea at present appears to me to be, let it be once proved from scripture, that perfection of one attribute does not necessarily imply perfection of every other, and I shall be one of the first to acknowledge, that a being possessed of perfect existence, is not therefore necessarily possessed of perfect happiness. This, however, is not all for

3dly: If a distinction between everlasting existence and everlasting life could be established; and if it could be shown that the wicked possess the former, while the latter falls to the lot of the righteous; it would actually follow, that the wicked hereafter are placed in better circumstances, and inherit a higher privilege, than the righteous. To effect this reductio ad absurdum a very few statements indeed will be sufficient. Everlasting existence is not merely, as we have just seen, an attribute of the Supreme Being, but is the highest which, by any possibility, we can conceive of or ascribe to Him. JEHOVAH,-the I AM THAT I AM,—that is, the Being possessed of independent and everlasting existence, is His incommunicable name. Everlasting life, on the other hand,-if it must be distinguished from everlasting existence,-being employed to denote a privilege which is possessed by those who believe, of course refers to and signifies, not the divine nature as it exists in God himself, but that nature as it is communicated by Him to His creatures. Upon the principles of popular religionists, everlasting existence being God's nature as it exists in Himself, everlasting life must be His nature

as communicated. But, say these theorizers, the wicked hereafter have everlasting existence, not everlasting life. That is, they have the divine nature as it exists in the Creator himself, not that nature as it is communicated by Him to His creatures! They are destitute, to be sure, of the lower attribute,—but it is because they are possessed of the higher! Now are our opponents prepared in sober earnest to maintain this? The wicked, although possessed of an essential attribute of Deity, and thus standing, according to their system, in a closer and more intimate relation to the Supreme Being than the righteous themselves, are nevertheless subjected to everlasting torments!!! Is this their doctrine? If not, what, pray, is it? for, as they deny, that those who live and die wicked here, attain to everlasting life herafter; and yet, as they maintain, that such persons have everlasting existence, which, if not the same with everlasting life, must be an essential as distinguished from a communicated divine attribute; I know but one other alternative which remains, namely, that the wicked are annihilated or swallowed up in God, an inference which, I am certain, it is not their intention to deduce. Little, I suspect, have those by whom the various popular theories of religion are supported, allowed themselves to reflect on what is implied in everlasting existence: for never, if thoroughly acquainted with the subject, would they have placed themselves in the awkward predicament of being obliged to maintain, in the first place, that intelligent creatures now wicked may hereafter become possessed of an essential as

distinguished from a communicated attribute of Deity; and, in the second place, that an essential attribute of Deity may be possessed in connection with the endurance of everlasting torments!

Admitting, then, that those who are wicked here have everlasting existence hereafter; and yet failing in their attempts to establish a distinction between everlasting existence and everlasting life; is it not clear, that popular religionists, however unintentionally, admit the fact of all who are wicked here, being destined to possess everlasting happiness hereafter ?

2. A large majority of popular religionists admit, that at the final judgment such a display of the divine perfections shall be afforded, as shall constrain even the wicked to understand and acquiesce in, or, at all events, to apprehend the justice of the punishment inflicted on them. Those, likewise, who entertain this notion place themselves in a false position: for

1st: They become bound to shew that the divine perfections, and especially the divine justice, may be understood and acquiesced in by beings, who nevertheless are the subjects of everlasting torments. According to many of those by whom the theory of eternal torments is maintained, the damned in hell are filled with horrible and inexhaustible rage against the holy name of God, and continue to blaspheme it for evermore. Such an idea as this, however, cannot of course be entertained by those who imagine, that the damned, although everlastingly punished, are nevertheless satisfied of and