regard to future amendments, or how extensively the constitution may be shielded from violent assaults or the inroads of

error.

The people, when acting in masses, are unfortunately too easily misled by feeling, or imposed upon by the artifices of demagogues. Untried expedients have often more charms for the multitude than sober realities. Sometimes a good system will seem to operate harshly or unjustly, when the grievances proceed from other causes, which no constitutional provision can relieve. The very objectionable clause may be the means of resisting the progress of the injury, or of alleviating the severity of its operation. Levying taxes, for example, may be at the same time the most beneficent, and the most unpopular, act of the government. The credit, the security, and the prosperity of the country, often depend upon its prompt exercise. Yet whilst a public debt, or some other cause for raising money exists, the demagogue may delude the people with the hope of getting rid of their burthens, by the subversion of the constitution. If the simple proposition were made, whether a convention should be called to consider the propriety of revising the constitution, as regards the power to lay taxes, with the avowed object of destroying the power, it is altogether absurd to suppose that a measure which would subvert the government could be adopted. But the very odium produced by the exercise of that power, might be successfully used by the advocates of other amendments in procuring a convention, in which their favourite theories, or interested projects, would acquire force, by seeming to have the support of public opinion. How much more satisfactory would it have been if the act of assembly, submitting the question of convention to the people, had designated the clauses of the constitution proposed for consideration? Whether the legislature possessed authority thus to restrict the subject, it is not now necessary to consider, but it strikes us that the same sovereign power of the people, which can direct a convention to be called to revise the whole, could have limited its authority to the consideration of a part.

The contrary doctrine has, however, been adopted, and it is to be hoped that the convention will make a judicious provision for all future occasions. The peaceable assemblage of the representatives of the people to frame systems of government, is peculiar to our country. We should cherish a proper sense of our happy condition. If we look to other nations, we see similar acts performed either by military power, or attended with sanguinary commotions. The whole government of a free state is subjected to revision with less excitement than that which is produced by the election of a member of the British house of commons. With such an example before us, we

would seem to have no cause to apprehend danger. But a consciousness of security is not unfrequently the prelude to imminent peril, if not to the most serious disasters. No people ever preserved their freedom long, without continual watchfulness. We have seen too many instances of the instability of human affairs, to repose unlimited confidence in any system, however wise, or in any people, however judicious. Commotions have disturbed the peace of society, and the wildest infatuation has sometimes gained the ascendency in the most rational and best organised communities. Should they arise under less favourable circumstances for the preservation of social order, it is impossible to anticipate the extent to which they may be carried, or the permanent effect which may be produced by the prostration of the powers of the government. The alteration of a constitution is a critical period in the existence of a state. The present calm and deliberate manner in which it is conducted, ought not to deter the convention from making provision for those calamities which sooner or later befal all free states.

It has already been remarked that the executive power of appointment has been the chief source of dissatisfaction. Few, if any officers in this country, have been so extensively clothed with authority. There are conditions in which nations are placed, that require the extensive concentration of powers in the executive for their security. It may become necessary for them to abandon a portion of their local or individual rights, and submit to the numerous abuses and disadvantages of a great central power, that their national independence may be preserved from foreign aggression, and their social peace protected from violation, by desperate internal factions. In such cases, extensive executive patronage may strengthen the government, and enable it, by its immense influence, to wield all the resources of the community for its preservation. The executive then, in a measure, becomes identified with the state, and the love of country becomes synonymous with loyalty to the chieftain who rules it. The contiguity of rival nations requiring constant preparation for hostilities, and rendering peace at all times precarious, is the fruitful source of the increase of executive power. Wherever these causes do not exist, extensive patronage in the executive is detrimental to the public service. By creating a host of dependents, its corrupting influence may affect the morals of the people, and the pure administration of the constitution, if it do not lead to more fatal consequences. The people are perhaps too vigilant and intelligent to justify fears for the cause of freedom, and our rights are too well protected by the federal constitution, to be wantonly assailed; but as we cannot dive into futurity, it is the part of

wisdom to profit by the lessons of history, and in framing a state constitution, to be cautious in creating a vast central power, not necessary for the energetic and faithful administration of the affairs of the commonwealth.

"The governor shall," says the constitution, "appoint all officers whose offices are established by this constitution, or shall be established by law, and whose appointment is not herein otherwise provided for." Sheriffs and coroners are elected by the people, the state treasurer is appointed by the legislature, "and all other officers in the treasury department ;-attorneys at law, election officers, officers relating to taxes, to the poor and highways, constables and other township officers," shall be, says the constitution, "appointed in such manner as is or shall be directed by law." Notwithstanding the exceptions contained in the constitution, there is left in the hands of the governor an immense power-covering the whole of the judiciary, justices of the peace, and various subordinate offices, necessary for the transaction of public business. The power of removal, although not equally great with that of appointment, is sufficiently extensive to give to the executive a vast influence. The judges and justices of the peace may be removed by him, on the address of both houses of the legislature, a majority of two thirds of each branch being requisite for the removal of the former. The secretary of the commonwealth is "appointed and commissioned during the governor's continuance in office, if he shall so long behave himself well." A multitude of other officers are removable at the pleasure of the governor. There are two points connected with the exercise of these powers, deserving of consideration; the ability of the governor judiciously. to execute so extensive an authority, and its influence on the administration of the affairs of the state. With regard to the more prominent stations, such as judges, and officers whose duties concern the whole commonwealth, no officer is more competent to make suitable selections, or whose appointments will be less liable to be influenced by unworthy motives. The candidates for such places are mostly men whose characters and qualifications are extensively known. The intelligence and opportunity of observation possessed by the executive will, in a majority of cases, guard him from deception. That governor will wilfully err, and merit the condemnation which he will receive, who, passing the ranks where talents and intelligence are arrayed before him, shall indulge his personal partiality or interest, by elevating the incompetent to important stations. But to guard against a result so pernicious to the public service, and so degrading to the commonwealth, a check upon the executive power can advantageously be introduced into the constitution. The power of appointment is a delicate

duty, and with every precaution which can be devised, is still liable to great abuses. In whatever quarter it may be deposited, it can never produce entire satisfaction, nor be completely protected from improper administration. Selfishness will sometimes gain the ascendancy; fawning sycophants will surround the depositories of political power; the incense of flattery, the claims of party friendship, and the clouds of misrepresentation, which continually obscure the political atmosphere, are obstacles in the way of a pure and independent administration of public affairs, against which no regulations however wisely framed can entirely guard. This should not however prevent the establishment of a salutary system, which although imperfect, may furnish a strong reliance against the inroads of abuses, and facilitate an escape from their consequences. All that can be accomplished by any constitution will be imperfect, since it must be carried into operation by fallible men, in whom confidence must be reposed. The virtues and intelligence of the people must after all be the bulwarks of any system which can be devised.

There is a natural point of division in offices, which may advantageously be looked to, as affording the means of lessening the accumulation of power in the governor; and that arises from the distinction which apparently exists between state and county officers. There are strong reasons for separating them in regulating the appointing power. There are numerous offices whose functions relate exclusively to the counties, and the appointment to which can appropriately be made, within the sphere in which their duties are to be fulfilled, and where the merits of applicants are known. The extent to which this course should be pursued, depends upon the nature of the offices, and upon the ability of the convention to select or create a suitable appointing power within the counties. A defective arrangement may be the means of substituting new evils for those which are removed. The difficulties which the convention will have to encounter, are duly appreciated. If it succeed in overcoming them, it will confer a lasting benefit on the community, for few subjects of greater importance can occupy its attention. We shall at present confine our attention to the qualifications of the executive. The governor can have but a very limited personal knowledge of the competency of candidates for local offices, and in a large majority of cases must be entirely ignorant of it. His information necessarily proceeds from the representations made by others. As he will naturally repose confidence in his political friends, it is apparent that their recommendations will influence, if they do not entirely control, the appointments. A few partisans in the counties thus actually exercise the appointing power. What

seems to be the act of a highly responsible officer, is in reality the work of irresponsible individuals, destitute of the confidence of the people, and wielding an extensive influence by party management. The motive which induces the appointment is seldom apparent, and unfortunately too many cases occur in which conjecture would assign any other reason as plausible than the merit of the successful candidate.

That the governor is liable to gross imposition, as to the characters and qualifications of applicants for subordinate or local offices, we have unfortunately too many proofs. The means which are taken to procure recommendations from private citizens, have not always been of the most praiseworthy description; and in fact so entirely illusory is this mode of communicating to him the sense of respectable people, who from their localities, and opportunities, are presumed to be competent judges of fitness for office, that this source of information can seldom be relied upon. Papers are circulated, fraught with encomiums upon the incompetent, which are signed by some from a reluctance to disoblige, by others from selfish motives, and by many from deceptive information communicated by those who have enlisted in the service of the aspirant. Sincerity is one of the least of the features of a great majority of these recommendations, however imposing they may appear with a large appendage of respectable names. Their insincerity is perhaps an incurable evil, and the obscurity in which they involve the executive can only be corrected by depositing the power of appointment in those who will from their situation be better able to ascertain the truth. Gross frauds have also been perpetrated. The names of respectable citizens have without their knowledge been annexed to petitions. To what extent, or in what variety of forms, attempts have been made to impose on the governor, it is unnecessary to enquire. His great exposure to deception is sufficient to show the propriety of making a modification of the power of appointment so far as regards local offices, if it be practicable, without incurring other dangers equally to be dreaded. Residing at the seat of government, it is apparent that his opportunities of acquiring information from the numerous and sometimes distant counties, to which his authority extends, and who are vitally interested in the faithful and judicious exercise of it, are very limited. Whilst the mass of the people are occupied with their vocations, and ignorant of the proceedings at the capital, the interested few surround him with their importunity, and offices are distributed without reference either to public opinion or the propriety of the selection. With most patriotic intentions, the governor may be misled. The sentiments of the people reach