when indulged in to excess, create a mental excitement entirely hostile to the deliberate and impartial exercise of the judicial functions. If judges, holding commissions during good behaviour, have ever been led into this error, instead of its being an argument against that tenure, it powerfully supports it. For we are induced to enquire to how much greater an extent would it have been carried, if the judge's office and means of subsistence had depended upon the success of his party? All his prospects in life might be involved in an election. The support of his family, his advancement in life, the possession of his present honours and income, might be swept away. Is it reasonable to expect independence, impartiality, learning, or a deportment becoming his station, in a judge with so fleeting a tenure? Opportunities are constantly occurring for the exercise of his influence. Questions affecting powerful partisans, or popular feeling, constantly arise, and shall they be decided by the judge who is elevated but for a short or uncertain period, and who may have presented to his view, proscription with honesty, or a continuance in office as the reward of servility? Nothing is more disgusting than to see a judge yielding to influence; he should know no distinctions among men; he should possess sufficient learning and confidence in his own abilities, to decide correctly and without bias, whoever may be the party, or whatever counsel the suitor may employ. Although the public will and should recognise the various grades of learning, ability and integrity, which must exist in every profession, a court should be able and willing to decide causes according to their merit, without regard to the persons, who may be standing before it, retained as advocates. That the tenure during good behaviour is better adapted to guard against these evils than the term for years, is apparent. However honourable and independent some judges are who hold their offices for a term of years, they do not justify an opposite conclusion. We should guard against permitting the personal merit of the judge to sanction a defective organisation of his office. It is highly desirable that the bar should never be stronger in mental resources than the bench, for the purest judges will quail before the power of superior intellect and learning. To avoid this evil, the judicial station should be so elevated as to invite by its dignity, and not to deter by the penuriousness of its compensation, the services of men of superior genius and attainment. The poor would then be on a level with the rich. If individuals can obtain men of superior abilities to manage their causes, than the public to decide them, it is evidently giving to the former a great advantage over the rest of the community. It is a great mistake for the public to allow itself to be surpassed by individuals, in selecting men

of abilities to transact its affairs. On the score of economy, the highest grade of intellect is always the cheapest, although it may apparently cost more to procure its services. Nothing will more effectually tend to break down the intellect of the bench than to alter the present judicial tenure.

A state of dependence is most frequently one of degradation. Independence is calculated to foster virtuous feelings, to give to the mind a lofty tone of honour, and inspire the heart with a pure and exalted spirit. Judicial, unlike ministerial, officers cannot yield to dictation, without sacrificing their principles, and becoming faithless to their duty. The nature of the judicial functions revolts at a condition of subordination. We have no satisfactory evidence that a judicial term for years has answered a good purpose any where. Arguments in abundance have, as has already been remarked, been drawn from the examples of distinguished men. But the judgments of the most sagacious observers have condemned that tenure, and it is believed that the general sense of the country, so far from being favourable to its extension, is opposed to any further official subordination in any of the departments of the government than is essential for their proper responsibility. It is the misfortune of our country that offices are too frequently dispensed to provide for the wants of partisans, without reference to their qualifications. It cannot be expected that the judiciary will be exempt from this evil. To make judges dependent on the appointing power is to give the mischief additional force. The people are the sufferers by this course of conduct, for all are interested in the administration of justice. The certainty of the law must be impaired by frequent changes. Its impartial operation will be equally affected. A mild, firm, and enlightened administration of the law requires that its ministers should be exempt from external influence, and capable of devoting their lives to their duties. There should, in every community, be a body of men set apart for the administration of the laws, who, having as little connection as possible with topics that agitate society, and having no motives of policy to guide their conduct, will be without inducements to permit justice to be warped to suit the purposes of powerful citizens or excited factions.

Should the judicial power be abused, it is not the fault of the constitution, but of the representatives of the people, who possess the most ample means of preserving its pure and impartial administration. If it be impure, the representatives of the people are guilty of a gross dereliction of duty. It is apparent that the clamour which has been raised against the constitution has been singularly misdirected, for if well founded in its estimate of the grade of judicial competency, it should have vented VOL. XIX.-No. 37.

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its wrath on those who, possessing the power of removal, have not exercised it. The term, let it be remembered, is during good behaviour; the power of removal is for any reasonable cause. They who have condemned the constitution are without an excuse; for if there be a fault, it lies not in the admirable provision of that instrument.

The judiciary has within itself checks against the abuse of power, which no other department can possess. The station, from its exposure to observation and scrutiny, is surrounded with peculiar safeguards. The public trial, the constant exertion of the mind in the decision of causes, the pressure of litigants, and the watchfulness of the bar, are calculated to keep a judge in the path of duty, and prompt him to pursue an honourable career. A man who is qualified for the station, is too elevated in feeling, and too thoroughly disciplined in mind, to permit the consciousness of independence to lull him to repose, or the possession of an income adequate to his support to relax his habits of industry. Reputation, the love of knowledge, and a devotion to the cause of justice, which it is his duty to administer, will inspire the heart and expand the intellect of the upright judge. A contrary effect may be visible in many incumbents, but it only proves their unfitness for their stations, and does not impair the force of the remark that, when a judge is made of the right materials, a stable tenure and comfortable income increase his capacity and opportunities for the performance of his duties.

The term of office during good behaviour has, perhaps, in some sections of the country, lost the approbation of a portion of the people, in consequence of the refusal of the legislature to purge the bench of a few glaring examples of immorality. The legislative and executive power of removal will have a most salutary operation when exercised, in the true spirit of the constitution, not to gratify personal animosity or party spirit, but to preserve the purity of the judicial corps. When the motives are correct, and the power is exercised with discretion, there can be little danger from its rigorous exercise on all suitable occasions. Perhaps a power of so high a nature might be subjected to some useful restrictions, such as requiring a formal specification of charges, and guaranteeing to the judge an opportunity to make his defence. Nor can judges complain of the just and energetic, exercise of this authority; for a public trial being afforded them, they are exempt from the snares which malice might lay, and being brought in open contact with their accusers, the fairest opportunity exists for their vindication. Ordinary prudence will screen them from assault. There should always be sufficient circumspection in the conduct of a judge, to guard him from unmerited condemnation.

As the uncertainty of the law is one of its greatest evils, the adoption of a temporary tenure, by which it will be increased, is calculated to inflict a serious injury upon the public. The legal knowledge contained in books is immensely extensive, and requires years of indefatigable study to master. The practice also exacts great labour for its acquisition. Principles must be well understood, and be consistently administered. It will be in vain to expect certainty in legal proceedings, if the judiciary be in a constant state of fluctuation. Each new incumbent will display the want of experience. The administration of justice will exhibit the various impressions which the different abilities, acquirements, and prejudices, of its ministers must produce. The intricacies of litigation, and the variety of legal authorities which, under the most favourable circumstances, are of a magnitude to occasion formidable obstacles in the path of justice, will be vastly increased. The clouds which overshadow the law cannot be removed by the delusive expedient of creating a succession of officers, to exhibit for a while their powers, and then to give way to a new race. The commencement of the judicial career will be one of preparation for the duties, even allowing that the favoured officer has no debts of gratitude to occupy his attention. approach of the time when his commission must expire will be a period of feverish excitement, if it be not occupied with exertions to obtain its renewal. These evils may be qualified by circumstances, or may be obviated by the personal virtues of the incumbent. But in framing a constitution the general motives and features of human nature are to be considered, and not cases of individual excellence. Provision must be made for the ordinary grade of mankind, and to guard as much as possible against improper influence.

The

It has already been remarked that judicial tenure during good behaviour, is the most truly republican. The independent administration of the law is essential to the existence of republics. Despotic and aristocratical governments would be shackled by such a regulation. Without dwelling upon the influence of party spirit, and the domination of corrupt demagogues, which so frequently disturb the peace and control the career of the freest and purest commonwealths, the history of human freedom exhibits the frightful abysses of despotism which at all times are open to engulf it. The wisdom of the day may teach us to repose in security, but the lessons of experience prove the necessity of guarding our liberty from assault. An enlightened and independent judiciary is one of the most effectual means of protecting the principles and the rights embodied in a republican constitution. Whilst the storm of party rage or corruption is struggling to undermine the political

system, whilst the people are agitated by dissentions, and society is rapidly yielding to the power of aspiring demagogues, who does not see the advantage of having the administration of the laws aloof from the turmoil, and under the control of men free from its influence and independent of its power? It has been remarked that, where the crown was not concerned, Jeffries was an impartial and honest judge. His infamous career was partly owing to his dependent condition. Had his term of office been exempt from royal power, his resistance to the despotism of his superiors might have been as conspicuous as the unrelenting spirit which, for the sake of preserving his station, he exercised towards the unhappy victims of monarchical animosity.

The term of office during good behaviour cannot, it is true, make the corrupt heart virtuous, nor the ignorant mind enlightened; but its tendency is to create an honourable spirit, and to stimulate to exertion. The term for a limited number of years has nothing to recommend it. There is no principle of republican government, that requires an efficient officer to retire from his station merely to make room for another, or to furnish the appointing power with an opportunity to issue a new commission, and place the officer under additional obligations. This power of appointment is, however, an essential ingredient in an unlimited monarchy, for there all official subordination is necessary to the supremacy of the executive. In many offices, the term for a fixed number of years may be proper. Periodically renewing the commission, and receiving the homage of the favoured candidate, add to the power of the government. If judiciously exercised, it may preserve official purity in the inferior departments. But it is difficult to see what good can result to the judiciary from being placed in this condition of subordination, or being subject to these changes. The sole object, in a republic, of conferring appointments, is, that the laws may be properly administered. The mode, therefore, by which this object can be the most safely and efficiently accomplished, is the most truly republican. When a good man is in a judicial office, republicanism requires that he should be sustained; when a bad man has gained authority, the same creed calls for his prompt removal. That official tenure, therefore, which renders the conduct and qualifications of a judge the criterion by which the duration of his authority shall be measured, is the most truly republican. It is not a term for life, although the good behaviour of the incumbent may make the official and the natural life coextensive.

The cry that has been raised against the constitution of Pennsylvania, as authorising offices for life, is no more than the exaggerated expressions of party animosity, destitute alike