The total Depravity and Corruption of Man's Nature. Efficacious Grace. 403 404 An univerfal and abfolute Decree; and abfolute, eternal, Particular Redemption. Perfeverance of Saints. 406 407 408 Concerning the Treatment which Calvinistic Writers and 410 The Unhappiness of the Change lately in many Proteftant 411 The Boldness of fome Writers. 412 The excellent Wisdom appearing in the holy Scriptures. 413 PART PART I. Wherein are explained and stated various Terms and Things belonging to the Subject of the enfuing Difcourse. I SECTION I. Concerning the Nature of the Will. T may poffibly be thought, that there is no great Need of going about to define or describe the Will; this Word being generally as well understood as any other Words we can use to explain it: And fo perhaps it would be, had not Philofophers, Metaphyficians and Polemic Divines brought the Matter into Obfcurity by the Things they have faid of it. But fince it is fo, I think it may be of fome Ufe, and will tend to the greater Clearness in the following Difcourfe, to fay a few Things concerning it. B And And therefore I obferve, that the Will (without any metaphyfical Refining) is plainly, That by which the Mind chufes any Thing. The Faculty of the Will is that Faculty, or Power, or Principle of the Mind by which it is capable of chufing. Am Act of the Will is the fame as an Act of Chufing or Choice. If any think 'tis a more perfect Definition of the Will, to fay, that it is that by which the Soul either chufes or refufes; I am content with it: tho' I think that 'tis enough to fay, It's that by which the Soul chufes For in every Act of the Will whatfoever, the Mind chufes one Thing rather than another; it chufes fomething rather than the Contrary, or rather than the Want or Non-existence of that Thing. So in every Act of Refufal, the Mind chufes the Abfence of the Thing refufed; The Pofitive and the Negative are fet before the Mind for its Choice, and it chufes the Negative; and the Mind's making its Choice in that Cafe is properly the Act of the Will: The Will's determining between the two is a voluntary determining; but that is the fame Thing as making a Choice. So that whatever Names we call the Act of the Will by, a Chufing, Refufing, Approving, Disapproving, Liking, Difliking, Embracing, Rejetling, Determining, Directing, Commanding, Forbidding, Inclining or being averse to, being pleafed or difpleas'd with; all may be reduced to this of Chufing. For the Soul to act voluntarily, is evermore to act electively. * Mr. Locke fays, "The Will fignifies Nothing " but a Power or Ability to prefer or chufe." And in the foregoing Page fays, "The Word Preferring seems best to exprefs the Act of Volition;" But 66 * Human Understanding. Edit. 7. Vol. I. p. 197. But adds, that "it does it not precifely; For (fays he)" tho' a Man would prefer Flying to Walking, yet who can fay he ever wills it?" But the Inftance he mentions don't prove that there is any Thing else in Willing, but merely Preferring : For it fhould be confidered what is the next and immediate Object of the Will, with refpect to a Man's Walking, or any other external Action; which is not his being removed from one Place to another, on the Earth, or thro' the Air; these are remoter Objects of Preference; but fuch or fuch an immediate Exertion of himself. The Thing nextly chofen or prefer'd when a Man wills to walk, is not his being removed to fuch a Place where he would be, but fuch an Exertion and Motion of his Legs and Feet &c. in order to it. And his willing fuch an Alteration in his Body in the prefent Moment, is nothing elfe but his chufing or preferring fuch an Alteration in his Body at fuch a Moment, or his liking it better than the Forbearance of it. And God has fo made and establish'd the human Nature, (the Soul being united to a Body in proper State,) that the Soul preferring or chufing fuch an immediate Exertion or Alteration of the Body, fuch an Alteration instantaneously follows. There is nothing else in the Actings of my Mind, that I am confcious of while I walk, but only my preferring or chufing, thro' fucceffive Moments, that there fhould be fuch Alterations of my external Senfations and Motions; together with a concurring habitual Expectation that it will be fo; having ever found by Experience, that on fuch an immediate Preference, fuch Senfations and Motions do actually, inftantaneously, and conftantly arife. But it is not fo in the Cafe of Flying: Tho' a Man may be faid remotely to chufe or prefer Flying; yet he don't chufe or prefer, incline to or defire, under Circumstances in View, any immediate B 2 immediate Exertion of the Members of his Body in order to it; because he has no Expectation that he fhall obtain the defired End by any fuch Exertion he doth not prefer or incline to any bodily Exertion or Effort, under this apprehended Circumftance of it's being wholly in vain. So that if we carefully diftinguish the proper Objects of the feveral Acts of the Will, it will not appear by this, and fuch-like Instances, that there is any Difference between Volition and Preference; or that a Man's chufing, liking beft, or being best pleased with a Thing, are not the fame with his willing that Thing; as they seem to be according to thofe general and more natural Notions of Men, according to which Language is formed. Thus an A&t of the Will is commonly exprefs'd by it's pleafing a Man to do thus or thus; and a Man's doing as he wills, and doing as he pleafes, are the fame Thing in common Speech. Mr. Locke fays, "The Will is perfectly dif "tinguish'd from Defire; which in the very fame "Action may have a quite contrary Tendency "from that which our Wills fet us upon. A "Man (fays he) whom I cannot deny, may oblige "me to ufe Perfuafions to another, which, at "the fame Time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this Cafe 'tis plain the "Will and Defire run counter." I don't fuppofe, that Will and Defire are Words of precisely the fame Signification: Will feems to be a Word of a more general Signification, extending to Things present and abfent. Defire refpects fomething abfent. I may prefer my prefent Situation and Pofture, fuppofe fitting ftill, or having my Eyes open, and fo may will it. But yet I can't + Hum. Und. Vol. I. p. 203. think |
