not approve our felves to God here, nor expect his Rewards hereafter. And Our Saviour in the Text feems to go on with the fame Doctrine ftill, and I think the Words ought to be interpreted and explained accordingly: The Light of the Body is the Eye: If therefore thine Eye be fingle, thy whole Body fhall be full of Light. But if thine Eye be evil, thy whole Body shall be full of Darkness. That is to fay, what the natural Eye is to the whole Body in Cafe of Sight or Blindness, the Body being enlightned or all in Darknefs according as the Eye is, that the Intention of Mind and Heart the Eye of the Soul is to all the materially good Actions of a Man, as it renders them either valuable or worthlefs, rewardable or incapable of Reward. This I take to be the true Senfe of the Place. Wherefore in the handling this Point of Doctrine I fhall difcourfe in this Method. 1. I fhall fhew the Neceffity of an boneft and good Intention, or of propounding a good End, in order to the pleafing of God, and obtaining his Rewards. 2. I fhall lay down thofe Ends of Actions, for the Matter of them good, which Chriftianity requires us to intend. 3. Shall enquire whether the mixing of any other Ends with thefe deftroys the Goodnefs of our Intention? 1. As to the Neceffity of propounding a good End. I think I need not labour much to fhew that, it being very plain that no Work, how good foever it be in it felf, makes a Man acceptable to God, or rewardable with him, if a Right Intention be wanting. But however there are thefe Reasons of it, which I think fit to infift on. 1. The Choice of an End is the chief Privilege and Excellency of our Nature above that of Brutes, and therefore the Intention which we proceed upon, and our being moved by an End that we defign, is that which properly makes our Actions Human A&tions, and principally diftinguishes them from the Actions of Beasts; which makes it plain that the Intention of a Man in the End he propounds is of great Confideration in the whole Action, and that he is good or bad himself chiefly upon the Account of thofe Reafons by which he is moved and governed; and if it be the Choice of an End that diftinguishes a Man from a Beaft, it is the Goodness or the Badnefs of the End that has the chief Stroke in diftinguishing a good Man from a bad Man. 2. It is moreover plain that the Ends which we propound to our felves do engage our Wills and Affections far more than the Means which we ufe to accomplish them, and therefore those Actions, how good foever, which we use as Means to an End, do not so effectu effectually render us good as the End it felf which we aim at. A Man is good or bad according as his Affections are placed, as he loves or hates, hopes or fears, defires or abhors, rejoices or grieves, &c. And it is the End we aim at that carries our Paffions along with it, and not the Means, but only for the Sake of the End, and therefore these have not fo confiderable a Share in giving the Denomination of Good or Bad to reasonable Creatures, whofe Privilege it is to know and chufe the End for which they act. He that giveth Alms for Vain-glory, loveth the Praife of Men more than to do Good, and fince he maketh his Alms a Means of getting Applaufe, he is moft certainly a vain-glorious Perfon, but charitable he is not, because his End is corrupted, and it is that, that must give the Name to the Perfon, and not the Action, for the Matter of it. He that reftraineth himself from Drunkenness and Riot, but this only left he fliould waste his Eftate, or that he may increafe his Wealth, may juftly go for a covetous Man, but he has not the Virtue of Temperance; so long as the Defire of Riches is the reason of his Abstinence, his Abftinence inakes him not a Jot the more commendable than his worldly Defires leave him. And therefore if Religion had made Prayers and Alms, and the outward Appearances of Piety and Charity, a more more certain Way of coming to the Riches, and Honours, and Pleasures of this World; if the Promise of these Things had been given to the Religious Man, instead of the Promife of Spiritual Bleffings and Everlasting Life, the Worldling would not have oppreffed for the Encrease of his Eftate, nor would have lied and flattered to raise himself to. Greatness, and to compafs Pleafures, he would have given Alms, and conftantly performed his Devotions, he would have done the thing that is righteous, and all the while had been as bad in Reality as now he is in Appearance too, his Heart, notwithstanding all his outward Shew, had been still eftranged from God by the Idolatry of Covetousness, he had ftill been a Lover of Pleasures more than a Lover of God, and ftill he had valued the Praife of Men above the Praife of God. It is the End we aim at, that governs our Minds, and makes us what we are, far more than the Means; and therefore be the Means never fo good in themselves, if a bad Intention spoils them, the Man cannot be good, becaufe as his Will and Affections are, fo is he himself. From hence it follows, 3. That tho' the outward Action makes never fo good an Appearance, and be in it felf never so good, yet if the End is naught, and the Intention corrupt and bafe, it makes a Man a downright Hypocrite, as our Saviour Ꮓ here here in the beginning of this Chapter thrice calls them, that faft, and pray, and give Alms, to be feen of Men. The moft obvious Interpretation of doing a Work of Charity is, that a Man has a compaffionate and beneficent Mind; but if he had not done the thing, unlefs to gain the good Opinion of others, he feigns himself to be, and defires to be taken for what he is not; he is in good earnest another Kind of Person than what he would be believed to be; he mocks the World, but God is not mocked, who knows his Heart, and fees his Ends, while they are concealed from Man. And now that which Men efteem, is not the Benefit fo much as the Mind of him from whom they receive it; we may indeed be glad of a Benefit we receive from another, because we need it, but if we could be fatisfied that it was with no good Defign to us, but out of mere Selfishness that he was at the Pains, or at the Coft of it, he would lofe all our real Thanks and Esteem, his Kindness we could not value, because there was none to value, but we should fcorn his Diffimulation and Hypocrify. It is a. plain Cafe, that fetting afide a Man's Intention to do me a Kindness in the Benefit he confers upon me, I can no more thank him for the Benefit, than I can thank a Tree for yielding me good Fruit, or a Field for bringing me a bountiful Crop; therefore the Be |