general affociation, founded on the connection of good and evil, pleasure and pain, obferved through all nature, is firmly established (like the fixing of the correfponding points in the retina) not even the mcft fudden appearance of evil will be able to affect the mind with the idea of any thing but what is right and defirable upon the whole, any more than two images, one in each eye, though ever fo unexpectedly impreffed, are not able, even for a moment, or by furprize, to give us the idea of two objects; though this was always the cafe in our infancy, and would be fo ftill without affociation of ideas. If ever our minds fhould arrive at the perfect ftate here hinted at, all the works of God, and all the events of divine providence, will conftantly appear to us as they do to the divine being himfelf, i. e. perfectly and infinitely good, without the leaft perceivable mixture of evil.

In what time it is even poffible to effect all this, cannot, with the leaft certainty, be fo much as conjectured: for though we cannot remember objects appearing to us in any other

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other manner than they now do; yet as thefe affociations of vifible ideas muft have been impreffed every time we opened our eyes, from the time that we began to take any notice of things; we must conclude, that this operation, cannot but require a very long and steady application of mind. Temporary pains and evils of all kinds, must be very clearly and fatisfactorily feen to be, in all cafes, productive of happiness in the iffue, under the government of an infinitely good God; and the conviction must be repeated and felt again and again, before the ideas will entirely, univerfally, and readily coalefce; fo that, by reafon of the neceffary avocation of mind, and the unfteady and imperfect views of things we can gain in this ftate, little can be done towards it here, and it must be referred to the attainments of a better world.

The above-mentioned facts, however, fhew, in the strongest light, what is the natural progrefs and effect of affociation of ideas in the human mind. We fee the courfe that things are evidently in, and it

doth

doth not appear, that any bounds can be fet to it. We muft, therefore, in favourable circumftances (fuch as we shall, no doubt, find ourselves in in a future world) approximate to this perfection of comprehenfion with the experience of every day; and in this way, time only is requifite, to make a mere man arrive at a pitch of excellence and happiness, of which we are able, at present, to form but very imperfect conceptions. With thefe lights, though, as yet, we are able to apply them but very imperfectly, how may we ftand amazed in the contemplation of our future felves!

By the help of these confiderations, we may form fome idea wherein confifts the fuperiority of beings of higher orders, whofe intellectual powers exceed ours. The affociation of their ideas may be more extensive, and affociated ideas may unite and coalesce more readily, and perfectly in their minds, than they do in ours; the confequence of which will be, that ideas collected from a greater space, both before and after the prefent moment, will be co-exiftent in their

minds; which will make the influence of ideas still greater, and that of fenfation (or what may be in them analogous to fenfation in us) ftill lefs than it is with us; fo that their natures will be more purely intellectual than ours.

Hence, alfo, if we may prefume to indulge a conjecture on fuch a fubject, may we form a faint idea of the incomprehenfible greatnefs and perfection of the divine being. For fince there is a real connection of all things, in the whole fyftem of nature, how diftant foever the parts of it may be, in point of time or place; this connection may at once be fo completely feen by him who planned, and who'directs the whole, that it may be faid, there is nothing paft or future in his ideas; but that to him, the whole compafs of duration is, to every real purpofe, without diftinction, prefent. To him, therefore, one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day; the two extremes, being fo perfectly united, and fo equally prefent, that the intervals, how different foever, vanish alike in both cafes. VOL. II.

I

We

We fee, then, the courfe which the divine being has pointed out for the improvement of intelligent beings, whereby we may make approaches to the excellence and happiness of the divine nature. We are to be influenced lefs by fenfation, and more by affociated ideas perpetually. The association of all connected ideas is to grow more perfect, and more extenfive continually, till things paft, prefent, and to come shall, to greater and greater diftances, become the fubject of our contemplation, and the fource of our happiness. Provifion is made for the continuance of this progress, in the ftructure of our minds, and in all the influences to which we are exposed. All the objects about which we are conversant, and all the events to which we are liable, are contrived to favour it.

Let us now confider whether any thing fimilar to this may be obferved in the scheme of revelation; and fince both the ordinary and extraordinary courfe of divine providence have the fame object with respect to us, both being defigned and calculated to