writings must neceffarily give a great, and a very plaufible advantage to unbelievers; who, finding that it is not now pretended that religion in general, or chriftianity in particular, is founded on argument, will make no difficulty of rejecting them on the principles of common fenfe alfo, and will not be difpleafed to find that chriftian writers will argue the matter with them no longer.

This common fenfe, which is from henceforth to be confidered as the firft, and likewife the laft refort with refpect to religion, and the evidences of it, thefe writers reprefent as being the fame power or faculty by which we judge that the whole is greater than a part, and by which we distinguish all other felf-evident truths from palpable abfurdities.

By the very concise process of an appeal to this principle, they fay, that any man may fully fatisfy himfelf concerning the truth of the being, the unity, the attributes, and the providence of God, and alfo of a future ftate of retribution, and even (as Dr. Ofwald has given out, and VOL. II.

L

has

has promised to prove at large) of the evidences of chriftianity.

Upon this plan I might have faved myfelf the trouble of writing the preceding parts of this work, in which my object has been to prove the truth of the abovementioned propofitions, contenting myself with roundly afferting them; and, without replying to any of the objections of unbelievers, not hesitating to pronounce every man a fool (fee Dr. Ofwald's Appeal, P. 134.) who did not affent to them.

But, notwithstanding, I have given all the attention I could to the treatife of Dr. Ofwald, who has written moft fully on the fubject, I am by no means convinced that the propofitions above mentioned are to be claffed among primary truths, or those to which every man muft neceffarily give his affent (when the terms of them have been properly explained) without the help of other intermediate propofitions. And as I have no natural right to fet up my private judg

ment

ment as the ftandard of truth, in oppofition to that of the reft of mankind, I do not fee but that an unbeliever is as much at liberty to affert the falfhood, as I am to affert the truth of fuch propofitions; and what would be gained by our reciprocally calling one another fools and blockheads?

The fource of this umbrage that has been taken at reafoning about religion, appears to me to have been a mistake concerning the nature of it, and an expectation of a kind, or degree of evidence, that the nature of the cafe will not admit of; and which, indeed, is by no means neceflary for the purpose to which it is applied; being different from, or fuperior to, that evidence which, in other fimilar cafes, does actually produce conviction, and influence the conduct; which, however, is evidently all that can be neceffary in the business of religion.

If a lottery be propofed to me, in which I fee that there are a thoufand prizes to one blank, I do not demur about purchafing a ticket, because it cannot be abfolutely demonftrated

L 2

ftrated that I fhall be a gainer by it; a very high degree of probability having an effect upon the mind, that can hardly be diftinguished from that of abfolute certainty.

If the Copernican hypothefis of the folar fyftem be propofed to me, I do not reject it, or even keep my mind in fufpenfe, becaufe there is a poffibility of the Ptolemaic fyftem being true, and because the fun, immenfe as it is, and rapid as its motion muft be, may revolve round the earth.

This is ftill more evidently the cafe with refpect to the influence of teftimony upon the mind of man, though it can never amount to more than a very high degree of probability. For we reafon and act upon the fuppofition of there having been fuch a man as Julius Cæfar, of his having been ftabbed in the fenate-houfe, and of there being fuch a city as Pekin in China, juft as if we ourselves had been prefent at those fcenes, or places; though there is a poffibility of all the books we have read having been contrived to impofe upon us and the world,

and

and that all our acquaintance were in the fecret, and concurred to favour the deception.

Now all the evidence of religious truths is of these kinds, being either general conclufions, by induction from a number of particular appearances, or founded on hiftorical evidence.

If any perfon, like Lord Bolingbroke, call in queftion the goodnefs of God, all that I can fay to convince him of his miftake, is to fhew him that there are more marks of kind intention than of the contrary in the structure and government of the world; and, if he reply, that fome facts, fingly taken, are as evident marks of a malevolent intention, as others are of a good intention, and the particular inftances to which he alludes be fuch as I cannot deny or explain, fo that my proof is not complete, I frankly acknowledge that I have no other, or better. But this is fufficient to fatisfy me, and, I prefume, it will be abundantly fatisfactory to all who are can