"from God." The colours are here laid too strong, and the invective against Jacob (and the God of Jacob) pushed too far, beyond all rules of decency and equity. In the first place, Jacob was not so much to blame in that affair as the objection represents. In the next place, supposing Jacob to have been ever so much to blame, it ought not to be suggested, that the unjustifiable part of his conduct was either "commanded or approved of in "Scripture;" for Scripture says no such thing, neither can any such consequence be justly drawn from the Scripture account. The facts are there related, without either approbation or censure: and God made use of that conduct of Jacob's (be it supposed right or wrong) to very good and great purposes, by his overruling providence. Divine wisdom often makes use of the sins and follies of men to wise and excellent ends, bringing good out of evil. In the meanwhile, we are never to take our measures of good and evil merely from Scripture examples; because one design of Scripture is to serve the purposes of humility and watchfulness, by recording human frailties. The law of God is the rule, not the examples of mere men. When any one draws false consequences from Scripture examples, the fault is not in the Scripture, but in the man that draws them. If Scripture must be charged and impeached as often as men reason ill from it, then may also the first principles of natural religion, or any thing else whatever, be in like manner impeached, because foolish or partial men may wrest and pervert it to ill purposes. If there be any thing in the argument, it points directly against the use of reason; as reason is liable to abuse, and human faculties are imperfect or depraved. A man that has the light of Scripture and of reason too, is undoubtedly more secure against error in such cases, than he that has the light of reason only: For Scripture leaves reason all the strength and force it had, whole and entire, without the least diminution; never crosses upon it, never clashes with it: but as it furnishes reason with fresh notices and clearer views of the whole case, it is assistant to it for the forming a more exact and correct judgment. Both together therefore are as much better than either singly, as the whole is larger than a part. Particularly as to fraud and lying, and whatever else is akin to them, Scripture is clearer and more express against them, than the law of nature is; and besides carries more authority along with it, and binds us to obedience by the strongest and most engaging sanctions. It is a weak thing therefore to argue for the throwing off Scripture, for fear the example, suppose of Jacob, should lead any man astray : for the Scripture rule is the best preservative against it, being indeed stricter, stronger, and clearer, than the mere law of nature appears to be. is To return to Jacob's case: I do not know indeed whether it be justifiable in every particular, upon strict Scripture principles: I suspect that it is not. But upon the looser principles of mere natural religion, (if the Objector any judge of them,) perhaps it may bear. For however rigid a casuist the Objector seems to be when he has any good man to blacken, or any flout to throw upon God, he can be milder at other times, when his malice or his memory happens to sleep; as may appear from the apology he makes for lying and falsehood on some special . occasions. His words are, "z Friendship will sometimes oblige men to deceive people, when it manifestly tends "to their good, and none are prejudiced by it: and all "practise it with relation to children, sick people, and men in passion. And if men (as none scruple it) may "bid their servants say, they are not at home, and do se"veral other things of this nature; why may they not, "when silence will be interpreted to their prejudice, de"ceive impertinent people in such matters where they "have no concern?" Thus far the Objector could plead for officious lying, when he did not think of Jacob, but was contriving some easy principles for himself and his own fraternity. By the same principles it will not be difficult to defend the good Patriarch Jacob, who ought at least to have been commended by the Objector, for acting so agreeably to nature's law. Let us try the experiment. 1. In the first place, it was a part of friendship to deceive the good old man, who was going to do a wrong thing. It was deceiving him into what was right; and what himself owned to be so in the conclusion a. The truth is, God had determined long before, (before the birth of the twin-brothers,) that the blessing should rest upon the head of Jacobb: and he had given some very particular and significant intimations of it. Rebecca observed and remembered them; and therefore judged it strange that her husband Isaac could have a thought of giving the blessing at length to Esau, against the plain direction of God. But the good man's love and tenderness for his eldest son Esau blinded him for a time, and was like to betray him into a very gross mistake. In these circumstances, Rebecca having set her heart upon the blessing, and grieved to see what Isaac was going to do, in prejudice to his son Jacob, and in contradiction to the will of God; I say, Rebecca, in that case, thought of a wile, and by the help of officious lies, diverted Isaac from evil, and directed him to good. In a word, her friendship towards her husband obliged her to deceive him, when it manifestly tended to his good, according to the rule of reason laid down by the Objector. 2. The only remaining thing to be proved is, that "none were prejudiced by it." By prejudiced, I suppose, the Objector means, prejudiced in their rights, that is, injured. Now there can be no pretence of any person being injured in this whole transaction, except it was Esau. But it is demonstration that he had no injury done him. For, not to mention that he had sold his birthright, and bound himself by solemn oath to insist no more upon it, a Gen. xxvii. 33. e Gen. xxv. 33. Heb. xii. 16. b See Gen. xxv. 23. it is further plain all along from the history, that God designed the blessing for Jacob; and so it was invading Jacob's right for any one else to pretend to it. Esau was indeed the injurious ravisher, who against the will of God before declared, against his own sacred promise, and more sacred oath, feloniously endeavoured to defraud his brother, and to steal away the blessing from him. Upon the whole, it is evident, that Isaac, in that case, was deceived for his good, and that no one was prejudiced by it, but many excellent purposes were served in it. Therefore by the law of nature (as interpreted by the Objector) Jacob was entirely guiltless: and so this Scripture éxample is not more liable to lead us astray, than the law of nature is which was to be proved. Nevertheless, I must entreat my readers to observe, that I do not take upon me to acquit Jacob or Rebecca of all blame in that instance. There were several very good and laudable circumstances in what they did, which might move a merciful God to give a blessing to it; though it might not be strictly right in every circumstance, if rigorously examined by the measures of the sanctuary. Scripture casuistry is not altogether so mild and favourable as the casuistry of this gentleman. But it. was a weak thing of him to charge Scripture as not strict enough, when his own law of nature is looser; and to fall so foul upon Jacob, for doing what he not only lawfully might do, but ought to have done, if there be any truth in this writer's doctrine concerning officious lies. If any one has a mind to see this case of Jacob more minutely discussed upon Christian principles, I refer him to a judicious author d in the margin. It is sufficient for my purpose to have observed, that, taking the thing ei ther way, Scripture stands clear of all impeachment in that article; and that the charge which the Objector has drawn up against it recoils entirely upon that law of na Heidegger. Histor. Patriarch. tom. ii. exercit. 14. p. 400, &c. Confer Pfeiffer, p. 164. ture which he is recommending as a better rule than Scripture to go by. GEN. XXXVIII. 13, &c. دو Upon the history of Judah and Tamar, as related in this chapter, the Objector has this remark: "We are to use our reason in judging of the actions of the most ce"lebrated persons of old: else, to give no other instances "than the transactions between Judah and Tamar, we "might approve her stratagem in getting to lie with her "father-in-law e." No doubt but "we are to use our "reason" in every thing: it was given for our use. And it will be a heavy article of condemnation upon this gentleman, that when he sits upon Scripture, he lays his reason aside as useless, following only the corrupt bias of his lusts, malice, or profane levity; throwing out petulant scoffs, raillery, and buffoonery, instead of arguments. One can scarce think him in earnest, when he charges Scripture with giving countenance to Tamar's stratagem. If he really thought that Scripture had approved such impurities, it would very probably have had fairer quarter at his hands. I am much mistaken if it be not, in his account, one of the greatest offences which Scripture carries with it, that it is too pure and chaste, and gives no manner of countenance to lewd stratagems. This makes him take refuge in his pretended law of nature; which, according to him, forbids not "incontinence in single per"sonsf," but which teaches that "that warm desire which " is implanted in human nature cannot be criminal when "pursued after such a manner as tends most to promote "the happiness of the parties," (he does not say, happiness of the public,)" and to propagate and preserve the "species ;" and which teaches also, that "provided due "care be taken to continue the race of mankind, there is "no moral turpitude in any unnatural lusts whatever:" e Christianity as Old, &c. p. 276. f Ibid. p. 119. |