3

ness at New Orleans to take advantage of the opening of that season. Accordingly an officer of the commissary department was sent to New Orleans in advance to assemble the necessary equipment in the way of boats and provisions.1 Major Arthur Loftus, with a detachment of three hundred and fifty men from the Twenty-second Regiment, which had occupied Mobile in the autumn of 1763, embarked a few weeks later for the French capital. The commander, with a number of officers and a portion of the expeditionary force, arrived at New Orleans on the twenty-second of January, 1765, and on the following day Loftus and some of his associates were entertained at dinner by Governor Dabbadie. On this occasion, observes Dabbadie in his journal, “I told him how much I desired that he go to this post, since it was daily of more interest to the king to evacuate it." On the seventh of February the ship conveying the remainder of the convoy dropped anchor near New Orleans, and the troops disembarked and encamped below the town. During the next few weeks the British were busily engaged with the details of outfitting their expedition. During this time, also, the governor of the province, as he observes in his journal, employed "all the facilities which depend upon me to hasten the departure of their bateaux. I stopped all the work of the king in order to procure workmen for them." Moreover, he "warned all the commandants of the French posts located on the Mississippi of the departure of these troops, and ordered that all assistance of which they might have need be given" and that the commandants "neglect nothing to quiet the Indians." In order, 1 Farmar to the secretary at war, January 24, 1764. Rowland, Mississippi Provincial Archives: English Dominion, 1:8.

2 Dabbadie's journal, post, 168.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., post, 170.

The letter of Gage to Halifax, April 14, 1764 (post, 240),

gives the date as February 12.

furthermore, to avoid misunderstandings "which might arise on the part of the inhabitants of the river refusing to furnish the troops the provisions and supplies that they would need" he ordered a French officer to accompany them as far as Pointe Coupée.1 Detailed information respecting the navigation of the Mississippi, the location and strength of the posts, and the number and disposition of the Indians was likewise outlined for the British officials.2

4

On February 27 the expedition, including four officers, three hundred and twenty men, thirty women, and seventeen children, departed for the Illinois country. A detachment of sixty men was to be left at Fort Massac on the Ohio River and the remainder were to occupy Kaskaskia and Fort de Chartres. The convoy reached Pointe Coupée on March 15 without incident except for numerous desertions." Here the French conductor left the expedition. Five days later the flotilla was attacked at Roche à Davion or Fort Adams, as it was later known by the British, by a band of Indians composed of Tunica, Choctaw, Ofogoula, and Avoyelles. After a sharp fight resulting in the loss of several men in the boats composing the vanguard, Loftus ordered a retreat and the expedition was abandoned. Depleted by desertion, sickness, and death the party retraced its way over the two hundred and forty mile route to New Orleans and thence to Pensacola.R

1 Details of what happened in Louisiana, post, 227.

2 Remarks by Aubry [?], post, 1; Report from Robertson, March 8, 1764, post, 217. Dabbadie's journal, post, 173; Details of what happened in Louisiana, post,

227; Loftus to Gage, April 9, 1764, post, 237.

4 Report from Robertson, March 8, 1764, post, 220.

5 Details of what happened in Louisiana, post, 228.

• Ibid., post, 229

Ibid., post, 229; Loftus to Gage, April 9, 1764, post, 237.

8 Details of what happened in Louisiana, post, 231; Loftus to Gage, April 9, 1764, post, 238. See also Johnstone to Pownall, February 19, 1765 (post, 437) relative to Loftus' failure to establish himself at Point Iberville in the course of his retreat.

Major Loftus placed the blame for the failure of his expedition upon Governor Dabbadie and other French officials at New Orleans.1 The facts which have already been cited, however, and the evidence found in the documents included in the present volume would seem to indicate that on the whole his accusations against the governor were without foundation. There may have been some justification for the suspicion of Loftus that unofficial intrigues were at work, for the French in general were not in sympathy with the attempt as the success of the English would mean the cessation of the lucrative trade between New Orleans and the Illinois country. They were no doubt delighted at the discomfiture of the British officer. It may be observed also that the French advocacy of peace and good will at numerous Indian conferences and parleys was probably neutralized by the action of the commandants of the posts in furnishing the Indians with some arms and ammunition. This was done ostensibly to aid them in their hunting and was probably justified by conditions, but apparently no assurance was required that these would not be turned against the British.3

The failure, however, to heed the warnings of the French officials of the bad disposition of a number of tribes in the immediate vicinity of the Mississippi, whom Pontiac had recently visited and enlisted in his cause, must be emphasized. Loftus had been assured that unless he carried presents to the Indians he would be unable to proceed far up the river. The policy of sending advance agents with 1 Loftus to Gage, April 9, 1764, post, 238.

Neyon de Villiers to Dabbadie, March 13, 1764, post, 224; St. Ange to Dabbadie, July 15, 1764, post, 290; St. Ange to Dabbadie, August 12, 1764, post, 293. St. Ange to Dabbadie, August 12, 1764, post, 293.

4 Neyon de Villiers to Dabbadie, April 20, 1764, post, 242; Neyon de Villiers to Loftus, April 20, 1764, post, 244; Dabbadie to Farmar, May 16, 1764, post, 246. 5 Gage to Halifax, April 14, 1764, post, 240.

convoys of presents for the natives was successful the following year when the Illinois posts were finally reached from the east, but no such policy was adopted at this time. No action was taken to counteract any possible intrigues on the part of irresponsible French traders, if indeed such machinations were carried on. Dabbadie's advice was not heeded, but his prophecy was fulfilled. General Gage, in his official correspondence relative to a second expedition, implied that he did not think sufficient care had been exercised to insure success, and expressed the belief that if Loftus would make use of the "necessary precautions" he might reach the mouth of the Ohio with little interruption.2

As soon as news of the collapse of the expedition reached New York, General Gage immediately dispatched orders to Loftus to equip his regiment for another trial and to Major Farmar, the commandant at Mobile, to prepare the way by assembling the chiefs of the tribes hostile to the British and by flattering speeches and presents to gain their complete approval of the British plan to ascend the Mississippi. He was authorized, if necessary, to make use of threats and of the assistance of the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations, who were now ready to espouse the British cause against the northern Indians. Then Farmar was instructed to occupy the post at Natchez, which would serve as a basis for further operations and would tend to sever the former easy communication between the French and the Indian nations residing east of the Mississippi River. In order to avoid the necessity of passing the French capital at New Orleans, Gage further directed

1 Gage to Halifax, April 14, 1764, post, 240.

2 Gage to Bouquet, May 21, 1764, post, 248; Gage to Halifax, May 21, 1764, post, 248; Gage to Haldimand, May 27, 1764, post, 250; Gage to Halifax, July 13, 1764, post, 282.

the opening, if practicable, of the Iberville River to navigation.1

Surveys of the Iberville were at once begun by Captain Campbell; and in June, 1764, Lieutenant Philip Pittman visited the governor of Louisiana bearing a request from Farmar that assistance be given him in his proposed mission to the Illinois country in an endeavor to discover the disposition of the savages of the upper Mississippi Valley. Pittman's plan was to accompany one of the numerous parties of French traders to the Illinois. He arrived at New Orleans, however, too late to accomplish his project.2 A second attempt was made later in the summer,3 but it, too, was abandoned.

As matters stood in the spring and summer of 1764 therefore it appeared that the immediate occupation of the Illinois was impossible. In the north the Indian war was still raging, although the backbone of the conspiracy was evidently breaking. In the campaign of 1763 Colonel Henry Bouquet had raised the siege of Fort Pitt, but had been unable to carry the war to a decisive conclusion in the enemy's country. In the spring and summer of 1764 Colonel Bradstreet was advancing with a detachment along the southern shore of Lake Erie, penetrating as far west as Detroit, whence companies were sent to reoccupy the posts in the upper lake region. Bradstreet's terms, however, were so easy that the Indians were apparently not in the least awed by the proximity of his army. This is well illustrated by the treatment accorded Captain Thomas

1 Gage to Halifax, May 21, 1764, post, 249.

2 Farmar to Dabbadie, June 12, 1764, post, 264; Dabbadie's journal, June 13, 1764, post, 189; Dabbadie to Farmar, June 22, 1764, post, 266; Dabbadie's journal, July 18, 1764, post, 193; Dabbadie to the minister, June 29, 1764, post, 272; Gage to Halifax, November 9, 1764, post, 351.

'Dabbadie's journal, August, 1764, post, 194.

Johnson to lords of trade, December 26, 1764, post, 389.