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condemn for the fame cause? Fi- | ed, them he also juftified, and nally, if he is eternally the fame, whom he justified, them he alfo glo"without the leaft variablenefs rified."If thefe paffages do not or fhadow of turning," then his fully prove the doctrine of God's thoughts are one eternal thought, decrees, then to me they are unand his ways are one eternal way, meaning. On review of what we and with him there is no fucceffion have faid, there appears to be reaof purposes, and his exiftence is fon, revelation, and the effential one eternal now" the fame, yef- perfections of God, to establish it. terday, to day and forever."

James. I can conceive the poffibility of God's decrees, but find nothing in fcripture pofitive to eftablish them.

James. If God, from all eternity, has determined every event, and the time and means by which it fhall take place--will it not fol low that there is an impropriety. in praying him to beftow mercy, when his plan is fixed, and it is: impoffible for him to alter it ?

John. I think the doctrine is fully taught, and that there is direct and fufficient proof, even without any collateral evidence. John. If God has determined I will felect a few paffages out of that prayer fhall be the means his many which I think fully imply creatures fhall use in order that he the doctrine: "According as he should beftow mercy, then there is hath chofen us in him, before the the utmoft neceffity for it, to "make foundation of the world. Hav our calling and election fure.". ing predeflinated us unto the adop- If God requires faith and evangeltion of children, by Jefus Chriftical repentance as neceffary qualito himself. Come, ye bleffed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. But for the elect's fake thofe days fhall be fhortened. And he shall gather together his elect from the four winds. Who fhall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect? It is God that juftifieth. There is a remnant according to the election of grace. Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through fanétification of the fpirit. That the purpose of God according to election might ftand, not of works, but of him that calleth. The election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded. Them who are called according to his purpofe; for whom he did foreknow he alfo did predeftinate to be conformed to the image of his Son: Moreover John. Will you pretend to fay whom he did predeftinate, them that Judas was innocent in betrayhe alfo called, and whom he calling the Lord Jesus Christ, because

fications, in order to be one of the elect-then it is abfolutely neceffary to be poffeffed of thofe graces, as evidence that we are chofen of God, We have all poffible encouragement to perform every religious duty. As God decides our characters according as our works fhall be, if we do not perform good works, we have no profpect of eternal life ;-for election does in no way interfere with the terms of falvation. God chofe his elect thro' fanctification of the fpirit, before the foundation of the world, to be conformed to the image of his Son.

James. I cannot fee how a creature can be to blame, for doing what God has determined he fhall do, for he fulfils the divine will, and anfwers the very end for which he was created.

it was determined he should betray him? The Pfalmift predicted it and Jefus himself said to his difciples, one of you fhall betray me (mark the word ball); the queftion was asked, which? He anfwers, the one to whom I fhall give the fop when I have dipped it; "and when he had dipped the fop, he gave it to Judas Ifcariot the fon of Simon." It cannot be difputed that here was a determination of God. Chrift fays, "truly the fon of man goeth as it was determined; but woe unto that man by whom he is betrayed;" and Judas, after betraying him, fays, "I am guilty, in that I have betrayed innocent blood" but if your arguments are juft, it will follow that Judas was not to blame for betraying the Lord of life and glory; which has ever been confidered, the greateft fin that was ever committed by man.

James. Then if election is eftablished, does it not follow that there is a neceffity for every thing to take place juft as it does?

John. There is no natural neceffity for every thing to take place juft as it does, but there is an abfolute moral neceffity that it fhould; fo that all events may terminate in fuch a manner, as finally to produce the greateft poffible quantity of good, and bring the highest glory to God's name. James. For my part I know no difference between moral and natural neceffity; what I mean by neceffity is what must take place at all events, and cannot be hindered.

John. I make an entire diftinction between moral and natural neceffity: natural neceffity may be oppofed to the will, but moral neceffity on the contrary agrees with the will, and is perfectly confiftent with its freedom. If I

should put you out of my houfe in fpite of every effort you could make to oppofe me, because I was the ftrongest man, I fhould fay you went out by a natural neceffity ;-but if you went out of your own free choice, the event would prove there was a moral neceffity, tho' you acted with an entire freedom; and in this cafe, there is no natural neceffity. The apoftle faid to the crucifiers of Chrift, "Him, being delivered by the determinate counfel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands, have crucified and flain." They had a natural power to refrain from this wicked act, but they were conftrained by their own perverfe wills. I prefume you will not contend for their innocence, but on the contrary that they were very wicked; which acknowledgement proves that moral neceffity does not interfere with free agency.

James. I fully agree that mankind poffefs the liberty you defcribe, but deny, that there is an abfolute neceffity for every event to take place juft as it does.

John. If God has a fixed plan of government, and acts according to fyftem, then every event must take place agreeably to his fyftem. But if he acts without order, and has no fixed plan of government, then he has created beings without end, or defign, and without know ing what part they would act in creation; and instead of events ta king place by order, and under divine direction, they take place by mere chance, and God is liable to difappointment. But fcripture fays, "known unto God are all his works from the beginning.' If he knew all his works from the beginning, then he knew them in confequence of his fixed determi nation.

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To know an event will

evil that good may come, is con-
trary to the divine law, but for
God to permit evil, in order to
produce the greateft poffible quan-
tity of good, is perfectly confift

take place, it is neceffary the event
fhould take place. Determina-
tion is the foundation of fore-
Knowledge, and foreknowledge
cannot exift without it. It then
follows, that if God poffeffes fore-ent with his holy nature; neither
knowledge, the certainty of every does it follow that he does evil
event is eftablished.
because he has faid, "I the Lord
create evil"-but on the contrary
that he is good, and "his tender
mercies are over all his works."
If evil had never existed, no crea-
ted being could have any just idea
of its nature and tendency, any
more than a man that was born
blind could have of colors. If
fin had not existed, no created be-

James. It follows, that if every event takes place by neceffity, and divine agency, then fin has taken place by divine agency, and you make God the author of finwhich I think is nothing fhort of blafphemy.

pofition to holinefs, and God's
true character could never have
appeared to his creatures in its
full beauty and glory. If fin had
not exifted, Chrift would never
have died for finners, and of course
redeeming love never would have
been fung; and because God is
good and poffeffes almighty pow-
er, we know it is for the best, if
it was not, he would have prevent-
ed it—which is a fufficient reafon
to filence every objection.

John. If you mean that God is a finner, by his being active in the production of fin, then I agreeing could have feen its infinite opwith you that it is blafphemy;but I conceive no fuch inference can follow ;-for his works are the effect of his power, and not the emanation of his nature. If his works must neceffarily partake of his nature, then the moft venomous reptiles partake of his nature. If the idea is juft, then God is a material being, becaufe he has made a material world. But if fin has taken place contrary to the divine plan, then infinite wifdom, and almighty power, are difappointed; but if fin has been a mean under divine direction of producing an infinite quantity of good more, than could poffibly have exifted without it, then its permiffion muft have been a good and glorious act.

James. Is it neceffary that evil fhould exift in order that good may come? The apoftle fays, "fhall we do evil that good may come? God forbid."

John. I conceive an entire diftinction between creating and doing evil. An act of creation belongs alone to God, and is above the power of the creature, but doing evil, is within the power of the creature. For creatures to do

James. If fin is neceffary, in order that created beings fhould have a true fenfe of the nature of holinefs, does it not follow that the angels in heaven have no juft idea of the nature of holiness, becaufe they never participated of fin, notwithstanding they cry to one another, "holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hofts, and the whole earth is full of his glory"?

John. I think it does by no means, as they have the example of all finful creatures before them. If fin had never existed in the fystem, they would have poffeffed perfect innocence, and would have had a tafte for holinefs, the fame as a babe has for a sweet cordial he has a tafte for it, on account of

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of his own doings. But the divine government has made fuch a display of juftice, and unbounded benevolence, in the character of the Redeemer, as will stop every mouth, and filence every objecter. Chrift has not only put himself under the law made for mortals, and made it honorable by his obedience, fhowing that it was reasonable, holy, just and good-and that he was willing to be treated, as he treated his crea

its sweetness, but not on account | right, in treating all beings accorof its fweetness and nature and ding to their characters, and in tendency both-which it is im-making every one eat of the fruit poffible he should have knowledge of. Since fin has exifted, they can see its infinite contraft; they fee it was of fuch dreadful turpitude, that it required an infinite atonement; they can now as well judge of its nature, as you can of the nature of intemperance, tho' you never drank to excefs; they can now behold the beauty of God's attributes in his conduct towards his rebellious creatures; they can fee his infinite justice in the punishment of impenitent fin-ures-but has gone infinitely furners; they can fee his infinite be- ther; for he who knew no fin, nevolence in providing an atone- neither was guile found in his ment for fin, in his long suffering, mouth, who was deferving of and tender mercies towards his nothing but infinite happiness, and probationers, and in the gift of the humble praises of all created the Holy Spirit to regenerate and beings,-voluntarily bore the fins fanctify his redeemed: fo that of his people in his own body on they can with the utmost propri- the tree, fo that by his ftripes they ety fay, "Juft and true are thy are healed; he took fuch a weight ways, thou King of Saints," and of the fins of the universe upon cry "Alleluia; for the Lord God him, as made his "foul exceeding omnipotent reigneth." forrowful even unto death;" fhewing to all intelligent beings, that all things whatever he required of them, he was willing to be obedient to, himself. And in the character of unbounded goodness, has done infinitely more; for by his obedience and sufferings, he has made an atonement for the fins of the whole world, in fuch a man

James. If fin is neceffary in the fyftem, in order that created beings fhould have a juft view of God's character, then those who fall under its penalty, are poor unfortunate creatures, as they become miserable, in order that others may be more happy. Will not fuch a doctrine make the divine government partial ?

John. I conceive that partiality confifts in injuftice, in rendering to one what is another's due. If the very nature of fin is pregnant with mifery, and beings voluntarily choose it, with its confequences, and become their own executioners, and others choose the road that leads to life and peace-then fuch a government cannot be charged with partiality, which is regulated by the eternal rule of

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would be accountable to no being; and where there is no accountability there can be no rewards, or punishments. Independence, is an incommunicable attribute, which belongs alone to Jehovah. I would inquire what you fuppofe is the efficient caufe of our volitions?

James. I fuppofe we act in view of motives, and the motives we fee, are the prime cause of our actions.

John. From whence come the motives, which are the cause of our actions?

James. God undoubtedly fets the motives before us, and leaves us to our entire freedom to act as we please in view of them.

John. Do you fuppofe any fuch connection, between motive and action, that from certain motives will flow certain actions?

but if you mean that we create our actions, which is the only fenfe in which we are the efficient cause, then I difagree with you, and deny that we are any more the efficient caufe of our actions, than we are of feeing, or hearing. I wish you would inform me how you regulate your self determining power, fo as to determine what you please?

James. We must neceffarily have an energifing power within us, which we exert previous to our final determination, so that we choose what we will determine. It is neceffary our choice should regulate our determination, if it did not, we should be as likely to determine one thing as another.

John. Choice being as much a volition as determination, it follows agreeably to your arguments, that felf acts on felf-and it is neceffary to have a previous voli

which would require one volition previous to another, until it would require an infinite number to produce one, which implies we muft have a volition before we ever did have one.

James. I do by no means. If that were the cafe, God might astion in order to produce a volition, well move us like machines, as to create us with fuch faculties, that certain motives would produce certain actions; for it would be only for him to fet certain motives before us, and he would be as certain what would be the action, as we could be of the product of two and two, multiplied together. John. If there is not an infallible connection between motive and action, then motive is not the efficient caufe, but only the neceffary occafion for action, and we are ftill in the dark, as to the efficient caufe.

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James. I fuppofe we must have a felf determining power, in order to be moral agents; and of course we originate our own volitions, and become the efficient caufe of all our actions.

John. If you mean that we ad, and determine, the fame as we fee, and hear, then I agree with you;

James. I acknowledge I have got my ideas a little bewildered on the fubject, as I have not fufficiently attended to it. I would thank you to inform me what you conceive to be the efficient cause of our actions.

John. I believe that God is the efficient caufe of our actions, as much as he is of our fight. We ourselves fee, and we ourselves act freely in view of motives; but it is neceffary God fhould act upon us, in order to make us act freely. When God makes us act freely in view of motives, then the act is our own, and not his. Human action cannot be made divine action, nor divine action, human

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