to vindicate his cause; and such as will inspire him with preternatural strength and courage (as in the instance of mothers just now alluded to), while at the same time the mind of the delinquent is filled with terror and pusillanimity. "The reason and end," says the admirable Butler, "for which man was made thus liable to this passion, is, that he might be better qualified to prevent, and likewise (or perhaps chiefly) to resist and defeat sudden force, violence, and opposition, considered merely as such, and without regard to the fault or demerit of him who is the author of them. Yet, since violence may be considered in this other and further view, as implying fault; and since injury, as distinct from harm, may raise sudden anger; sudden anger may likewise accidentally serve to prevent, or remedy, such fault and injury. But, considered as distinct from settled anger, it stands in our nature for self-defence, and not for the administration of justice. There are plainly cases, and in the uncultivated parts of the world, and where regular governments are not found, they frequently happen, in which there is no time for consideration, and yet to be passive is certain destruction; in which sudden resistance is the only security." Nor does the wisdom of nature stop here. For as in the lowest state of civilization mankind are prompted by motives and instincts more nearly approaching to those of the brutes; so, as they advance in knowledge, these motives and instincts become subject to the direction of the reason; and are suited to serve man more perfectly in his improved state, and to carry him forward towards higher attainments. Thus, it is not necessary for those, who would be guided by a high sense of good, to oppose the agression of the wicked by giving way to violent ebullitions of rancour and revenge, in the way that an undisciplined mind would do; but they have a far better security in that deliberate and settled resentment, which Bishop Butler has so amply vindicated; and which the Apostle Paul has sanctioned by the laconic precept, " Be ye angry and sin not." It has been remarked before, that as the rational part of man prevails, the animal instincts, which are the forerunners of the better principles, become less violent This is a truth so important as to be worth a further illustration. It would seem, that the end for which the instincts are created is not hazarded by their becoming weaker, provided that the principles of reason are strengthened but, on the contrary, an improved motive of action is ingrafted upon that which was only an animal propensity while there was little reason to guide it. Thus improved, it is less impetuous, but more durable; not propelling by enthusiasm, but making its way by constancy and perse verance. Thus in the case of the benevolent affections, the animal man, upon the bare sight of wretchedness, has all his sympathies roused at once into passion. He does not stay to inquire into causes, and deserts, and consequences, but administers superfluously to the necessities of the object without reason or forethought. The conduct of the truly virtuous man is very different. He is not instigated by the same impetuosity, yet the sufferer is not in equal danger of being neglected; for his benevolence is not alternating between the extremes of heat and cold; but its temperature remains steady, and is always sufficient to invigorate him for beneficial pur poses. But then, as he has not at command the means of relief to an infinite degree, whether they be time, talents, or money, he inquires into causes, and deserts, and considers consequences, and selects his objects so as to keep this maxim in view—always to apply his means in such a manner, as, in his judgment, shall appear likely to communicate the largest share of happiness. It will not, I trust, be inferred from this, that he is to stand unmoved when some dreadful casualty happens for both reason and experience determine, that the virtuous man is not behind the instinctive man in prompt assistance upon such occasions. Perhaps the character of Howard may be thought an exception to these doctrines; but his was a mind of so peculiar a structure, that the equanimity, which was constant to him, exceeded in intensity the paroxysms of most minds with similar pursuits, just as a large river exceeds in constancy and majesty the swollen stream. Similar applications may be made to the subject of Anger. This passion, as exhibited in uneducated persons, has all the characteristics of a merely animal propensity. It is violent, ungovernable, temporary, giving for the time such a propulsion to the strength and courage as seems preternatural; but soon subsiding into coldness, or a settled malignity, which is quite a different feeling. The first attack of Turkish soldiers, and indeed of all rude nations, is a remarkable example. But if well disciplined troops can sustain the shock, (which those who have witnessed it describe in the most terrible colors) fortitude soon puts to flight those who are actuated by this temporary paroxysm, and have nothing to support them beyond the animal passion. The same thing occurs here, as in the exercise of charity. Those who are excited by the instinct alone, though they do great things for a time, cannot carry on a prolonged system, which requires reason, conscience, and moral judgment to guide it.* In order to see the object and end of the passion of Anger, let us imagine for an instant some neighbour suffering by injustice, supposed or real. A sympathy is universally excited in his behalf-every one who hears the relation kindles into indignation, and thus a whole city, and by the aid of the press, * See Note (C) Appendix. |