munication had taken the treaties of 1815 as a starting-point. Russia had made a precise reply by contesting the interpretation given to them by the principal Secretary of State; she confined herself, as a method of pacification, to speaking of an amnesty after the war, and promising not to withdraw any of the concessions she had made. The French Government doubted the success of any measure based exclusively on those treaties, and thought that matters should be viewed from a higher ground. The acts of 1815 assuredly conceded precious advantages to the Poles, in reviving the Polish name, in stipulating for her national institutions, and in establishing certain links between all the parts of the kingdom as it existed before the first partition. But those arrangements have not prevented the recurrence of commotions which periodically menace the repose of Europe. Without denying that the treaties offered to the Cabinets a legal motive of intervention, the French Government thought that it would be proper to invoke principally the interests of European order common to all the Powers. The two Cabinets appreciated these considerations; and the Emperor's Government made them the subject of a despatch to the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg. The despatch concluded by signalizing the opportunity of considering the means of placing Poland in the conditions of a durable peace. Austria, while alleging special interests as a Power conterminous and more exposed to the influence of these disturbances, held a language similar to our own. England, without abandoning her first argument on the treaties, reproduced in a briefer form the ideas which we had developed. The greater part of the States of Europe gave their adhesion to them, and thus stamped the communications of the three Courts with the character of a veritable European manifestation. Russia appeared to receive these overtures with favour. Although she endeavoured to cast the responsibility of the Polish movement on encouragements from without and revolutionary intrigues, she recognized the extent of the evil and the inefficacy of the measures adopted up to that time to provide a remedy. She neither contested the general interests engaged in the Polish question, nor the special interests of conterminous States. She did not decline the competence of the Governments who signed the final act of the Treaty of Vienna, but appeared, on the contrary, to accept their assistance for a deliberation, the bases of which she invited the three Powers to communicate. England was of opinion that the negotiations should be preceded by an armistice, in spite of the The idea of difficulties which its execution might encounter.

stopping as soon as possible the effusion of blood was too conformable to the feelings of the French Government not to obtain its approbation; and while itself acquiesced, it recommended the same to the Court of Austria. The Cabinet of Vienna, on its part, drew up a programme in six articles, the principal object of which was to claim for Poland institutions similar to those of

Galicia. Judging these data insufficient, the French Government introduced notable modifications in them, and for the sake of a good understanding agreed to admit the programme, but only as a starting-point for the conferences. We had, besides, attached much value to an appeal made to the whole of Europe to participate in the negotiations. France has constantly declared that she will always be found ready to enter on such discussions in the full light of day. The three Courts, in the communications which they a second time directed to their Ambassadors, had not succeeded in avoiding certain shades of expression which could not escape the attention of Russia. It might have been foreseen that that Power would seek to derive profit from the apparent diversity of views. In order to parry that danger as much as possible, the French Government made to the Vienna and London Cabinets a proposal to consolidate the accord by taking, in the form of a convention or a protocol, an engagement to pursue in concert a regulation of Polish affairs, by diplomatic methods or otherwise, if necessary. Such an engagement, besides the immediate advantage of exalting the authority of the language of the allied Courts, would have offered to that Power whose position required most consideration the guarantees of a complete solidarity in all eventualities. We were persuaded that the surest method of preventing complications was to show ourselves ready to meet them with all the firmness required, and that conflicts between Governments took their origin not so often in bold resolutions as in protractions and hesitations that allowed difficulties to become aggravated. Our proposition was not accepted. The Russian Court replied to the programme of the three Powers by an absolute refusal. She promised to take the six points into consideration, but only when the insurrection was suppressed. She rejected all idea of a suspension of arms, and declining the competency of the Powers which signed the general act of 1815, which she had previously admitted, she proposed to open with Austria and Prussia, as participating Powers, a separate negotiation. The Vienna Cabinet rejected that proposal without hesitation, as being contrary to her duties to the two other Powers, and gave explanations at St. Petersburg with a spontaneousness and a frankness which did honour to her sincerity. The French Government at the same time expressed at London and Vienna the painful impression it had felt on receiving the replies of Russia. The three Cabinets addressed fresh communications to St. Petersburg, the conclusions of which were conceived in identical terms. They unanimously declared Russia to be responsible for the consequences which might arise from a refusal to take their representations into account, and from the prolongation of the troubles in Poland. The last despatches of Prince Gortschakoff are well known. Notwithstanding the little success of the diplomatic intervention of the three Powers, the Emperor's Government has the satisfaction of knowing that it has, from the moment in which the Polish question was brought

forward, in the measure of its rights and its duties towards England, neglected nothing to arrive at a solution. Ever attentive to the painful spectacle of the struggle which is going on in Poland, it loses sight of none of the great interests which are connected with that conflict. It will maintain its accord with England and Austria, and it cannot believe that the union of the Cabinets, in an affair so worthy of their solicitude, must remain sterile. We have not, however, the pretension to impose our solutions on the Powers interested, as much or even more directly than ourselves, in the settlement of the existing difficulties. In a question essentially European it is neither in conformity with our obligations or our rights to incur alone a responsibility which it is the duty of all to partake."

The Danish dispute was thus touched on :-

"The affair of the Duchies of the Elbe has continued to be a subject of discussion between the Court of Copenhagen and the Germanic Confederation. The Danish Government having adopted for the constitutional reorganization of the monarchy certain dispositions which the Frankfort Diet did not consider conformable to its anterior resolutions and the engagements made by Denmark, the German Cabinets have agreed to have recourse to a military occupation of the Duchy of Holstein by the Federal troops. Without contesting in principle the right of Germany to intervene in the affairs of Holstein and Lauenberg, which form part of the Germanic Confederation, the Cabinet of Copenhagen alleges that having accorded to the pretensions of the States of Holstein all the satisfaction compatible with the rights of the Crown, the Federal execution is not justified by any legitimate motive. Consequently the only object of that measure was in reality to compel Denmark to place the Duchy of Schleswig, a Danish province, under a political and administrative régime which would be an infringement on the integrity of the monarchy. His Majesty's Government has not seen without regret a dispute, which its counsels had always tended to adjust, become envenomed. Guided at the same time by the traditional sympathies of France towards Denmark, and by the neighbourly feelings which preside in her relations with Germany, we have redoubled our efforts to cause counsels of prudence to prevail, and to turn aside an imminent crisis. A conflict could not arise without the Scandinavian States, which are more directly interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in the North of Europe, being brought to take a share in the struggle, and without giving rise to grave complications in which the powers which signed the Treaty of London of 1852 would be implicated. Our co-operation is assured beforehand to any combination which would have the effect of preventing such eventualities, and we are inclined to hope that the wisdom of the two parties will prevail against excitements which are to be regretted. Germany is besides occupied with other cares. The Sovereigns assembled at Frankfort have given the highest sanction to the efforts attempted with the object of modifying the internal

régime of the Confederation by associating themselves in the study of the best means of attaining that object. All that can contribute to the development and happiness of a great neighbouring nation, with which we maintain the best relations, cannot be indifferent to us. We therefore watch those attempts with a friendly attention, with the desire to see Germany obtain from them the advantages which she expects, and which she well knows how to conciliate with European interests and with the international rights which are connected with the constitution of the Germanic Confederation." Rome and Italy are thus spoken of :

"At the commencement of the present year the French Government remarked with satisfaction the calm which had succeeded in Italy to the excitement caused by the Roman question. Men's minds in that country do not, however, yet appear sufficiently disposed to grant the reciprocal concessions which require, on the one hand, a respect for rights, and, on the other, regard to the necessities of the age, for the work of conciliation to be resumed with any hopes of success. In the particular position in which events had involved the French Government, the greatest service it could do to the Italians was to remain inaccessible to the divers passions which were in agitation around it. The Emperor's Government is conscious of having laboured in such a manner, so far as was in its power, to prepare for the future. Those adjournments have not been without advantage to Italy. Adopting the generous intentions of the Sovereign Pontiff, the Roman Government has endeavoured to realize some of the reforms demanded in the administration of the States of the Church. We have reason to hope that that task will be continued. The Italian Government on its side has applied itself to organize the new kingdom, to develope its resources, to constitute its military state, to repress brigandage with our loyal co-operation, and to discourage those feelings of impatience to which it was resolved not to yield. There is reason to believe that those fortunate influences will tend to dissipate suspicions, and give rise to feelings more favourable to a reconciliation."

As regards the civil war in North America the report states: "The sad previsions suggested by the exasperation of the struggle carried on during three years in the United States have been but too much realized. Blood has continued to flow, while the respective situations of the belligerents do not yet allow us to anticipate a period to this terrible crisis. In presence of such an accumulation of ruins, and such a sacrifice of life in a struggle hitherto fruitless, we have felt profound regret that the proposition which we made at London and at St. Petersburg, to unite in provoking an armistice, was not accepted. Compelled to renounce that project by a double refusal, we have, however, declared that our desire to contribute to the re-establishment of peace in any form would not be the less lively and sincere. We have given proof of this by suggesting the idea of substituting for the project of an amicable intervention of the maritime Powers the expedient of direct

messages between the Government of the United States and the Confederates of the South. This new attempt has not been more fortunate than the preceding. From that time we have had nothing left but to follow out the line of conduct adopted ever since the beginning of this war by the Government of the Emperor. This we have striven to do with scrupulous care under all circumstances. We have remained neutral and well disposed, although it has often been difficult for us to reconcile this part with our duties towards our fellow-countrymen. Independently of the sufferings which, in our departments, are the consequence of the American crisis, hostilities on the territory of the Union itself have occasioned considerable detriment and loss to French residents. They have often had occasion to make just complaint of the abusive proceedings of the civil and military authorities. Our countrymen must understand that their interests, like those of other foreigners, cannot claim an exceptional security in the midst of the tumult of arms, and that in such cases all ordinary guarantees necessarily lose something of their efficacy. Moreover, a state of war imposes inevitable fetters on the commerce of neutrals. If the progress of liberal doctrines tends to relax them, it cannot wholly suppress them. The Cabinet of Washington has been able to satisfy itself that we have made, in our reclamations, a large allowance for these difficulties. But the Government of the Emperor cannot disguise its pain at seeing so many aggrieved interests, well deserving of its care, making a vain appeal for protection."

With respect to Mexico the following passage occurs:

"We congratulate ourselves on seeing our ideas shared by the eminent Prince whom Mexico calls to inaugurate its new destinies. The fortune of France and the blood of her soldiers belong to France only. An evident and imperious French interest could therefore alone determine the Emperor's Government to engage in an undertaking of which it had beforehand weighed the sacrifices and difficulties. It had, moreover, foreseen the salvation of Mexico as a possible consequence of the military expedition to which it was constrained. The public feeling of the country and the wisdom of the Archduke Maximilian justify all our hopes in this matter. In an early future we expect to receive from the new Government of Mexico the guarantees which have been wanting to our interests under all the Governments which preceded it. For the moment, important questions necessarily remain to be settled as concerns ourselves; for the military result of our expedition has only prepared the ground for ulterior negotiations. The Emperor's Government will devote all its attention to them."

At the sitting of the Corps Législatif on the 11th of December, there was an animated discussion on the question of some contested elections, but the chief interest in the debate was the speech of M. Thiers, who, after so long an absence from the Chamber, had now returned to take his part in parliamentary conflicts as of old,

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