BISHOP TAYLOR. Neither ought the precept of charity and forgiveness, which Christ so often, so earnestly, so severely presses, evacuate the power of princes. For the precept of forgiving offenders does not hinder parents from correcting their offending children; nor masters from chastising their rebellious servants; nor the Church from excommunicating them that walk disorderly: these things rely upon plain scriptures, and upon necessity and experience; and they do evince thus much without any further dispute, that some punishment may stand with the precept of forgiveness; or, at least, if he who is injured may not punish without breach of charity, yet some one else may. And if it be permitted to the power of man to punish a criminal without breach of charity, the power of the magistrate must be without all question; and that such a power can consist with charity there is no doubt, when we remember that the apostles themselves, and the primitive churches, did deliver great criminals over to the power of Satan to be "buffeted, even to the destruction of the flesh, that their souls might be saved in the day of the Lord." St. Paul delivered Elymas to blindness; and St. Peter gave Ananias and Sapphira to a corporal death. But the great case of conscience is this. Although all punishments less than death may, like paternal corrections, consist with charity, (for they may be disciplines and emendations,) yet in death there is no amendment; and, therefore, to put a man to death flagrante crimine, before he hath mortified his sin, or made amends for it,—that is, before it is pardoned, and consequently to send him to hell,-is the most against charity in the world, and therefore no man hath power to do it: for God never gave to any man a power to dispense justice to the breach of charity; and that dispensation which sends a man to hell, is not for edification, but for destruction. He then assigns many reasons why punishments may be inflicted consistently with Christian charity; and concludes thus: Though from these considerations it appears, that the pretence of charity cannot evacuate that justice which hath given commission to all lawful magistrates, and warrant to all capital sentences, and authority to all just wars, in which it is more than probable many will be killed that are not very well prepared; yet this power of inflicting capital punishments must not be reduced to act in trifling instances, for the loss of a few shillings, or for every disobedience to command; it must not be done but in the great and unavoidable necessities of the commonwealth. For every magistrate is also a man ; and as he must not neglect the care and provisions of that, so neither the kindnesses and compassion of this. Nothing can make recom pense for the life of a man, than the life of a better, or the lives of many, or a great good of the whole community. But when any of these is at stake, it is fit the innocent be secured by the condemnation of the criminal; and this was excellently disputed by Cicero in his argument against Calenus upon this very question. "Hoc interest inter meam sententiam et tuam: ego nolo quenquam civem committere ut morte multandus sit: tu etiamsi commiserit etiam conservandum putas. In corpore si quid ejusmodi est quod reliquo corpori noceat, VOL. XII. NO. XXIV. X Pam. uri secarique patiamur, ut membrorum aliquod potius quam totum corpus intereat. Sic in reip. corpore ut totum salvum sit, quicquid est pestiferum amputetur. Dura vox; multo illa durior: salvi sint improbi, deleantur innocentes, honesti, boni, tota Respublica." Cicero would have no citizen deserve to die; but Calenus would have none die though he did deserve it. But Cicero thought it reason, that as in the body natural we cut off an arm to save the whole, so in the body politic we do the same, that nothing remain alive that will make the other die. It is a hard sentence, it is true, but this is a harderLet the wicked be safe; and let the innocent, the good, the just men, the whole commonwealth, be destroyed. This we see is natural reason; but it is more than so, it is also a natural law, expressed and established by God himself. "He that sheddeth man's blood, in man, or by man, shall his blood be shed.” To restrain the malice of evil men, and to prevent mischief to the good, is the purpose of authority and the end of laws. So Isidore, "Factæ sunt leges ut earum metu humana coerceatur audacia, tutaque esset inter improbos innocentia, et in ipsis improbis formidato supplicio refrænaretur nocendi facultas." Fear is the beginning of wisdom, and fear is the extinction and remedy of folly; and therefore the laws take care by the greatest fear, the fear of death, to prevent or suppress the greatest wickedness. FROM GROTIUS ON WAR AND PEACE. The fourth argument is this, which seems to me of no small weight. If it were not permitted to punish certain criminals with death, nor to defend the subject by arms against highwaymen and pirates, there would of necessity follow a terrible inundation of crimes, and a deluge of evils, since even now, that tribunals are erected, it is very difficult to restrain the boldness of profligate persons. Wherefore if it had been the design of Christ to have introduced a new kind of regulation, as was never heard of before, he would certainly have declared in more distinct and plain words, that none should pronounce sentence of death against a malefactor, or carry arms in defence of one's country, which we no where read that he did; for what is brought to this purpose, is either very general or obscure. But equity itself, and common sense, teaches us to restrain words that are general, and favorably to explain those that are ambiguous, and even to recede somewhat from the propriety and common acceptation of the words, in order to avoid that sense which may bring along with it the greatest inconveniences. To which add, that if the Gospel absolutely condemned war and capital punishment, such Christians as observed the precepts of their religion with the greatest exactness, would thereby be inevitably exposed to become a prey to villains and usurpers; which is not agreeable to the goodness and wisdom of God. NOTE B, page 294. This ought to have been a note to the words "common moralists:" and see postea, note C, the extract fram Dumont, which begins "Je sais bien que les moralistes communs, toujours dupes des mots, &c." NOTE C, page 295. LETTERS FROM ENGLAND. In a work intitled "Letters from England," there are the following observations. I have seen it recorded of some English judge, that when he was about to sentence a man to death for horse-stealing, the man observed it was hard he should lose his life for only stealing a horse; to which the judge replied, "You are not to be hanged for stealing a horse, but in order that horses may not be stolen." The reply was as unphilosophical as unfeeling; but it is the fashion among the English to assert that prevention is the end of punishment, and to disclaim any princi ple of vengeance, though vengeance is the foundation of all penal law, divine and human. Proceeding upon this fallacious principle, they necessarily make no attempt at proportioning the punishment to the offence and offences are punished, not according to the degree of moral guilt which they indicate in the offender, but according to the facility with which they can be committed, and to their supposed danger in consequence to the community. LORD KAIMES. Upon every wrong, reason and experience make us apprehend the resentment of the person injured but the horror of mind which accompanies every gross crime, produceth in the criminal an impres sion that all nature is in arms against him. Conscious of meriting the highest punishment, he dreads it from the hand of God and from the hand of man. "And Cain said unto the Lord, My punishment is greater than I can bear. Behold, thou hast driven me out this day from the face of the earth: and from thy face shall I be hid, and I shall be a fugitive and a vagabond in the earth: and it shall come to pass, that every one that findeth me, shall slay me." Hence the efficacy of human punishments in particular, to which man is adapted with wonderful foresight, through the consciousness of their being justly inflicted, not only by the person injured, but by the magistrate or by any one. Abstracting from this consciousness, the most frequent instances of chastising criminals would readily be misapprehended for so many acts of violence and oppression, the effects of malice even in judges; and much more so in the party offended, where the punishment is inflicted by him. " I Cor The purposes of nature are not anywhere left imperfect. responding to the dread of punishment, is first the indignation we have at gross crimes, even when we suffer not by them; and next resentment in the person injured, even for the slightest crime; by which sufficient provision is made for inflicting the punishment that is dreaded. No passion is more keen or fierce than resentment; which, at the same time, when confined within due bounds, is authorised by conscience. The delinquent is sensible that he may be justly punished; and if any person, preferably to others, be entitled to inflict the punishment, it must be the person injured. -But at the tyrant's name ! Genesis, chap. iv. ver. 13, 14. "Tis just resentment, and becomes the brave; Revenge, therefore, when provoked by injury or voluntary wrong, is a privilege that belongs to every person by the law of nature; for we have no criterion of right or wrong more illustrious than the approbation or disapprobation of conscience. And thus the first law of nature, regarding society, that of abstaining from injuring others, is enforced by the most efficacious sanctions. An author of the first rank for genius, as well as blood, expresses himself with great propriety upon this subject. "There is another passion very different from that of fear, and which, in a certain degree, is equally preservative to us, and conducing to our safety. As that is serviceable in prompting us to shun danger, so is this in fortifying us against it, and enabling us to repel injury, and resist violence when offered. "Tis by this passion that one creature offering violence to another, is deterred from the execution; whilst he observes how the attempt affects his fellow, and knows by the very signs which accompany this rising motion, that if the injury be carried further, it will not pass easily, or with impunity. "Tis this passion withal, which, after violence and hostility executed, rouses a creature in opposition, and assists him in returning like hostility and harm on the invader. For thus as rage and despair increase, a creature grows still more terrible, and, being urged to the greatest extremity, finds a degree of strength and boldness unexperienced till then, and which had never risen except through the height of provocation." I But a cursory view of this remarkable passion is not sufficient. It will be seen by and by, that the criminal law in all nations, is entirely founded upon it; and for that reason it ought to be examined with the utmost accuracy. Resentment is raised in different degrees, according to the sense one hath of the injury. An injury done to a man himself, provokes resentment in its highest degree. An injury of the same kind done to a friend or relation, raises resentment in a lower degree; and the passion becomes gradually fainter, in proportion to the slightness of the connexion. This difference is not the result of any peculiarity in the nature of the passion. It is occasioned by a principle inherent in all sensible beings, that every one has the strongest sense of what touches itself. Thus a man hath a more lively sense of a kindness done to himself than to his friend; and the passion of gratitude corresponds in degree to the sensation. In the same manner an injury done to myself, to my child, or to my friend, makes a greater figure in my mind, than when done to others in whom I am less interested. Every heinous transgression of the law of nature raiseth indignation in all, and a keen desire to have the criminal brought to condign punishment. Slighter delinquencies are less regarded. A slight inju ry done to a stranger, with whom we have no connexion, raiseth our indignation, it is true, but so faintly, as not to prompt any degree of revenge. The passion in this case, being quiescent, vanisheth in a mo ! Characteristics, vol. ii. p. 144. ment. But a man's resentment for an injury done to himself, or to one with whom he is connected, is an active passion, which is gratified by punishing the delinquent in a measure corresponding to the injury. And it must be remarked, that many circumstances must concur before this passion be fully gratified. It is not satisfied with the suffering merely of the criminal. The person injured must inflict the punishment, or at least direct it; and the criminal must be made sensible, not only that he is punished for his crime, but that the punishment proceeds from the person injured. When all these circumstances concur, and not otherwise, the passion is fully gratified, and commonly vanisheth as if it had never been. Racine understood the nature of this passion, and paints it with great accuracy in the following scene, Cleone. Vous-vous perdez, Madame. Et vous devez songer. Hermione. Que je me perde, ou non, je songe à me venger. Je ne sai même encor, quoiqu'il m'ait pu promettre, Et pour rendre sa peine et mes plaisirs plus grands, De cacher ma rivale à ses regards mourans ! Ah! si du-moins Oreste, en punissant son crime, ANDROMAQUE, Act IV. Sc. 4. Though injury, or voluntary wrong, is generally the cause of resentment, we find by experience, that sudden pain is sufficient sometimes to raise this passion, even where injury is not intended. If a man wound me by accident in a tender part, the sudden anguish, giving no time for reflection, provokes resentment, which is as suddenly exerted upon the involuntary cause. Treading upon a gouty toe, or breaking a favorite vase, may upon a warm temper produce this effect. The mind engrossed by bodily pain, or any pain which rouses bad humor, demands an object for its resentment; and what object so ready as the person who was the occasion of the pain, though without design? In the same manner, even a stock or a stone becomes sometimes the object of resentment. If accidentally striking my foot against a stone, a smart pain ensues, resentment discovers itself at once, which prompts me to bray the stone to pieces. The passion is still more irregular in a losing gamester, when he vents it on the cards and dice. All that can be said, as an apology for such absurd fits of passion, is, that they are but momentary, and vanish upon the first reflection. And yet such indulgence was by the Athenians given to this irrational emotion, that if a man was killed by the fall of a stone |