Vol. III. No. 9.

Saturday, August 29, 1807.

Price 10d.

161

HISTORICAL DIGEST.

The passage from the French journals which was extracted in my last number, as descriptive of the discontent which prevails in Paris, is confirmed by other collateral testimonies; but though it would be the height of folly to consider this temper as a circumstance which ought to inspire us with a glimpse of hope that it will be productive of any change immediately favourable to the cause of European indepen dence, yet it certainly does afford scope for very serious meditation. And if this temper should excite the turbulent passions of the most active and aspiring men in the world, to break out, no one would repine at seeing the blood-stained desolators of Europe engaged in the destruction of each other.

Raro antecedentem scelestum
Deseruit pede pæna claudo.

It is natural that all these marshals and generals of France should view, with envious eyes, the elevation of Buonaparte's brothers to regal dignities. Neither king Joseph, king Louis, nor king Jerome, have performed any achievement for France which entitles them to the pre-eminent distinctions to which they have been raised. Military exploits being now considered by the French as the only tests of merit; these fresh made kings cannot be regarded in any other light than as interlopers. Joseph has never served in the army; and Napoleon was so fully aware of this blemish in his character, that immediately after he had made himself emperor, he sent him to the camp at Boulogne to be drilled. Jerome was placed in the navy, and sent in the capacity of a lieutenant with the expedition to St. Domingo. In the late campaign, he was appointed to the command of the auxiliaries of France, and became a general by imperial inspiration. Louis was made a colonel of a regiment of cavalry by the great Napoleon, but he has never seen any service. Their pretensions to sway the sceptres of kingdoms are, therefore, merely derivative, and they have nothing to recommend them except their affinity to the man who, by the power of the sword, has assumed the sovereignty of France. Hence, it may be presumed, that as they are totally deficient in the qualities which give a gloss to the usurpation of power, their authority will be ephemeral, and be sustained no longer than while the power of their earthly creator predominates. The generals who have borne the brunt of the revolutionary storm, who have braved death in every shape, may shortly believe themselves entitled to share with Buonaparte himself in the spoils of the vanquished nations, whose freedom, happiness, and independence, they have individually assisted in subverting. They may feel, equally with their master, that they bear commissions from hell to worry mankind, and that, having successfully executed those commissions, they are entitled, by the laws of conquest, to erect dynasties of their own. Having subverted the thrones of lawful princes, and rendered the continent of Europe one vast and informal blank, they may feel themselves qualified to fill the empty spaces, and, considering the various conquered communities as vacant successions, and themselves as the accomplices and instruments of Buonaparte's ambition, they may cherish the wish to be his companions in royal honours also, and conspire to tear in pieces the empire which they had concurred to form. I affirm that this is a probable event; and if it should happen, we shall then see these fierce ruffians, like ravenous kites, devour each other while contending for their prey, and retaliate, upon France, the miseries she has inflicted upon mankind. Men who have led victorious armies, must feel awkward in serving as the obsequious valets of upstarts, who have never distinguished themselves in the arts of war, or civil policy. Thus, this mighty empire will most probably suffer the same fate as that of Charlemagne;-founded on a sudden, on a sudden it will sink to ruin, after having been rent and divided by intestine wars. While territories remain to be disposed of, these exalted criminals may restrain their ambition; but sooner or later their avarice and selfishness will be prompted to demand VOL. III.

NO. 9.

what it will not be in the power of their master to give: then the imperial brethren who, from an ostentation of gratitude and generosity, have been permitted to hold precarious sceptres, will be dismissed from their thrones, after having performed their appointed task of fashioning to the yoke the conquered nations.

These events may be dependent upon the life of Buonaparte, or, perhaps, upon a peace with England; if it be possible to suppose that he will not keep us more tremblingly alive to our dangers during peace, than while we are at war with him, If he can find occupation for his generals, their ambitious enterprizes may be suspended; but unless the hero's brains should be turned, and, like Alexander the Macedonian, he should become a fool, it is to be apprehended that he will shew his ability to preserve what he has acquired. His virtues are all artificial, his vices natural; but he possesses a cool head, an unfeeling heart, which give him prodigious advantages in a contest with any foe. It is a mistaken notion, that Buonaparte is in hourly danger of his life, from the stifled indignation of his subjects: they who reason thus, are wholly ignorant of the French character. The splendid illusion of liberty no longer animates a venal senate, and profligate people. The dream of liberty is at an end; and nothing but a motive of self-preservation, not the love of freedom, will ever give birth to any conspiracy against him. If such an event should ever take place, it will not be directed against his political authority, which naturally feeds the national vanity of Frenchmen, by inspiring them with a consciousness of their martial superiority. From the first dawning of Buonaparte's usurpation, we have seen what importance he attaches to the will of the army. In his letter to our sovereign, and in his proclamations, immediately after he assumed the imperial diadem, he declared himself emperor by the will of the army, in addition to the will of the people, thus drawing a line of distinction in one nation. The same language becan constitutional with the Roman emperors, and we know what were the fruits of this consent. It was with reluctance, and even with remorse, that the Prætorian guards were persuaded to abandon the cause of Nero; and the two centuries, from Augustus to Commodus, passed away, with the exception of three inconsiderable rebellions, which were suppressed in a few months, and without even the hazard of a battle, unstained with civil blood, and undisturbed by revolutions. Every eye, and every passion, are directed to the supreme magistrate, who possesses the arms and treasures of the state; whilst the senate, neither elected by the people, nor guarded by military force, nor animated by public spirit, rests its authority on the pleasure of its creator. Even the republican maxims are obliterated. The senate is filled with eloquent slaves, who justify personal flattery by speculative principles of servitude. These new advocates of despotism are heard with pleasure at St. Cloud, and with patience by the people, when they inculcate the duty of passive obedience, and descant on the inevitable mischiefs of freedom. Senators, legislators, lawyers, and priests, all concur in teaching, that the imperial authority is held, not by the delegated commission, but by the irrevocable resignation of the nation; that the emperor freed from the restraint of civil laws, can command, by his arbitrary will, the lives and fortunes of his subjects, and may dispose of the empire as of his pri vate property. Add to this, a body of troops, subservient to the monarch's command, who, with bloody hands, savage manners, and desperate resolutions, are prepared to guard his throne.

Such is the picture of modern France, and of the power of its chief. It is a forced situation, framed and supported by a league of able, bad men; and it is not likely to survive the term of their existence. But, while it lasts, Europe must bleed under its operations, and it is to be feared, that the mischiefs which it has already effected, will require ages of labour and courage to repair. A new order of things must be struck out, and ripened into existence, in order to prevent the establishment of universal monarchy; but it is doubtful, admitting that the means are at hand, whether the genius to bring them into action is any where to be found. This is indeed, a gloomy prospect; but, after having considered the matter in a thousand different views, I cannot, with satisfaction, state, where to begin, how to proceed, ́and where to direct our ultimate views. The treaties lately concluded between the allies and the French, have bereft the continent of even the hope of independence from any natural causes; and yet, such is the strength of hope, that I fancy I

perceive, even in these treaties a glimmering ray of consolation. But this ray, is, perhaps, the working of a sanguine disposition, which may betray our reasoning. However, such as it is, I shall here present it to my readers, premising, at the same time, that no confidence should be placed in speculations upon speculative points; and that the suggestions which follow originate more in the wish to see the scattered fragments of Europe collected together, and a new and more substantial edifice formed out of the ruins, than from any favourable opinion which I entertain either of the capacity or power of those interested to attempt it.

REFLECTIONS UPON THE TREATIES OF TILSIT.

The conditions of the treaty between Russia and France, and between France and Prussia, are so much alike, that they may be examined as one piece of diplomacy. It appears, as the most prominent feature in these treaties, that Buonaparte has com pletely obtained the object for which he fought, and no more: the allies, on the other hand, have not only lost sight of every object for which they went to war, but they have formally recognized the whole of Buonaparte's usurpations, past, present, and to come. But great as these concessions are, they form the least parts of the policy which Europe has to deplore. Russia has ratified the unprincipled system of the French government, and become an accomplice in the crime of its ruler; for she has now completely sanctioned the aggrandizement of France, by incorporating into her own empire territories which she sent forth her armies to defend. There is, however, a marked distinction between the conduct of the French and Russian emperors in this respect. Whenever France has pretended to fight for her allies, she has always taken care never to sheathe the sword, until she has placed them in a situation of greater power and security than they before enjoyed; the emperor of Russia has disdainfully rejected this principle, and contrived to make his distressed ally poorer than he was before. By the peace of Tilsit, according to the edition of it which has reached the British public, France has taken nothing for herself immediately, but is satisfied with strengthening the outworks only of her empire: the empe ror of Russia, who took up arms "for the sole purpose of delivering Germany from the foe who tyrannized over various parts of it," has been graciously pleased to sign a treaty wherein he not only agrees, that the foe shall continue to tyrannize, as before the war, but acknowledges his right to tyrannize over any part of Germany here after.- "His said majesty (of Russia) also promises, information being communicated to him on the part of the emperor Napoleon, to acknowledge those sovereigns who may hereafter become members of the confederation, &c." (See the 15th article of the treaty.) If his imperial majesty of all the Russias had been beaten to the ground, or if the treaty of Tilsit had been done at St. Petersburgh, instead of Tilsit, he could not have assented to a condition more humiliating, because it is a solemn recognition of the will, whatever it may be, of his late enemy. In fact, it is a positive surrender of the power of interference, and the rights of independent sovereignty. Hence, Russia, in a legitimate sense, has no longer a pretension by this treaty, to intermeddle in the affairs of Europe; she has consented to be, what Buonaparte declared she should be-an Asiatic power.

Not satisfied, however, with this aberration from her true policy, Russia was determined to convince the world of the high spirit of honour which governed her councils, by appropriating to her own use several valuable districts belonging to the ally, whom she came to defend. "Honour," said the magnanimous Alexander, in his Ukase of November 28, 1806, unsheathed our sword for the protection of our allies." The same honour inspired his imperial majesty when he wrote to his minister that he had terminated the war with glory, by sharing in the spoils of his unfortunate ally, the king of Prussia. This is imperial honour; and since we have seen that the term imperial has been lately appropriated as a veil for all sorts of but, here let us pause: the honour of imperialists is too sacred a thing to be spoken of with irreverence.

I have heard that there was once a time, when two parties engaged in a law suit respecting the right of occupying a freehold estate, which belonged to a third person. As the defendant in this cause was himself an expert conveyancer, and thoroughly practised in all the tricks of the profession, the plaintiff, who had less experience though he was a practitioner too, was under the necessity of calling in the assistance

of a neighbouring serjeant at law, acknowledged by all parties to be a man of great honour and abilities. It appears that the plaintiff laid his action wrong; for he brought an action of assumpsit against the defendant instead of laying his action upon the statute of frauds and perjuries, 29 Car. 11. c. 3. According to that statute, where any contract or sale is made of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest therein, a mere verbal assumpsit is void, because though in equity the breach of a verbal covenant be an injury, yet the necessary forms, the solemnity of writing and sealing, are absolutely necessary. However, the serjeant undertook the cause for his client with great zeal and cordiality, and without a fee; and to it all the parties went tooth and nail with uncommon vigour and at a most enormous expense. But the friendship of the serjeant was not of long endurance. Finding in the course of the proceedings, that the defendant had come at the knowledge of some musty pieces of parchment, which rendered his title to a large tract of low-land contiguous to his patrimonial estate very equivocal, he entered into a secret understanding with the defendant, whereby the serjeant not only entered a non pros on the part of his client, but contrived to chouse him of a large part of his original estate, by way of a compensation for his trouble in the management of the cause. The plaintiff who had engaged in this law-suit with a view of cheating another man of his property, being thus tricked by friend and foe, was obliged to submit and to consent to pay all costs. The neighbours remembering the old adage, that when rogues quarrel honest men thrive, looked on with pleasure at the strife; but when they learnt that the action was suddenly dropped, in virtue of a compromise between the two powerful casuists, and that the generous serjeant had consented to make his client pay the piper; they gave up every idea that a principle of honour was harboured in the bosoms of such renowned equity lawyers, and every one began to examine his own title deeds, lest there should be any flaw of which these two formidable men might avail themselves. This is an history of other times.

Let us return to the imperial negociations at Tilsit. By inducing the emperor of Russia to appropriate a portion of the Prussian territories, Buonaparte has succeeded in throwing a gloss over his manifold usurpations, and has obtained an accomplice, at length, in the person of his rival in power. Setting aside the sad example, it may be worth our while to inquire, whether, according to the rules of fair political calculation, the treaty of Tilsit be unfavourable to the safety of Europe? I think it is not unfavourable. And unless Russia can be brought to act in a perfect communion of interests with France, which is not a likely event, I should rather suppose that we may yet trace the elements of a new but more efficacious balance of power in Europe. Every thing, however, will depend upon the judgment which Great Britain may exercise in this strange appearance of human affairs.

Prussia is now reduced to the condition from which she rose, on a sudden, by the genius of one man, to be a commanding power upon the continent. Let her, if it be possible, repair her dilapidated estate; she has been severely punished for her treachery and avarice; and though we cannot avoid commiserating the fallen fortune of the king of Prussia, yet we cannot deny that the chastisement has been just. To this it may be objected, that the loss of so great a portion of his dominions serves to increase the power of France. It cannot be denied, that it must have this effect; but it is ephemeral; for the people who are thus transferred from one master to another, are still Germans. A Bourbon reigns in Spain, yet no one complains that the national character of the Spaniard has undergone any change from this circumstance, or that the Spaniards imported with their royal stock the manners of France, While Buonaparte remains at the head of the French government, it is probable that the connection between himself and his vassal kings will be maintained, and we must expect that he will influence their foreign relations; but this connection must gradually diminish in proportion as the new sovereignties become more stable, and I do not hesitate to add, that if these sovereignties had been fewer, and each of them rendered more powerful, the whole world might feel, ten years since, the most beneficial effects from such an arrangement. The more these sovereignties gain in political consequence, the more will the ascendancy of one enormous state be kept down. We have good reason to lament the revolution which we have witnessed-; but, it is our duty to look before us, to extract as much good as possible from adversity

itself, and to deviate from the beaten track of our policy when we discover that the objects we pursued no longer exist. Unfortunately, all the changes that are expected have not taken place, so that we are still in the dark, and left only to vain conjectures. But, should Saxony be permitted to retain the territories wrested from Prussia, the king, as we must now call him, will be in fact the sovereign of a state more compact and as populous as Prussia. There are only three primary powers now remaining upon the continent, these are Russia, Austria, and France. The Germanic empire is a non-entity. Although the Austrian power feel severely the effects of the long war in which it has been engaged, yet it is capable of prodigious improvement, and it nourishes a hardy and warlike race of people. Bavaria has been enriched at the expense of Austria; nevertheless, if Austria be allowed to take breath, she certainly will, in the course of a few years, and under a provident administration, be able to resume her commanding attitude amongst the European powers; for it may be justly said of the government of that country, that it has not yet become acquainted with the greatness of its internal resources. In the present division of the continent, therefore, it will be desirable that Austria should enjoy a long and uninterrupted repose; and upon the same principle, I am not prepared to say, that peace, even under this distribution of territory, would not be advantageous to all the continental powers. For instances, all those states which have received great accessions of territory, must naturally be anxious to consolidate their strength, and to give some kind of regularity to the operations of their respective governments. Bavaria and Saxony, which are now become important secondary powers, are peculiarly interested in the return of general tranquillity. They have gained more by treaties than they could have expected from the most successful war, in which they might have been individually engaged, and the settlement of their kingdoms will require time, tranquillity, and a wise administration. By the treaties of Tilsit, Saxony is now composed of nearly five millions of inhabitants, a population which has converted that state into a very considerable power. The same may be said of Bavaria according to the treaty of Presburg. Prussia henceforward will rank as a secondary power, and be permitted to take a seat in the diet, if there should be one, of the confederation of the Rhine, upon the same bench, as the kings of Westphalia, Saxony, Bavaria, and Wirtemburgh.

All these dispositions are evidently framed with a view to defend the frontiers of France, and to give to that power a complete ascendancy over the united forces of Austria and Russia. But, it is beyond the skill of Buonaparte himself to say, that these intermediate states will not serve here after as outworks for the defense of those powers against France. The dominions of Saxony in particular, touch both Austria and Russia, and their political geography is such, that if Buonaparte will be quiet for a few years, it will be in the power of that king to act as an independent sovereign. If it were possible to believe a syllable that Buonaparte utters respecting great Britain, his speech to his senate might induce us to think that he has at length abandoned his maritime views of dominion, and that he will rest satisfied with the arrangements which he has made upon the continent. Certain it is, that should we enter into any negociation with him, the interests of the continental powers will form no part of our diplomatic discussions; for he declares, that "the pernicious influence which England exercised over the continent is irrevocably destroyed." It is true, he has made the same declaration before, and has found himself deceived; but he has certainly more reason to boast of it, at present, because Russia has acknowledged not only all the royal houses which he has raised, but she has also promised to acknowledge any other which he may create. We are told in this speech to the senate, that a French prince will reign on the Elbe; but, for an obvious reason, he has not traced the line of this new kingdom. Can he cherish for an instant, the idea, that this lure of Hanover will tempt the British government to recede from the just maintenance of our maritime rights? He might as well propose to yield the Orlean, nois as Hanover, surrounded as it would be by the immediate dependents upon France. The silence respecting this kingdom upon the Elbe is not without a significant meaning, and it is right that we should be prepared against the stra tagem.