lumns through the streets directly in their front. It was also to be expected, that though they knew that general Beresford's defeat and surrender had been occasioned principally from the murderous fire kept up from the tops of the houses, by the inhabitants, that they would place themselves in the very same predicament, instead of levelling to the ground those houses which served as banquettes for the enemy to fire from, before they made the assault. It was to be expected-but I can go no further: I am sick at heart, and too much exasperated, as well as overwhelmed with shame, to continue the exposure of this most unmilitary and unscientific attack. Well may the volunteers of Britain confide in their powers; and now the day has arrived, when all that I have urged against the maxims of those who have contumeliously treated them, is vindicated. If Buonaparte did not fear them more than some persons whom I could name, Great Britain would long since have been at his disposal. But mark! Here is no whisper of imputation against the courage and intrepidity of a single person engaged in the action at Buenos Ayres. They all did their duty like gallant, true-born Britons. My sole complaint is against the gross want, I will not say of military skill, but of common sense, which was shewn in the dispositions of that fatal day. Had sir Arthur. Wellesley commanded, Buenos Ayres would have been in our possession. If I were to take up my rule and square, and draw a plan of the battle, according to the official account of it, and to insert it in the next week's review, with an appropriate expla nation and commentary, it might be of public use, but it would convey melancholy reflections. It is painful thus to torment oneself in animadverting upon the conduct off those whose gallantry we admire, and upon whose judgment our existence may hereafter depend. But we owe to public safety, a manly avowal of our sentiments. I do not pledge myself to go further into this subject, though I am satisfied of its importance: it is more comfortable to obliterate it from the mind, or, if it must be remembered, that it should exist only in the official dispatch, a monumental record of courage ill-directed, and uselessly expended.

IMPENDING FATE OF PORTUGAL.

The last article, though unusually long, will not, I hope, be thought tedious by my readers, especially as the principles laid down in it, will apply with equal force to the state of Portugal, whose final doom seems to be at length sealed, by the remorseless disturber of the peace of Europe. According to the intelligence brought by the last Lisbon mail, there is reason to believe, that this harmless power, whose only crime is its ancient and stedfast attachment to this country, is on the eve of expiating its offence, by the loss of its independence. Indeed, if no information to this effect had reached us, the nature of the case, according to Buonaparte's logic, and the inilitary preparations of that ruffian, who is assembling an army at Bayonne, would sufficiently develope the views which he is about to execute. For this reason, I have thought it might not be amiss, to seize time by the forelock, and to submit to my countrymen, the different lines of conduct, which wisdom prescribes to us, in the event of the kingdom of Portugal becoming the victim, or the instrument of French perfidy. The perfection of human policy, consists in the anticipation of every contingency, and in providing to meet it. It is ridiculous to suppose that the humble and unostentatious independence of Portugal will be respected by a power, which has never yet withheld its grasp, except from motives of convenience. But the time is now arrived, when this act of convenient injustice may be executed with impunity, and even without the apprehension of reproach; and our expedition against Denmark, though varying wholly from such an invasion, both in motives and object, will most assuredly be made the ground whereupon the policy of seizing Portugal will be justified by Buonaparte, and accredited by the stupid herd upon the continent. It is probable,. however, that the blow may be deferred, just to afford time enough to draw a contrast between the outrage of Britain, and the moderation of the Corsican, as well as to lull our government, and the government of Lisbon into a state of deceptious security. I wish, that the blow may be suspended even on these grounds; for if it be not, the French army is, before now, on its march over the Pyrenees. That our government will not be lulled asleep, is tolerably clear, since the demonstration of vigour which they have lately displayed. But we cannot say the same of the Portuguese. At all events, it is the duty of a good citizen, not to trust to the vigilance of government, where he sees the danger, and the means of averting it.

The invasion of Portugal is a matter to be expected; but whether it would be politic for us to oppose a measure, which that court may not be disposed to resist, is not a question for our present consideration. It would be, no doubt, an expedient to engage us in a land war, and by that means to divert our attention from distant conquests, or naval enterprizes, which the strength of our victorious navy places within our power. History records an instance in which the Portuguese government was placed in a situation nearly as perilous as the present, and from which it extricated itself with honour, by a spirited determination to abide by its neutrality. It was in the year 1762, soon after the accession of our present sovereign to the throne, that France and Spain meditated an attack upon that kingdom. As Portugal, in some measure, owes to England the perfect recovery of its independence, and the family of Braganza its full establishment on the throne of that kingdom, the closest friendship has ever since subsisted between the two crowns. In consequence of this friendship, founded on mutual interests, England gives a preference in her ports to the wines of Portugal, above those of other countries; and obtains, in return for such indulgence, many exclusive privileges in ker trade with that kingdom, of which she is considered to be the guardian. Envious of these commercial advantages, and sensible that England would not tamely relinquish them, whatever might be the disposition of his most faithful majesty, France suggested to Spain the invasion of Portugal, as the most effectual method of distressing their common enemy. The conquest of Portugal indeed, seemed no distant or doubtful event. Sunk in indolence, reposing in the protection of England, and fed and adorned with the rich productions of Brazil, where gold and diamonds are found in abundance, and where the most luxuriant crops of rice and sugar may be raised almost without culture, the Portuguese had laid aside all attention to their internal defence. A long peace had utterly extinguished the martial spirit among them; and, notwithstanding the increase of their resources, they had suffered their army insensib'y to moulder away. That part of it which remained, was without discipline, and without officers, and the fortresses on the frontiers were in no state of defence.

Nor were these the only circumstances favourable to the views of France and Spain. Before Portugal had recovered from the shock of the earthquake that had laid its capital in ruins, it experienced a civil convulsion of the most dangerous kind, in a conspiracy, formed against the life of their sovereign, by the exiled Jesuits, the ambitious views of the duke d'Aviero, and other mutinous nobles.

Such was the state of Portugal when the Spanish forces marched towards its defenceless frontiers, and the ministers of France and Spain presented to the court of Lisbon a joint memorial, in order to persuade his most faithful majesty to confederate with them against his ancient ally. In that memorial, they insisted largely on the tyranny exercised by England over all other powers, (but especially in maritime affairs,) and which the kings of Spain and Portugal were equally commanded, by the ties of blood, and their common interest, to oppose; and they concluded with declaring, that as soon as his most faithful majesty had taken his resolution, which they doubted not would prove favourable, their troops were ready to enter Portugal, and garrison the fortresses of that kingdom, in order to avert the danger to which it might otherwise be exposed from the naval force of Great Britain. To this extraordinary memonal, the two ministers added, that they were ordered by their courts to demand a categorical answer in four days, and that any further deliberation would be considered as a hegative.

The king of Portugal's situation was thus rendered truly critical, and deserving of compassion. If, contrary to the established connections of his crown, its supposed interests, and in violation of the faith of treaties, he should engage in this proffered alliance, he must expect to see his most valuable settlements, Brazil and Goa, jäl a prey to his ancient and injured ally, and Lisbon and Oporto, his chief cities, laid in ashes by the thunder of, the British arms. Nor was this the worst: having admitted garrisons into his principal places of strength, the implied condition of his accession to the confederacy, he must necessarily lay his account with being reduced to the abject state of a vassal power. If, on the other hand, he should adhere to his engagements, and resolve to maintain his independency, an army of sixty thous and Spaniards was ready to enter his kingdom, and reduce it to the condition of a conquered province,

The firmness of the king of Portugal on this trying occasion, is worthy of admiration. In answer to the insulting proposition of the confederates, he observed, with judgment and temper, that his alliance with England was ancient, and, consequently, could give no reasonable offence at the present crisis: that it was purely defensive, and therefore innocent in all respects; that the late sufferings of Portugal disabled her, were she even willing, from taking part in an offensive war; into the calamities of which neither the love he bore to his subjects, nor the duty by which he was bound to them as a king, would suffer him to plunge them. The two courts denied that his alliance was purely defensive, or entirely innocent; and for this astonishing reason, that the defensive alliance was converted into an offensive one, "from the situation of the Portuguese dominions, and the nature of the English power!"* The English fleet, said they, cannot keep the sea in all seasons, nor cruize on the coasts best calculated for cutting off the French and Spanish navigation, without the harbours and friendly assistance of Portugal. Nor, added they, coud those haughty islanders insult all the maritime powers of Europe, if the riches of Portugal did not pass into their hands. And, after endeavouring to awaken the jealousy of his most faithful majesty, by representing his kingdom as under the yoke of England, they insultingly told him, that he ought to be thankful for "the necessity which they had laid upon him to make use of his reason, in order to take the road of his glory, and embrace the common interest."

Although the king of Portugal was sensible, that the necessity here alluded to was the immediate march of the Spanish army, to take possession of his dominions, he was not intimidated from his honourable resolution. The treaties of league and commerce, subsisting between Great Britain and Portugal, were such, he maintained, as the laws of God, and the laws of nations, have always deemed innocent; he intreated their majesties to open their eyes to the crying injustice of turning upon Portugal the hostilities kindled against Great Britain; and to consider that they were giving an example which would lead to the utter destruction of mankind; that there was an end of public safety, if neutral powers were to be attacked, because they have entered into defensive alliances with the powers at war; that if their troops should invade his dominions, he would, therefore, in vindication of his neutrality, endeavour to repel them with all his forces, and those of his allies. He concluded with declaring, that he would rather see the last tile of his palace fall, and his faithful subjects spill the last drop of their blood, than sacrifice the honour or the independence of his erown, and afford the ambitious princes, by his submission, a pretext for invading the sacred rights of neutrality.

In consequence of this magnanimous declaration, the ministers of France and Spain immediately left Lisbon. Their departure was soon followed by a joint denunciation of war against Portugal, in the name of their most christian and catholic majesties. The British government could not view with indifference the danger of their ally, who depended upon them for support; nor prudently avoid acting with vigour in his defence. Ten thousand troops, together with arms; ammunition, and provisions, were immediately sent over to Portugal.

By the help of these additional forces, the enterprizing valour of the British officers, and the skilful conduct of the count de la Lippe, the Spaniards, who had passed the mountains in three divisions, taken several places, and confidently hoped Soon to become masters of the whole kingdom; found themselves under the necessity of abandoning their conquests, and evacuating Portugal before the close of the campaign.

This transaction bears a very great analogy to the present situation of Portugal, but it will be readily perceived, that there is now a prodigious difference between the characters of all the persons concerned at that epoch, and those of three of the leading parties who are implicated in the events of our times. Although there was no inconsiderable portion of the same ferocious, vindictive, and ambitious spirit in Lewis XV: which characterizes the usurper of his descendant's throne; yet, there is an immeasurable distance between the vices of a gentleman and the atrocities of a

* See the whole of the state papers which passed upon this subject, in the 5th volume of the Annual Register, for 1702.

blackguard. Besides, the situation of Europe is as different now from what it was in the time of Lewis, and the policy of nations as thoroughly changed, as if an inundation of barbarians had completely swept away every vestige of its ancient principles and former governments. Spain now exists only by sufferance, and is the tool of France, herself the supreme dictator of the continent. We know that

Portugal has long been menaced, and that she has hitherto been spared only through some shew of respect for the Spanish connection, and the dread lest an invasion of her independence should throw her distant colonies into the arms of Great Britain. But it is very problematical whether the same forbearance will continue to operate, now that the absolute sovereignty of Europe, and the complete annihilation of our maritime power, are the things desired and avowed. To this consideration we may add, that the extraordinary accession of power which the continental tyrant has recently acquired, by the tergiversation and pusillanimity of Russia, will probably induce him to act as if Great Britain were reduced to extremity; and her relative condition so equivocal, that, far from being able to spare a force to take possession of the Brazils in the event of a French attack upon Portugal, it will be as much as she can do to preserve her own independence, by detaining all her forces within her watery confines. It is probable that the governor of France may reason after this manner. We know that he is never at a loss for a reason when he is about to commit injustice, or rather, I ought to say, that he is never at a loss for a reason after having committed it. He does not even condescend to excuse his devilish deeds upon the tyrant's plea, but avows, justifies, and glories in their perpetration. When it suited his convenience to incorporate Piedmont into his dominions, he assigned as a vindication of the measure "the necessity of existing circumstances, and its inability to support either the weight of its own independence, or the expenses, of a monarchy !* Who will deny, that this argument will not be applied to Portugal as well as to Piedmont? But some persons may flatter themselves with the hope, that the impending dangers of the Portuguese will rouse them from their long lethargic slumber, to call forth the latent energies of their country; and that the magnanimous rejection of the proposals of France and Spain, which are still within their recollection, and which a considerable part of their population has witnessed, will animate the councils of the prince Regent, with equal zeal, to maintain the independence of his country at present. But I fear, that persons who entertain this notion have not considered, that the energies of a nation can only be looked for from a people, every one of whom feels within himself a consciousness of the dignity of his nature; and that where this sentiment has long ceased to prevail, or has rarely been excited, these energies take a retrograde direction, and can only be revived by some great moral change in the Jabits of men.

We do not doubt the sincerity or the good wishes of the Portuguese, nor do we doubt their inclination to resist the demands of the enemy; but it is not from a people who have languished in a state of mediocrity without making any attempt to recover the great monuments of the capacity of their former kings and commanders, and the character of whose government is narrow and bigotted, that we are to expect efforts correspondent with the embarassments of their country. In such a war as the present, therefore, and such a government as that of France to contend against, it is right that we should be prepared to frustrate the schemes of the enemy if possible; and if not, to take advantage of the opportunity which his injustice may afford to augment our own power and resources. As an appendage of rance, Portugal must sink into absolute insignificance; she will be deprived of that commerce which has proved her only support; her European merchants, who may be considered in no other light than as intermediate agents or factors, between Great Britain and the Brazils, will be utterly ruined; the direct trade to her American settlements will devolve upon our merchants; and thus, the encroachments of France, and the spread

*See his "View of the State of the Republic," February 22d, 1803.

It is not at all improbable, that the time may have arrived when the services of Spain will be requited with the gift of Portugal, in consideration of the resignation of the queen of Etruria, whose kingdom may be incorporated into our kingdom of the iron crown.

of her pernicious system, will only tend to open new sources of commerce and wealth to our country, without occasioning any extraordinary expense, and without causing one drop of British blood to flow; for, it will then become our duty to secure the exclusive commerce of that tract of fine sea-coast upon the Atlantic Ocean, which stretches above two thousand miles from the river of Amazons to the Rio de la Plata. It is here, that the principles advanced at such length, in the preceding article, may be successfully applied; and to avoid repetition, all parties agreeing upon the neces sity of strengthening our bulwarks in proportion to the approaches of the enemy, Jet us inquire how we should set to work upon so goodly and indispensable a measure. It may be urged, that being bound by the most sacred ties of ancient alliance and friendship with Portugal, we ought not to count our gains upon her distresses, but generously to exert our whole force in her support. This is honest doctrine: but I hope it will be allowed, that we are bound by no moral or political obligation to expend our strength upon a nation which will not, or cannot, stir an inch in its own behalf. Let it also be recollected, that this bond of alliance has been scarcely reciprocal, as the balance of good hitherto derived from it, has uniformly been in favour of Portugal. During the last war, we sent her a protective force, which deterred the enemy from annihilating her independence, because the face of Europe then exhibited a very different appearance; but it would be more than could be expected from the most romantic friendship and valour, that the whole disposeable force of this country should undertake the defence of Portugal against the combined armies of the whole continent; for such I may term the French and Spanish armies, sincè no power remains to overawe, or to create a diversion of the French force while engaged in the invasion and plunder of Portugal. If, therefore, the French ruler be determined to occupy Portugal, Portugal he will have, there being no hunian power that can prevent it. But, in this case, it follows as a necessary. consequence, that if he make a breakfast' of the body of this state, we ought to take instant measures to secure to ourselves a good substantial meal of its wings. Now the question is, how we are to proceed consistently with the regard we owe to our ally, to our own security, and his advantage?

In the first place, the necesssity of the case being clearly established, we should keep constantly before us the causes of our failure in Spanish America, and endeavour to make that very circumstance serve as a beacon to us in our future course. Our occupation of Brazil must not, therefore, be contemplated until every other effort shall have been exhausted. We should begin with this business to-morrow; first, by sending a squadron directly into the Tagus to take possession of the Portuguese navy pelo amor de Deos e pelas almas, which, reduced into sterling, means "for the love of God and of the souls;" without which nothing is done in Portugal.* By the navy I do not mean the ships of war only, but the very large ships which are engaged in the Portuguese navigation; for if the Corsican should invade Portugal, this description of vessels would be of the first importance, as they would serve to embark a large body of troops for Ireland, according to the French mode of packing up their bales of squalid flesh, while our attention would be occupied with diversions along the whole extent of coast from Rochefort to the Elbe. In the next place, our minister at the court of Portugal should be instructed to feel the pulse, and pry into the hearts of the leading persons, in order to ascertain what line they mean to adopt in the event of an invasion; whether they mean to resist to the last extremity, and expect succour from us?-if not, whether they entertain thoughts of removing the seat of government to South America, which idea should be urged strenuously in case they talk of it, and put into their heads if they should not? On the other hand, should they resolve to succumb and "submit to the will of Heaven," as they will call their want of public spirit, then, in either of these cases, we shall see our way; for as the court of Portugal has no other alternative than the adoption of one

*Portugal, though a maritime power in ruins, possesses, nevertheless, about twelve ships of the line, and as many frigates. It is understood, that by taking possession, is meant a temporary deposit according to the noble and generous principle of our operations before Copenhagen. The least resistance would of course occasion a second edition of the Copenhagen affair.