alarm they indulged as to the objects of the French, they might have had 40,000 men at Copenhagen, and lord Cathcart would have met with a reception under its walls, similar to that which the duke of York met at Dunkirk, in Holland, and, in fact, at every place upon the continent wherever the English have dared to set foot. Was it by taking the Danish fleet, and setting fire to the capital, and thus violating the independence and impartiality of Denmark, that the English ministry, or their general, thought to preserve its neutrality. In that case, we should be justified in forming an idea equally as unfavourable to their foresight as their justice. If they think to remain in Zealand, they ought to bring an army of 80,000 men together; and even then it would be of little signification. This attack must be viewed as still more absurd, if it is to be understood as an experiment upon the continental powers, Let us estimate the hatred it will excite, and the means which it will administer to the arm of vengeance. The emperor Alexander had offered England his mediation. In reply to this offer, they attack that sea, for the independence of which this prince was guarantee. They steal the fleet, and burn the capital of a power, to which they are united by the ties of policy, friendship, and neighbourhood. Thus the English repay the services which Russia has at all times afforded them; the privilege which she has given to their commerce, and the immense sacrifices which she has made to their ambition. When they might have availed themselves of their remaining ally, they put her to defiance in a point of honour; and attack her in her dearest interests; and in the discord they excite, they expose the respectable house of Denmark, be longing to the family of the king of England, as the only sacrifice to their wanton cruelty. It will be in vain to endeavour to obtain forgiveness for this offence, by endeavouring to make it believed that France had views against the interests of Denmark. And even so, was it prudent to anticipate France by a transaction so much more scandalous? But the interest which the French emperor takes in his glory, and that of his people, would have prevented him from such a violation of the immu table rights and morality of nations; one consequence of a contrary conduct, would have been to kindle a new war, to offend Russia, and again deliver up the continent to fire and sword. In all cases, it was the interest of England to have acted prodently. She might at any time have placed her fleets before the island of Zealand for its defence, and then, besides the justice of her cause, she would have had Denmark, Sweden, and Russia in her favour. If we view the expedition in its object, its execution, and its effects, we can see nothing in it but the blind and cruel policy of fear, which makes no calculations, nor acknowledges or respects any power. After all, it will be very difficult to believe, in the excellence of a constitution which admits of such combinations, and not to be astonished at the idle speeches of a parliament which suffers, and, we may say, sanctions such acts of injustice."

To animadvert on every part of this acrimonious philippic, would be a waste of time; but it is impossible not to rejoice, when we see Buonaparte biting his lip, because we were before-hand with him in seizing the prey which he was about to appropriate. We cannot avoid smiling when we are told, in the slavish journals of that vile usurper, that human language has not terms sufficient to characterize the nature of our enterprize, when we recollect his enterprizes against Rome, Venice, Tuscany, and Egypt, and his unprovoked invasion of the peaceful and neutral cantons of Swisserland. The fact is, that the defective terms of which our enemies complain, relate not to morals, or the law of nations, but to envy, hatred, malice, and disappointment. They have not, with all their natural and acquired villainy, a sufficient stock of curses wherewith to bespatter us, for having out-witted the imperial Grotius, who takes such an interest in his glory, and that of his people, that it would have prevented him,-sweet pattern of excellence!-from such a violation of the immutable rights and morality of nations. This is really carrying the joke too far. Buonaparte is the last man living who should throw the first stone at us; nor should he preach the necessity of an adherence to moral virtues which he has never practised, and which he does not hesitate to trample under his feet, whenever they are in the way of his ambition. It is impossible to avoid smiling at the doleful moanings, with which the weak conduct of Denmark is arraigned, for mistaking her interest so far as to keep her army upon the continent, when it ought to have been in Zealand for the discomfiture of the British, and for the convenience of offering to the French troops

an unobstructed entrance into Holstein. A considerable portion of this envious dissertation upon the morality of nations, is copied from the London journals, and dressed up for public exhibition, by the varnishers of Paris. Little do the writers of our papers imagine how serviceably they cater for the despot of Europe. I am warranted in using this expression from the epithets the Moniteur employs respecting the Danish navy; for contrary to known facts, it represents the Danish fleet as composed of fifteen or twenty block-ships, or the timber, &c. in the arsenal of Copenhagen. But, the most curious admission of the whole consists in the declaration, that Englaud" might, at any time, have placed her fleets before the island of Zealand for its defence;" and yet, a few paragraphs before, we are assured, that "had the French effected the seizure of the fleet, they could not have fitted it out, and brought it into a French port." This will afford a satisfactory answer to such of our writers who believe, that it is within the power of France to send an expedition against us from the Baltic, now that we are in possession of the Danish navy. In short, the whole force of this ethical essay of the French may be summed up in their own words," WAS IT PRUDENT TO ANTICIPATE FRANCE?"

DUTCH DECREE AGAINST BRITISH COMMERCE.

They who have been flattering themselves and the public, with the idea that the attempt to interdict our commerce from the continent was a mere chimera, because it would occasion the ruin of Holland, and every other commercial country, have now an opportunity of learning, that the project was not so visionary as they were willing to believe. The prohibitory decree of Louis Napoleon, by the grace of God, king of Holland, which was inserted in our last Number, is so explicit, that no farther doubt can be entertained of the intention of "the throne which governs the world," to enforce, with the utmost rigour, our exclusion from every part of the continent. All vessels entering the ports of Holland are to give a double security, which is to remain in force until their papers are examined and allowed, and until it is proved that they have not touched at an enemy's port. Should it appear that the ship had touched at an enemy's port, the double security is to be immediately demanded of the sureties, and the amount paid into the treasury of the state. If any goods of British manufacture, or coming from an enemy's port, be unloaded, they are not only to be confiscated, but the double security is also to be levied, and the ship obliged immediately to put to sea; and, in case of bad weather, it is to have no shelter, except under the strictest precaution. There is also another article which enjoins the seizure and destruction of all letters, journals, &c. coming in a neutral flag; and all passengers who cannot prove that they do not come from the British isles, are to be immediately sent out of the Dutch territories. These new regulations are expressly declared to have been enacted for the purpose of obtaining a general peace, and the independence of the seas; two events which can never be reconciled upon the supposition, that Great Britain shall preserve her maritime power and ascendancy.— Thus, there is an end to that rare and precarious intercourse which subsisted between this country and Holland, since the original decree of November last, in the sprit of which these regulations are framed. The whole of the naval and military power of Holland, is placed at the disposal of the minister of finance, for the sake of carrying into effect this evidence of Buonaparte's envy and rancour. Our commercial intercourse with Holland, produced no material addition to our públic resources, the advantage was on the side of Holland; but as it contributed to mitigate the evils attendant on a state of hostility, it was in every respect desirable for both countries. The prohibition of it must have the ffect of diminishing the resources of Holland, and of alienating the people from the government of their new master. They cust consider this attempt, to circumscribe so narrowly the sphere of the little exertion which remained to them, as an act of unfeeling oppression. Hence, the people will leave no means untried to elude the practical application of this decree. The severity of the government will keep pace with the evasions of is orders, and the governor and the governed will, at length, live in a state of variance with each other; probably, in a state of mutual detestation. It is not in the nature of things, that these prohibitions can be reduced into a permanent system; for a time they may be enforced by vigilance and terror, but they cannot be lasting, unless we can bring ourselves to

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believe, that it is possible to prevent sixteen millions of civilized men from holding any sort of intercourse with more than one hundred and forty millious of their fellow creatures. Unless all the ports and customs of the whole continent are placed under the superintendance of French troops, and custom-house officers, these prohibitory laws will be evaded and rendered ineffectual. The most effectual mode of counteracting their effects will be to declare the continent, from the Elbe to the Adriatic, in a state of blockade, and, above all, to prohibit all intercouse between its nations and the commerce of the United States of America. The order of council of the 19th of August, which allows the seizure and condemnation, as lawful prizes, of all vessels under the flags of Oldenburgh, Pappenburg, Mecklenburg, or Kniphausen, trading with an hostile country, excepting such vessels shall either be going from, or bound to, a port of the United Kingdom, was a measure of great vigour, and nothing remains to be done but to extend the principle, and to make it include every neutral flag.

POLITICAL LITERATURE.

MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

A Reply to the Strictures of the Edinburgh Review, on the Foreign Policy of Marquis Wellesley's Administration in India, &c. by Lawrence Dundas Campbell, Esq. My readers must, by this time, be fully acquainted with my sentiments respecting the administration of lord Wellesley in India. They are also apprised of the principles on which my view of that nobleman's conduct is founded, as well as of the motives which induced me to vindicate his transactions from the base calumnies with which they have been assailed since his return to this country. They will, therefore, anticipate the satisfaction which I have felt in the perusal of the above work, to which it is now my object to direct their serious and impartial attention, and of which it is also my wish, on this occasion, to exhibit as comprehensive an analysis as the limits of my paper will admit.

It is the production of a gentleman who has acquired a thorough knowledge of Indian politics, both from a long residence in that quarter of the globe, and from the habits of a life continually occupied in researches into the policy, laws, manners, customs, and literature of Hindustan. Mr. Campbell is the editor of that excellent work which appears annually, under the title of the "Asiatic Register;" in praise of which the least that can be said is, that without a frequent recurrence to it, no one can possibly comprehend those intricate and momentous questions which have been so often agitated in the British senate, and which will continue to be discussed, as long as our Indian empire shall be considered as one of the most valuable sources of our commercial opulence, and national prosperity. We are in possession, therefore, of a book of practical experience, if I may be allowed the expression, and penned by a masterly hand, as my readers will soon discover on their perusal of it. They owe to their own honour, to the sentiments of justice, to the character of the state, and to the reputation of the illustrious nobleman, whose useful, meritorious, and splendid administration has been traduced, at home, by all the foul acts that envenomed malice and the spirit of persecution could devise, to blacken a name which shines amongst the brightest in Europe, and of which this nation may be justly proud-to read with attention, the plain, unvarnished, yet forcible train of reasonings contained throughout the whole of Mr. Campbell's book. It is a manly appeal to the tribunal of public conscience; and they who read it, will never rise from the perusal, without asso-> ciating in their minds, the name of Lord Wellesley, and the SAVIOUR OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA.

I will not discuss the insidious and unworthy manner in which the attack upon his lordship has been ushered into the world, under cover of a Review of a work which has no possible connection with recent transactions in India, and which refers to occurrences that took place before lord Wellesley was born. The work to which I now direct the attention of my readers has rendered this discussion quite unnecessary; since, whatever were the motives and objects of the Edinburgh Reviewers, they are (in my opinion), completely defeated by the masterly criticism of their candid and well informed opponent. I

The quest quisuel between the Edinburgh Reviewers and Mr. Campbell is this, ystem of policy is likely, either while it is undergoing the

process of establishment, or after it has been established, to diffuse general satisfaction, and, consequently, to strengthen the authority and influence of the British nation in Hindustan ?

In the discussion to which this question has given rise, Mr. Campbell has divided his observations into three parts.

1st. The general policy of lord Wellesley's administration. 2d. The causes and origin of the wars in India, which the Reviewers assert, were kindled by the English cabinet; and, 3dly. The late transactions in the Carnatic.

With respect of the first point, Mr. Campbell lays down this general principle.

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"The right of every state to provide for its own security, both by repelling actual dangers, and by adopting measures of prevention against those which it has good reason to apprehend, is derived from the law of nature, and recognized by the prac tice, as well as by the principles, of all civilized nations. The recognition of this right implies, that the means by which it is to be enforced should be perfectly adapted to the nature of the existing and apprehended evils, and fully adequate to remove and to prevent them. The executive government, therefore, of every state, is under the highest political obligation to observe and to judge when this right ought to be put in force, and to see that the means by which it is exercised are as effectual as the cir cumstances of the case will admit: for the employment of insufficient means, where the object is to secure the well-being and happiness, and, it may be, the lives and property of many millions of people would not only be irrational, but highly criminal. This general and acknowledged right acquires additional authority when it is to be exercised within the limits, and under the circumstances, to which the law of neighbourhood extends. "This law," says Mr. Burke, " is founded on the principle, that no use should be made of a man's liberty of operating on his property, from whence a detriment may justly be apprehended by his neighbour :"-a principle no less true of nations in political society, than of individual men in civil life. It bestows on both an obligation to know, and a right to prevent any damage or injury which either may have sufficient reason to fear, from the general conduct, the particular actions, or the evident intentions of a neighbour. But the right of vicinage, though resting on the same general principle of equity, both in civil and in political society, is at the same time much stronger, and more obligatory, amongst nations than individuals ;not merely because the community is of more importance than a single person, but because there being amongst states no constituted judge, neighbours must themselves take cognisance of each others acts, and determine upon them vicini, vicinorum facta, presumuntur scire.* Hence, if there be any where a nation, surrounded by neighbouring states, which exist only under arbitrary and changeable institutions, totally distinct and opposite in their nature from all the acknowledged principles of moral and political science, and which are at the same time governed by men of a turbulent, restless, and mischievous disposition; some of whom make it the main spring of their policy to excite and foment disunion in all governments, with a view to profit by the disorder which it may create, and others consider themselves "always in a state of war, because war is with them a source of revenue,"-that nation has a clear and unquestionable right to take cognisance of all the actions of such neighbours, and to employ means of security against the accumulated injuries, which those actions conspire to produce, proportioned to the degree of danger; and adapted to restrain the destructive policy which assails her safety, as well as to fortify her own relative situation. If that nation, in addition to the general danger arising from such neighbours, should observe manifest indications of their forming an hostile combination against lier, whilst she possessed satisfactory evidence of their being powerfully instigated to such hostility, by the subjects of a great rival state, who commanded their armies, and domineered in their councils; and if, moreover, that great rival state was at the same moment waging against her, (though in another part of the world) a war of the most inveterate malignity, and aiming at her destruction by every means which the most ingenious hatred could devise, or the most audácious enterprize employ, then the rights of security

* Vide Domat's Civil and Public Law; tom. I. liv. III.—from which Mr. Burke has taken the principles of his admirable and conclusive reasoning on this subject, in his first letter on a regicide peace.

and of vicinage become not merely a matter of political prudence, or expediency, but of absolute necessity. Hence the British government in India, which, at the commencement of lord Wellesley's administration was precisely in this situation in respect to the neighbouring states, adapted the measure of its policy to the extraordinary cir cumstances of that situation, and to the peculiar character of those states. That those measures were completely effectual for their primary purpose of averting the dangers that menaced the government, is proved by the fact of those dangers being removed: that they were also justified by their entire adaptation to the genius and character of the surrounding states, will no less clearly appear."

Mr. Campbell then proceeds to explain the exact nature of the policy which was adopted by lord Wellesley, under the state of circumstances which existed in India at the period of his arrival in that country.

"The principle of defensive subsidiary alliance," he observes," upon which the foreign policy of lord Wellesley's administration proceeded, and by which all its measures were therefore governed, had long before been acted on by the company's governments in India, with the express approbation of the constituted authorities in England, and had proved the best and most effectual security of our Indian dominions against the aggressive and predatory system of the native powers. In the administration of lord Cornwallis, this principle had been extended, by the conclusion of some treaties, which promised the most beneficial effects at the time, and which actually produced some partial and temporary good. But these treaties had all been frustrated in their operation, by the fluctuating and pernicious policy of the native states; and by the principle on which they were grounded not being carried to that extent, which was necessary to repress that policy, and by which alone the dissolute and lawless spirit of those who acted on it could be effectually curbed. Lord Cornwallis had also tried the experiment of introducing the principle of European alliances into Indian politics, by the conclusion of the triple alliance already mentioned between the British government, the Nizam, and the Peishwa. But the confessed and palpable inefficiency of that treaty, whilst it existed in force, and the circumstance of its premature dissolution, by a war of aggression, commenced against the Nizam by the i Peishwa, at the head of the Mahratta states, furnished the moss irrefragable and satisfactory proof of the total inapplicability of that principle to the genius, character, and circumstances of Indian states. Lord Wellesley, therefore, with the experience before him, both of the acknowledged inefficiency of the subsisting treaties of defensive alliance, and of the total failure of the triple alliance formed by lord Cornwallis, was called on to exercise the rights of security and of vicinage, under the critical circumstances which have been stated; and to provide means suited to the nature, and commensurate with the magnitude of the dangers that threatened his government, for repelling actual injuries, and for ensuring the safety of the British Indian empire, on the most enlarged view of its interests and dignity. He therefore resolved to modify and extend the understood and established principle of subsidiary alliance, and to frame upon it a regular system of defensive policy; which, by the preponderating, protecting power of the British government, would effectually exclude the influence of France from the councils of the native states, would preserve those states in their relative situations, and, by checking the ruling passion of their chiefs for war and plunder, would gradually establish general tranquillity, and thereby enable the peasantry of those distracted countries to cultivate their ancient habits of industry and peace. Accordingly, after the destruction of the French party in the Nizam's dominions, and the subversion of the hostile power of Tippoo Sultaun, both of which received the most unqualified and universal approbation, lord Wellesley turned his attention to the reformation of the defective system of connection between the British government and its tributaries, and to the improvement of its subsisting relations with the sovereign states of Hindustan. In order to accomplish these objects, it became necessary to form new compacts with those tributaries, and to enter into fresh treaties of alliance with those states. In making these arrangements, the long established and approved principle of subsidiary alliance was strictly adhered to, but it was modified by the commutation of subsidy for territory. The prevailing defect in the former system of connection between the British government and its tributaries, and that which gave birth to many of its other evils, was a divided government. But, by commuting the tribute which those vassal chiefs were, by their former compacts, b