such of our ships of war as they may chance to fall in with, either on the high seas, or in any rivers, waters, havens, roads, ports, or places, whatsoever or wheresoever. And, for the better execution of the purposes of this our royal proclamation, we do authorize and command all captains, masters, and others, commanding our ships and vessels of war, to stop and make stay of all and every such person or persons (being our natural-born subjects) as shall endeavour to transport or enter themselves into the service of any foreign state, contrary to the intent and command of our royal proclamation; and to seize upon, take, and bring away, all such persons as aforesaid, who shall be found to be employed or serving in any foreign merchant ship or vessel as aforesaid: but we do strictly enjoin all such our captains, masters, and others, that they do permit no man to go on board such ships and vessels belonging to states at amity with us, for the purpose of so seizing upon, taking, and bringing away such persons as aforesaid; for whose discreet and orderly demeanour the said captains cannot answer; and that they do take special care that no unnecessary violence be done or offered to the vessel, or to the remainder of the crew, from out of which such persons shall be taken: And in case of their receiving information of any such person or persons being employed, or serving on board of any ship of war belonging to such foreign state, being a state at amity with us, we do authorize and command our captains, masters, and others, commanding our ships of war, to require of the captain or commander of such foreign ship of war, that he do forthwith release and discharge such person or persons, being our natural-born subject or subjects; and if such release and discharge shall be refused, then to transmit information of such refusal to the commander in chief of the squadron under whose orders such captain or commander shall be then serving, which information the said commander in chief is hereby strictly directed and enjoined to transmit, with the least possible delay, to our minister residing at the seat of government of that state to which the said foreign ships of war shall belong or to oerlord high admiral, or lords commissioners of the admiralty for the time being, in order that we, being apprised of such proceeding, may forthwith direct the necessary steps to be taken for obtaining redress from the government to which such foreign ship of war shall belong, for the injury done to us by the unwarranted detenti n of our natural-born subjects in the service of a foreign state: And whereas it has further been represented unto us, that divers mariners and seafaring men, our natural-born subjects, have been induced to accept letters of naturalization, or certificates of citizenship, from foreign states, and have been taught to believe that, by such letters or certificates, they are discharged from that duty of allegiance which, as our natural-born subjects, they owe to us; now we do hereby warn all such mariners, seafaring me, and others, our natural-born subjects, that no such letters of naturalization, or certificates of citizenship, do, or can, in any manner, divest our natural-born subjects of the allegiance, or in any degree alter the duty which they owe to us, their lawful sovereign. But, in consideration of the error into which such mariners and seafaring men as aforesaid may have been led, we do hereby publish and declare our free pardon to all such our subjects, who, repenting of the delusion under which they have acted, shall immediately, upon knowledge of this our royal proclamation, withdraw themselves from foreign services, and return to their allegiance to us; and we do declare that all such our subjects, who shall continue in the services of foreign states, in disregard and contempt of this our royal proclamation, will not only incur our just displeasure, but are liable to be proceeded against for such contempt, and shall be proceeded against accordingly; and we do hereby declare, that if any such masters of ships, pilots, mariners, seamen, shipwrights, or other seafaring men, being our natural-born subjects, shall be taken in any foreign service by the Algerines, or other Barbary powers, and carried into slavery, they shall not be reclaimed by us as subjects of Great Britain. And we do further notify, that all such our subjects as aforesaid, who have voluntarily entered, or shall enter, or voluntarily continue to serve on board of any ships of war belonging to any foreign state at enmity with us, are, and will be guilty of high treason; and we do by this our royal proclamation deslare, that they shall be punished with the utmost severity of the law.

Given at our court at the queen's palace, the 16th day of October, 1807, and in the 47th year of our reign. GOD SAVE THE KING.

Printed and published by G. SIDNEY, No. 1, Northumberland-Street, Strand; Sold by H. T. HODGSON, Wimpole-street; J. BELL, Sweeting's-alley, Cornhill; and by all the News-venders in Town and Country.

Vol. iii. No. 18.

Saturday, October 31, 1807.

Price 10d.

337

DISPUTE WITH AMERICA.

We have now become masters of all that has been alleged on each side of this controversy, and, therefore, we need not be long in pronouncing our verdict between the parties. In our last number, the evidence, on both sides, was marshalled with impar lality. We have seen the hostile declaration against Great Britain in the demi-official paper of the United States, which, not satisfied with imputing to us crimes that we never committed, proceeds to reason upon the advantages, and disadvantages, of war between the two countries; and closes with the avowal, that war would be favourable to the United States. The next important document, and which should be considered as a further commentary upon the article in the National Intelligencer, relates to the meeting of American citizens, holden under the auspices, and attended by some of the principal civil officers of the United States. In the transactions of that meeting, we discover that the spirit of America, towards this country, broke out with uncommon rancour; and the measures, subsequently adopted by the inhabitants of various towns, had such a tendency to provoke hostilities, that a person, unacquainted with the American character, might have been led to believe that her citizens really wished for war. On the other hand, the mass of evidence in support of the propriety of British conduct is so conclusive, that the English have not found themselves constrained to resort to those violent and indecorous expressions as have marked the behaviour of the Americans. Having truth and justice on their side, our officers had only to wait the final determination of the respective governments, upon a circumstance which they felt themselves justified in adopting. The testimony, then, on the side of the British, consists in the original proclamation of admiral Berkeley, respecting the desertèrs named therein, and the refusal of the American authorities to surrender them into our hands, upon a request to that effect; a refusal afterwards proved, by the account in the Nova Scotia paper, wherein it is stated, that when our officers reclaimed the seamen who had deserted, and who were openly paraded in the streets by the American lieutenant, he answered that Although he knew they were deserters, he could not give them up without orders from his government." The same shuffling kind of equivocation was observed by the government of the United States; for when our "consul remonstrated to the chief magistrate, at Norfolk, the latter refused positively to interfere in the transaction; and when this fact was officially communicated to the president and secretary of state, by our minister at Washington, their answers were "That having entered the American service, and claimed its protection, they were to be considered as citizens, and, therefore, could not be given up." These applications were frequently renewed, and always experienced the same answer; more especially in the case of the deserters who had entered on board the Chesapeak; for it appears, by the sworn testimony of lord James Townsend, and several other officers, that all the mild and amicable measures to which they had resorted, in their various applications for the recovery of the deserters, were either treated with levity, by the American constituted authorities, or evaded by the lowest arts of subterfuge. Nay, capt. Douglas, of his majesty's ship Bellona, positively swears, upon Ratford's trial, that when he made application for the deserters from the Chichester, they were not given up, and that the answer was," If any deserters from the English service have entered into the American service, they have been sent, with a detachment, into the country." Lastly, our body of evidence is sustained and closed by the facts which came out upon Jenkin Ratford's trial, especially by the admission of the delinquent himself. Thus, therefore, as far as human evidence can establish the truth of any proposition, it is most certain, that the following may be considered as unequivocal facts. First, that the course pursued by the British commanders, in order to reclaim their deserters, was orderly, legal, and respectful, towards the power to which they appealed. Second, that notwithstanding the most shameful fṛavids, on the part of the Americans, even under the eyes of our commanders, no steps were taken by the latter that might give the least offence to the

VOL. III. —No. 18.

government of the former. Third, that the American authorities countenanced and encouraged our seamen to desert, and then, when we reclaimed them, they did not hesitate to recur to their old concurrent falsehood-that the men were marched up the country, with a detachment; although our officers pledged themselves to point them out at the rendezvous. Fourth, that the act of enticing our men from our service, and of inducing them to change their names, in order that they may receive American protection, is an act of public fraud, which no government can justify upon any principle of neutrality, and the general laws of nations; and this misconduct, this legitamated perjury, is now ascertained to have been carried on upon a very comprehensive system; so that our men were seduced from our service by wholesale, and the communication between our ships of war, and the American shore, has become of such a pernicious nature, that no ship's boat can be trusted to bring on board the necessary refreshments. Lastly, that unless we enter into some definitive convention, which may tend to bridle the Americans, and to ascertain the limits, beyond which neither of the parties is to be allowed to go with impunity, we must not cherish any hope that there will be any termination of our disputes with America. A system of bickering and ill-will will supplant every social principle, and we shall at length discover, when, perhaps, it may be too late to retrieve our error, that concessions have only given birth to fresh demands, and to fresh concessions; that we have suffered our maritime power to be bullied by a vapouring race, whose commercial existence depends upon the sensibility of our nerves, or the timidity of our rulers. Our seamen will continue to augment the populousness of the American shipping; our commerce will be made essentially dependent upon American good faith; and what security shall we hold, in case we reclaim future deserters, that an American president, or secretary of state, may not tell us, that "Having entered into the American service, and claimed its protection, our deseriers are to be considered as American citizens, and, therefore, will not be given up?" Unless this doctrine of Mr. Jefferson be rescinded, and declared to be contrary to public faith, I see no good which can be attained by negociation; for the United States might as well justify the appropriation of any of our ships of war, which their mutinous crews might place under their protection, as to defend, upon this principle, the right of desertion, on the part of our men, and the correspondent duty of the American government to protect them as her own citizens.

The proclamation, which was inserted in our last number, for recalling and prohibiting seamen from serving foreign princes and states, has been considered as the first declaration of the British government relative to the question at issue with America; and, accordingly, it has been attacked with uncommon asperity, as a proof of the want of vigour and firmness in the ministry-Certainly, this is a very unfair and unfounded: insinuation; for, until the publication of the proclamation, the ministry had not disclosed, publicly, a single syllable of their sentiments. With what propriety, therefore, can they be accused of a departure from principles, which their accusers uniformly admitted they had not determined upon? The fact is, the subject of the dispute arose before the present ministry were in power; consequently they had to meet it according to their best conceptions of its exigency, combined with other collateral relations. Until the proclamation appeared, I could never obtain any knowledge of the opinions of the present administration, nor has there appeared the least ground whatever, for drawing any inference from their conduct, either favourable or unfavourable, to the conduct of our commanders. It is unjust, therefore, to say, that our ministry have relaxed, have changed their tone, or are disposed to put off the evil day by temporary expedients. The proclamation I consider to be the only expression which has been yet made of their sentiments; and, as such, I cannot avoid regretting that it does not go to the extent of preventing the evil of desertion; and that, as far as I comprehend it, (for it is somewhat obscure) if it be the basis upon which our relations are intended to rest in future with America, it will be too weak to produce any lasting good, or security to Great Britain. By a tortuous policy, by arts no less mean than flagitious, the Americans may swindle us out of a great portion of our commerce; but it does not, therefore, follow, that this gives them a title to thieve our men, in order to render themselves daily more insolent and unjust. The grand consideration, at this time is, how are we to prevent our seamen from being kidnapped by the Americans? And how are we to recover them forthwith, upon proper application made to the pub

lic authorities? Not a word of this appears in the proclamation; and, as far as I can penetrate into its meaning, we stand now precisely where we were before. I am confident the ministry will not sacrifice one inch of our interests, otherwise I should expatiate more upon the subject; but we shall soon see the result, and be able to form a perfect judgment upon it. In the mean while, I have laid before my readers all the documents which have been exhibited on both sides of the question; and though I stated, in my last number, that our limits would not admit of the insertion of Ratford's trial, yet, upon more mature consideration, I have inserted it here, because it is a very important fact, in the course of which, still more important facts have been elicited; and because it will, hereafter, serve as a voucher, when I may have to review, historically, the causes of those complaints, criminations, and recriminations, which have passed between Great Britain and the United States of America, since the close of the year 1784.

POLITICAL LITERATURE.

The Crisis, by the author of Plain Facts; or a Review of the Conduct of the late Ministers.

The author of this well-written and spirited pamphlet, has justly imputed the present deplorable state of the continent to the fatal jealousies which predominate in the cabinets of Europe against each other; and to the adventurous system almost bordering upon insanity, which Buonaparte has, in consequence, put in force, in order to subdue them in succession. Soon after the commencement of the present Review, I pointed out the various causes which had contributed to perpetuate this mutual jea lousy between the houses of Austria and Brandenburg, and I remarked that, if the court of Berlin did not set the example of public spirit, and intervene to save Austria from ruin, previous to the fatal battle of Austerlitz, it must not be surprized, should the funeral rites of the Germanic empire be celebrated at Berlin. This prediction has been verified; and those who wish to become more thoroughly acquainted with the motives of this ruinous, subsisting jealousy, will find them amply detailed in Mr. Genty's book, "On the State of Europe." Much of the evil which has sprung from this short-sighted patriotism, may be more properly ascribed to the tergiversa tions of Prussia, than to the supine indifference of Austria, to the public cause. I agree, therefore, with the writer of the pamphlet now under our review, that, " If the Russians and Prussians were of themselves sufficient to arrest Buonaparte's pro gress, and even to contend with him for victory in the field; if, in their numerous contests, each party claimed, with equal pretension, the ascendancy; if Buonaparte, instead of fulfilling his gasconading promises, was reduced to the miserable expedient of subterfuge and falsehood, in order to suppress the truth of events, and to keep down the spirit of insurrection, which was every day threatening to break out in the north of Germany; it is very evident, that the accession of the military strength of Austria to that of the allied army, would have insured his total discomfiture." But I cannot agree with him when he states, that Austria bore a more rooted antipathy te Prussia than to France; and in obedience to his malignant passion, generated in distant times, but which actual circumstances might have moderated, she secretly rejoiced at the total abasement with which Prussia was menaced. The subjugation of Prussia was an event so palatable to her feelings, that she preferred incurring, in her turn, the risk of a similar fate, to any interposition, which, by the reinstatement of the house of Brandenburg, would not only have secured her own future independence, but might have recovered for her whatever has been severed from her empire, in all the disastrous wars which she has waged in the course of the last fifty years. Reduced and humbled as Prussia was, and suing on all sides for aid, Austria might have negociated on her own terms. She might, by the expulsion of Buonaparte, from the old German empire, have restored the Germanic constitution, and for ever have consolidated her ascendancy and her fame. p. 9, ¡1.

This is placing Austria in a condition which her present power would not have qualified her to have filled. Since the peace of Presburgh, Austria has never been in a situation to negociate on her own terms, much more to have expelled Buonaparte from the empire, and to have restored that constitution, which the emperor Francis, by his own edict, declared himself no longer able to keep together. The intervention of Austria might, in one particular period of the campaign, have turned the fortune

of the war in favour of the allies; but I think it is saying too much to assert, that by such an intervention, Austria could have negociated on her own terms. With this single exception, I must, however, acknowledge the general merits and sound reasoning, contained in this excellent pamphlet; and my readers will agree with me, in opinion, that the author has brought the charge of remissness home to our late administration, with much greater success and justice than against the Austrians. After remarking upon the degenerated state of the continent, he proceeds to consider the abstemious policy adopted by the late ministers, while they were in power. "For several years past," says he," but more particularly since Buonaparte's unqualified usurpation, we have conducted the war on principles most palpably erroneous; and that force which, concentrated, might have been efficiently employed, has been either frittered away in the inanity of colonial expeditions, or has been cooped up in places, which, from their position, have deprived it of all possibility of active operation. But if this obvious mistake has been long persisted in, at no period was it pushed to such an extent, nor has it been productive of such mischievous consequences, as during the rule of the late administration. If ever there was a moment pregnant with important events; if ever there was a crisis on which the destiny of empires balanced, it occurred whilst they were entrusted with the direction of public affairs. Instead, however, of giving proofs of that enlightened judgment which can alone wisely plan, or vigorously execute, the whole of their time which was not engaged in occupations that personally concerned them, was consumed in arrangements of domestic policy, which, without inconvenience, might have been deferred, or in preparing and dispatching armaments which it would have been infinitely more judicious altogether to have omitted. Of what consequence was it, whether we possessed a fortress or a few miles of domain on the coast of South America; or whether we occupied Egypt with five thousand men; or whether we bombarded Constantinople with seven sail of the line? Our grand enemy was Buonaparte: our grand object was to rescue the continent from the grasp of his domination. Had we kept our troops collected in some convenient position at home, with an ample provision of transports ready to receive them at the moment their services were wanted, so as to have enabled us, a few weeks before, or even after the battle of Eylau, to land forty or fifty thousand men in the rear of the allied armies, is there a militarycharacter in Europe, who will estimate at so low a rate the value of such a detachment of British soldiers, as to maintain, that Buonaparte would not have been exposed to the risk of total destruction. This body of men occupying the left wing of the French army, and being more than its match, would have enabled general Benigsen, by contracting his lines, to strengthen his centre and his left wing, and, by such a movement, to out-flank the centre and right wing of his antagonist. Thus assisted, Dantzick would have been speedily relieved, and Buonaparte once overpowered in the field, harassed and pressed on every side, would, in his retreat, have been assailed by such a host of additional foes, that had he effected his personal safety, which would have been very doubtful, he would have been so reduced in strength, and so blemished in reputation, that he never again could have become a formidable foe. Nor would the destruction of his army, had it been accomplished, have been the greatest benefit which Europe would have derived from such an event. What would have been of far greater consequence, that magic spell, which has, for so great a length of time, obscured and enchained all the faculties of human action, would have been at once dissolved, and human affairs, after such tedious and distant deviations from their regular course, would have reverted to their former channels. All the false splendour which encircles Buonaparte's character, would have instantly vanished, and he would have appeared in his native baseness; as abject in adversity, as in prosperity he has been haughty, cruel, and unjust. The satellites who have revolved with him in his rapid and destructive orbit, would, with their primary planet, have disappeared; and those who are now occupying thrones and principalities, would have returned to the humble avocations, for which they are, by birth and edu cation, and manners, best fitted."

These reflections are as striking as they are just; and the author has fully estab lished their truth, by a train of melancholy facts, which carry irresistible conviction with them.